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Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-92-004

CONTENTS

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CIS/RUSSIAN MILITARY ISSUES

CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Current Problems in GRU Considered [A. Koval, B. Petrov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 Dec 91]	1
Acceleration of Army Collapse Viewed [A. Slobozhanyuk; SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 7 Jan 92]	5
Agreement on General Purpose Forces Oath [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 92]	6
Desertion, Low Morale in Army Unit Viewed [A. Dolinin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Jan 92]	7
Three Commentaries on All-Army Officers' Conference	8
Politicians, Not Military, Should Decide Future [Yu. Orlik; IZVESTIYA, 21 Jan 92]	8
Lessons of Gulf War Combat Cause Concern in Army [V. Litovkin; IZVESTIYA, 21 Jan 92]	9
'Yugoslav Variant' Considered [A. Ostalskiy; IZVESTIYA, 20 Jan 92]	9
Moscow Distributors Stop Selling KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Kiosks [V. Leonidov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Jan 92]	10
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Becomes Unavailable in Moscow [V. Vorobyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	11
KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Sale at Old Price Till 1 Feb [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	11

CIS: POLICY

Commonwealth Officials On Military Issues [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Dec 91]	12
CIS Leaders Discuss Military Questions [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 92]	12
Vladivostok Open As Of January First [V. Shirokov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Dec 91]	13
Republic Positions on CIS Defense Agreement [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Jan 92]	13
Soldiers' Groups Address Military Collapse	14
Air Force Unit Addresses Army, Navy [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jan 92]	14
Turkistan Officers on Status of Military [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jan 92]	14
Georgia Troops on Service Conditions [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jan 92]	14
Address to Officers' Assembly [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 Jan 92]	15
Formation of New Armed Forces Viewed [Yu M. Sinkov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 14 Jan 92]	15
Speculation on Political Utility of a Russian Army [V. Portnikov; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 16 Jan 92]	17
Leaders Said to Discuss Russian Jurisdiction over Military [P. Felgengauer; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 18 Jan 92]	17
Efforts to Maintain Unified Army Viewed [P. Felgengauer; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 21 Jan 92]	18
Russia Prepares Draft on Military Doctrine [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 23 Jan 92]	20
Threat of Military Coup Frightens West [A. Goltz; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	20

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Agreement on Strategic Forces Oath [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 92]	21
Estonian MP: Nuclear Arms at Tartu Air Base [Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET, 21 Jan 92]	21
Kiev Military District Weapon Withdrawal [A. Koryakin; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 28 Jan 92]	23

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Officers Fail to Receive Trip Compensation [A. Tolmachev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	24
Bandits Attack Murmansk Military Depot [A. Ivanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	25
Chechen Republic Air Units Formed [A. Aleshkin; ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 23 Jan 92]	25
Attack on Nakhichevan PVO Site [A. Ivanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	25
CINC Deynekin Attacked On Mi-8 Investigation [I. Burbyga; IZVESTIYA, 28 Dec 91]	28

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Navy Attacks Kobets Reform [SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, 28 Dec 91]	29
Russians Protest Ukrainian Claim on Fleet [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 4 Jan 92]	32
Ukraine Naval Claims Rebuked [B. Maryukha; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Jan 92]	32
Northern Fleet Telegrams Yeltsin on Black Sea Fleet Controversy [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Jan 92]	33
Obituary: Admiral Kuzmin, Military Academy Chief [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 Jan 92]	33
Division of Caspian Fleet Possible [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 15 Jan 92]	34
New Naval Flag Noted [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 18 Jan 92]	34
Cruiser Varyag Construction Said to be Halted [SELSKAYA ZHIZN, 31 Jan 92]	34

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rear Services Chief Fuzhenko Interviewed [Col-Gen I. Fuzhenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 23 Jan 92]	34
Housing Committee Official on Work, Situation [Yu.N. Soldatenkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Dec 91]	36
Moscow To Address Military Housing Question [A. Oliynik and V. Guryanov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 Dec 91]	38
Housing Problem of Returning Troops Viewed [N. Ivanyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 17 Jan 92]	38
'Homeless Officer's' Troubles Chronicled [O. Pavlyuk; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	40
Official On Food Supplies to Military [N. Kozlov; PRAVDA, 16 Jan 92]	41
Baltiysk Garrison Protests Food Prices [V. Gromak; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	42
Ukraine Claims Military Medical Facilities [Ye. Agapova; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Jan 92]	42
Centrally Subordinate Units Face Difficulties [O. Bedula; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	43
Border Guard's Family Denied Benefits [A. Veklich; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 24 Jan 92]	45

STATE AND LOCAL MILITARY FORCES

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Officer Asks: Does Russia Need Us? [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 Jan 92]	46
Declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh Units [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 17 Jan 92]	46
Russia, Estonia Agree on Talks [V. Urban; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	47

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Military Conference Speech [L. Kravchuk; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 11 Jan 92]	47
Defense Chiefs Antonov, Morozov on Budget, Fleet [V. Antonov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 15 Jan 92]	50
Morozov on Oath Controversy [V. Smaga; NEZAVISIMOST, 10 Jan 92]	52
Morozov Press Conference on Fleet [K.P. Morozov and V.V. Durdinets; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 9 Jan 92]	53
Morozov on Servicemen's Rights [Col-Gen K. P. Morozov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 9 Jan 92]	55
Ukraine Defense Personnel Chief Interview [I. Khaletskiy; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 14 Jan 92]	57
Lt-Gen Sharikov on Lagging Military Reform [B. Sharikov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 14 Jan 92]	58
Text of Military Oath [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 4 Jan 92]	59
300,000 Take Ukraine Pledge [IZVESTIYA, 24 Jan 92]	60
Air Defense Demands Guarantees Before Oath [NEZAVISIMOST, 10 Jan 92]	60
Ukraine Decree on Military Oath [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 4 Jan 92]	60
Units Take Ukraine Oath [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 15 Jan 92]	61
Carpathian MD Units Take Ukraine Oath [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 24 Jan 92]	62
Ukraine Law on Soldiers Rights Viewed [NEZAVISIMOST, 10 Jan 92]	62
Law on Armed Forces of Ukraine [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 4 Jan 92]	63
Discussion of Proposed Law on Military Service [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 11 Dec 92]	64
Ukraine Military Posts Designated [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 3 Jan 92]	66
Ukraine Military Appointments [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 4 Jan 92]	66
Ukraine Representative on Military [S. Knyazkov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 10 Jan 92]	67

Possibility of Ukrainian Loss of Control Over Army [P. Felgengauer; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Jan 92]	67
Referendum Military Vote Viewed [V. Knysh; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 3 Dec 91]	67
Second Congress of Ukrainian Soldiers' Mothers' Congress [G. Klyuchikov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 4 Dec 91]	69
All-Ukraine Military Conference [NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 14 Jan 92]	70
Desertions Up in Ukraine [A. Polyakov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	74
Lvov Officer on 'Homeless' Officers [G. Klyuchikov; NARODNAYA ARMIYA, 13 Dec 91]	74
Ukraine Officers on Housing, Readiness [V. Fomenko; PRAVDA UKRAINY, 14 Jan 92]	75

BELARUS

Belarus Stance on Troop Loyalty Oath [I. Sinyakevich; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 14 Jan 92] ...	77
---	----

BALTIC STATES

Lithuania's Butkevicius on Baltic Region Defense Issues [A. Butkevicius; LIETUVOS AIDAS, 19 Dec 91]	78
--	----

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Efforts to Create Army Viewed [A. Mekhtiyev; NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 16 Jan 92]	81
Poti Crisis Situation Reported [V. Pasyakin; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 25 Jan 92]	82

MOLDOVA

Decree, Law on Carabinieri-Style Militia [NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA, 17 Dec 91]	82
Moldova Adopts Military Doctrine [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 15 Jan 92]	90

GENERAL ISSUES

ARMS TRADE

Foreign Use of PVO Training Range Considered [N. Poroskov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 Jan 92]	91
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CIS/RUSSIA ARMED FORCES

Current Problems in GRU Considered

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[Article by A. Koval and B. Petrov, under the rubric: "Ideas and People": "'It Is Time To Replace the Fish in the Aquarium, But Not the Water or the Newly-Hatched Fish' Problems of Soviet Military Intelligence from the Point of View of Professionals Authorized to Travel Abroad"]

[Text] The abbreviation GRU is not too well known by the public at large either in the USSR or abroad. In any case, it is less well known than the KGB. "Aquarium" is still less well known—there is no comparison whatsoever with the dreary building at Lubyanka. The entire matter is certainly that the USSR Armed Forces General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) has never been involved with internal criminal investigation.

"Aquarium"—this is what the GRU headquarters building on Khoroshevskiy Highway (in Khodynke) is called in the language of the professionals. The main nine-story building was constructed in the "modern style" with walls made entirely of glass—it actually is an "aquarium." Former GRU Colonel Vladimir Rezun (who became the Writer Viktor Suvorov after his flight to the West) asserts that the GRU—is the most powerful and most effective intelligence service in the world. By the way, Viktor Suvorov has remained, despite his treason, a great patriot of his office and, in his nearly autobiographical novels, the GRU seems to be a powerful and omniscient department, sometimes even too powerful and too omniscient. And all these years Viktor Suvorov's texts have been the primary, if not to say the only, source from which the ordinary reader could extract any details whatsoever about the GRU's internal life.

But the times are changing and today NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA is presenting a somewhat different view to its readers on what is occurring in the secret "Aquarium." All the more so since this article was also written by professional intelligence agents who, according to the ancient "GRU" tradition, also used pseudonyms.

TOP SECRET

At the beginning of 1991, Intelligence Agent Colonel S. Krapiva fled with his family and, in the Spring of 1991—Intelligence Agent, Colonel, Rezident, and general's son S. Dvyrnik fled.

On August 10, 1991, our Comrade Sergey Pudín, a GRU intelligence agent and colonel, died, prematurely, in the prime of life. He committed suicide.

The command considers it to be an act of cowardice. We, his colleagues, close friends and comrades, have our own opinion on this score: he committed a courageous act.

We will attempt, within the framework of what is permissible, to slightly open the black curtain of secrecy that tightly shrouds this "super secret" military department. We think that the answers to very many questions will appear, between the lines, in and of themselves while setting it forth.

A LITTLE BIT OF HISTORY

In 1962, Colonel Penkovskiy, a traitor who intensively worked for British Intelligence for a long time, was exposed in the GRU. Through the investigation, his close ties with GRU Chief Colonel-General Serov were established (Penkovskiy carried out personal errands for the General's family). The GRU chief was removed from his post, partially demoted (to major-general) and forced to retire.

In March 1963, General of the Army (1971) and Hero of the Soviet Union (1985) P.I. Ivashutin was appointed to this post. This knowledgeable and professional leader's era of rule coincided for the most part with the Brezhnev period.

One of the most "graphic" events of that time, if you do not consider the next acts of treason, was the enrollment, studies and graduation from the Military Academy of the Soviet Army (a higher educational institution of the GRU) by L.I. Brezhnev's wife's nephew, Captain (then rapidly major, and lieutenant colonel) G.S. Podrobno but we will not dwell on this period. We will point out just one thing: this event was worthy of being entered in THE GUINNESS BOOK OF RECORDS only because, during the entire history of the academy, he was perhaps the first and last student in whose numerous forms the fifth column was correctly (and honestly) completed. The children and relatives of the remaining nomenklatura workers and high-ranking generals from mixed marriages did not, to put it mildly, totally accurately complete this column.

General Secretary Yu.V. Andropov's period of rule (incidentally, an exceptionally honest, principled and just man whom we respected very much) also affected the GRU but was much stricter and more sensitive.

The event of this period that merits attention was the exposure of Traitor (along with others) Major-General Polyakov, who had diligently labored for the CIA for nearly 25 years and sold Soviet military intelligence agents (entire lists) at wholesale and retail.

During the investigation, it was ascertained that (now already former) GRU Personnel Directorate Chief Lieutenant-General S.I. Izotov and GRU Political Department Chief Lieutenant-General G.I. Dolin facilitated Polyakov's advancement in service (including his promotion to the rank of general). Furthermore, it was ascertained that G.I. Dolin had also "groomed" one other traitor—Smetanin. The affair on major bribes had begun. This was perhaps the dirtiest period in the GRU's history.

S.I. Izotov, who did not have a special education and who had come to this post from Staraya Ploshchad [Old Square], took 20th century "gifts" and "swift" [borzyye] bribes: furniture made from red and black wood, video equipment, serving sets (including a set made from pure silver that had been purchased by the CIA and given to Polyakov on his promotion to the rank of major-general), and so on.

It is interesting to note that several dozen boxes of gifts were found during the search of Izotov's house and dacha which he had stored without unwrapping. When they were opened, each of them contained a "congratulatory" card with honeyed text and, naturally, a legible signature so that it would be understood who had sent the gift. This significantly eased the work of the investigators.

Posts (especially to prestigious countries) and early and on-time promotions of military rank (especially generals' rank) were sold. If you want to be a general—pay 25,000 and receive trousers with stripes which a general "from intelligence" can only show off in his office or at home in the kitchen in front of his wife with the doors and window shades tightly closed so that the neighbors did not catch sight of them.

The investigation lasted for a long time. Due to the "partial insanity" of those under investigation (and more accurately—the defendants), the case was successfully closed. They did not receive any punishment whatsoever (other than removal from their posts) and they live and prosper in freedom while receiving a decent pension.

The period of rule of General of the Army P.I. Ivashutin, who headed the GRU for 24 years, ended with this major (Polyakov) and several minor (Smetanin, Filatov) traitors. An entire era! This era was also famous because expensive gifts were presented to each new chief of the General Staff (especially on the anniversary), which had been purchased with GRU field funds and, of course, with hard currency.

Civilian sycophants gave the General Secretary sabers encrusted with precious stones. Military sycophants (they do not lag behind!) gave the minister of defense a custom-made rifle, encrusted no worse than the saber, that was purchased and delivered from abroad (of course, with GRU hard currency).

THE PERESTROYKA YEARS

And then the perestroyka years arrived. 1987 was a memorable year for the GRU since a new chief was named.

History fails to mention whom was struck by this "lucid" thought but Colonel-General V.M. Mikhaylov was designated to the post of GRU chief, a man who not only does not have a special education but not even the slightest notion of strategic military intelligence. He absolutely did not have the experience of foreign work,

did not know a single foreign language, but then he had mastered obscene language to perfection.

Can a man really head a department of which he has a notion only through detective films and novels? It turns out that communists can actually do anything: be ambassadors, consuls, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], KGB, or MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] ministers, ministers of agriculture, etc. The only thing that they cannot lead is a putsch, they are weak in that area.

It has long been known that incompetence in both intelligence, agriculture, or in machine building (yes in any sector) is more horrible than sabotage. Because sabotage is primarily local and incompetence is global.

The unexpected appointment of General Mikhaylov struck not only GRU officers, but all of the world's intelligence agents, like thunder in a clear sky. Different variations are played out on a computer when the CIA predicts possible candidates to head the GRU. So, when General Mikhaylov's name was entered, the computer simply dumped and, when the lowest probability coefficients were used in the calculations, it provided an answer: a one with thirty zeros ahead of it.

In due time, having become minister of defense, Dmitry Yazov issued an order to change the wear of the uniform which consisted of moving the stars on the shoulder boards and the emblems on the lapels 15 millimeters! His student, or rather Mikhaylov, having assumed the post of GRU chief, also issued an order: for all military intelligence agents to have a uniform made, to bring it to work, and to put it on upon arrival on GRU territory in the morning and to wear it. At the end of the workday, change into civilian clothes and go home. And if it was necessary to go outside the GRU gates 5-8 times a day, then do this "striptease" that many times.

The elderly general was not interested in the specific nature of the work, the working conditions, or in officer assignments. It did not matter that at times 6-8 people work in a 12-meter (12 square meter) room or that the elementary conditions did not exist. The odor of sweat and Army boots was like balsam for the general's spirit. All of this probably reminded him of his native barracks and it is possible that he suffered from nostalgia for that barracks just like an intelligence agent abroad suffers from nostalgia for his homeland (the stupidity of this order was so obvious that it was rescinded two years later).

Well, let us move on! The fact is that neither a conference nor a totally dirty army floor mat has anything in common with intelligence. Obviously it was simpler and easier for the GRU chief to socialize with his subordinates in his native language which it was (certainly) easier for him to understand.

HOW THEY "MAKE" AGENTS

But all of this was still tolerable. Subordinates attentively followed the new GRU leader and studied him. At that

moment, he was an "intelligence target" for them and "being studied." But when the general of the army began to look for the state of Cote D'Ivoire [Ivory Coast] in Southeast Asia, and to confuse the Ayatollah Khomeini with Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and the latter with Emperor Haile Selassie, he signed his own death sentence. The directorate chiefs began to falsify documents, fulfilling and over-fulfilling agent recruitment plans and, ultimately, plans to squander hard currency that is so needed in our time of hunger for the country and the people.

If you carefully analyze the accounts of just one GRU directorate and derive average indices, it will turn out that the entire world has been entangled by agent networks and there is not a dot of land on the planet where we do not have agents. Neither the deputy GRU chiefs nor he himself even noted the disparity between the "enormous agent network abroad" and the quantity of secret documents obtained.

During the next summary of results, the first deputy GRU chief noted with regret that of 100 percent of the documents obtained, 97 percent were from open sources: books, brochures, newspapers, magazines, etc., 2.7 percent were documents stamped "for official use only," and only 0.3 percent were documents stamped "secret." The impression is being created that the intelligence networks consists of 90 percent dead souls.

Somehow or other the inflated indices are increasing—"progress"! The CIA is carefully observing the increase of this soap bubble which will burst at a critical moment just like the myth about Saddam Husayn's "mighty" army burst.

Everyone is satisfied, everyone is progressing in the service, everyone is being promoted in rank (stray stars are falling from the heavens), everyone is receiving medals (primarily, of course, the leadership of the center, and the executors abroad...catch hell). Furthermore, all GRU agents, starting with the clerks and ending with the generals, smoke only Marlboro and Winston cigarettes. What kind of salaries are they making if they permit themselves to "purchase" two or three cartons of cigarettes per month that cost 150-300 rubles per carton!? It is a secret. And the name of this secret is very simple: corruption and bribery! If you open office safes, imported cigarettes, whiskey, jeans, etc. lie right next to secret documents. Where do they come from and why? Have GRU agents been placed on expense accounts at CIA?

And what is all of this for. Relations between the field directorates and the information directorate (the former are collection organs, the latter is an evaluating organ) always were, putting it mildly, "delicate." If they need to increase the foreign staff work efficiency indices that have been taken from the ceiling, the generals quickly agree among themselves and the field officer carries the "acquired document" or the "model of military equipment" with an attachment (whiskey, cigarettes, etc.). In

minutes, the ordinary article from an open-source magazine or newspaper is transformed before your very eyes into a document of "special importance" and a stump of a water pipe is turned into a model of the "latest weaponry."

The process of summing up results at the end of the year merits special attention, more precisely, not the process itself, but the preparation for it.

Having lost any shame or conscience, the directorate chiefs (generals!) issue the order to whom and how many "agents" to make immediately. In an hour, enrollment documents for the "agent network" are prepared. A certain Smith Wesson is already our "agent" in a European country and Charles Darwin—in Africa!

The most horrible thing consists of the fact that all of this is being done openly, as if it goes without saying. In intelligence agent jargon, this is called "making an agent."

But this is followed by the distribution of certificates of appreciation, awards, early promotions, etc. Mikhaylov receives the rank of general of the army, his first deputy—vice admiral, another first deputy—the rank of colonel-general and, the chief of the 4th directorate—the rank of lieutenant-general! And, as a result, everyone smokes Marlboro's and Winston's!

THE SECRECY GAME ARMY-STYLE

It is no secret for anyone right now that, while taking advantage of the GRU chief's incompetence, the "triumvirate" has taken practical power into its hands. They are Military-Political Department Chief (now already former) Lieutenant-General V.I. Prokhorov, First Deputy GRU Chief Vice Admiral of the Shore Service I.A. Bardeyev, and Personnel Directorate Chief Major-General V.A. Ivanov.

This troyka rotates the chairmanship, in turn, of the foreign travel approval commission. Quite a lot is known about the work of the foreign travel approval commission. Of late, the GRU is a sieve. The information leak moves especially actively from the personnel department. They do not manage to summon an officer and to offer him a variation of a duty assignment and already all of the GRU knows who, where, for how long, and in what capacity he is being assigned. Who stands behind whom, who is pushing whom, whose man this is, and when and who will submit him to the foreign travel approval commission.

Everything depends on the smallest clerk in personnel. His task consists of preparing all required documents for the foreign travel approval commission and calculating everything so that an officer who is being submitted by the political department chief ends up before the foreign travel approval commission on precisely that day and hour when the political department chief is the chairman, and the personnel directorate chief's man or

the first deputy's man when they are chairman, respectively. If the commission chairman has spoken "for," then the "approval" of the commission members is guaranteed.

But it is too bad for that officer who ends up there not according to that strictly calculated list. The first deputy "slashes" the political department chief's people and vice versa. The personnel directorate chief rushes about in a panic not knowing "who is who" and "slashes" indiscriminately. Well actually "when the bosses fight, the hired hands suffer."

Both lieutenants and balding, gray-haired colonels surrender in droves and tremble while appearing before the commission. But will this troyka suddenly make them not authorized for foreign travel? The triumvirate has unlimited power over the officers. At times, the foreign travel approval commission makes an intelligence agent not authorized for foreign travel without an explanation. At best, they cite the KGB: they are against it, they say. How much dirt, how many despicable and vile acts, and selfish interests are covered in the GRU with reference to the KGB! Including both personal revenge and a fight for a post. Suffice it to say that if the leader of a GRU staff abroad poorly met and escorted (if he was inadequately kind or did not give a gift) representatives of the center ("inspectors"), this leader is simply summoned home early from his assignment, allegedly "at the KGB's request." Try to verify whether this actually occurred! Generals really love foreign inspection trips, especially the chief of the 4th directorate.

God forbid that a field officer begins to shine a bit, he will suddenly become not authorized for foreign travel. The wording is brutal: "In the interests of secrecy and security." And the fact that undercover posts in departments abroad have not been changed for 30-40 years, despite dozens of traitors and defectors, is normal.

But secrecy and security is not for the elite. Look at the personal case of former GRU Personnel Directorate Chief Vice Admiral of the Shore Service K.G. Lemzenko. On his first foreign assignment, he was a civilian under the cover of a "civilian department abroad." After his return, he became a Party apparatchik and worked at Staraya Ploshchad and rapidly rose in rank. Then they sent him on an assignment as a military attache (he wanted stripes on his trousers!). He returned after this assignment to the post of GRU personnel directorate deputy chief and, after the arrest of the GRU personnel chief (Lieutenant-General S.I. Izotov), he took that post.

And then they sent the 60 year-old vice admiral of the shore service with the post of GRU personnel directorate chief, the possessor of super-secret information, especially on foreign intelligence cadres, on a lengthy duty assignment abroad. Not only do nine traitors and non-returnees but all of the world's intelligence agents know him to be a GRU agent! And nevertheless he turned out to be authorized for foreign travel. What did they want

to do, send him abroad at full salary before retirement? They made all of the GRU his hostage! He is among those individuals who possess very important information. Such persons are generally not authorized for travel abroad.

Several weeks ago, exposed and re-exposed Colonel Igor Sokolov was sent on a lengthy duty assignment abroad. He received a reprimand for his subordinate who fled—Colonel Krapiva (incidentally, the reprimand has still not been removed). Maybe, they tasked him to "find and return" the Traitor Krapiva to the homeland? But then why is he "looking for" him at the opposite end of the earth?

For some officers, the order to serve in each post for no less than two years is always in force. Others, who do not have any accomplishments in intelligence other than enrolling dead people and registrations, take rapid strides forward up the service ladder during that period of time.

Children and relatives of high-ranking military bureaucrats and Partocrats, as a rule, are sent on lengthy assignments to GRU posts, but without a task or only with the assignment of information tasks associated with processing the open press.

Lately the GRU has begun to use a "new method" for testing the dedication of those intelligence agents leaving to go abroad—the "eyeball test." It consists of bringing the intelligence agent to the GRU chief so that he can look the intelligence agent in the eye before the agent departs on a lengthy assignment abroad.

By the way, the situation is really desperate: in the atmosphere that reigns at the GRU, some intelligence agents do not see the sense of working any more. Is that not why the number of defectors is increasing catastrophically? Not only field officers but residents are defecting! The thought instinctively arises: maybe the intelligence agents are not fleeing from the homeland but from those who are ruling them?

As for the numerous commissions created after each betrayal, they consist of their own GRU agents and they are designated by the GRU leadership that is primarily interested in its own welfare. Today you are going to inspect my directorate at the commission and tomorrow I will inspect your directorate. But, as we all know, "ravens do not pick out each others eyes." Consequently, it is useless to expect an objective assessment of the situation from this commission.

Well, where is military counterintelligence looking?—the perplexed reader asks. Well, nowhere. Military counterintelligence's men and equipment are so insignificant that it is simply powerless. But is it not paradoxical that the main thing is that military counterintelligence is subordinate to the chairman of the KGB and is structurally part of the KGB, being its 3rd directorate. But recent events have shown who headed the KGB. It is possible

that military counterintelligence also operated according to the principle "the worse, the better."

In this article, we barely touched the GRU, yes and only the visible portion of the iceberg, and we will be silent for now on the unseen and underwater part. The professionals at Lefortovo can touch on many more aspects of the GRU's activities. Really, there even generals sob, as the case of Lieutenant-Generals S.I. Izotov and G.I. Dolin has demonstrated.

And military counterintelligence will forgive us for having intruded into the sphere of its activities. God knows that we are not enemies of our homeland or of our own people. We have not revealed military secrets and we have not violated our oath. We are not so cowardly and we do not intend to flee abroad. They did not choose either their Homeland or their parents. The path of betrayal is the easiest way out of this situation. This path is not for us. We love our homeland and we are not ashamed of our patriotic feelings and therefore we will follow another path. We will fight for the purity of the ranks of intelligence agents here, on our native soil.

Acceleration of Army Collapse Viewed

92UM0320A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
7 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by SELSKAYA ZHIZN military commentator A. Slobozhanyuk in the "Political Diary" column: "Soldier, To Whom Are You Swearing Allegiance?"]

[Text] Quite recently, Western military analysts who predicted the unavoidable division of the Soviet Armed Forces among sovereign republics believed that this complicated process would last approximately two years. They proceeded from the fact that in each of the 12 states there are soldiers and officers drafted from all the former Union republics who are performing their military duty outside their own territories. It is impossible to undo this tangle and disperse to ethnic barracks right away. In addition, it is cheaper for military outlays to be funded by the center; the military infrastructure, defense industries, and the training of cadres for the Army are centralized. The control of the air defense system from the center is more effective.

However, just as in years not yet so remote, we may once again proudly say: Gentlemen, you are wrong! They are wasting their dollars, pounds, and other hard currency paying you for such primitive research. However, in all fairness let us note that our domestic specialists who know the problems of the Army inside out, so to say, are overwhelmed by the turn of events involving the Army.

The day before yesterday the oath was administered to the first units of the national guard, formed on the basis of USSR Internal Troops units. By 18 January soldiers, officers, and generals of the Kiev, Carpathian, and

Odessa Military Districts, and subsequently Navy men of the Black Sea Fleet, should swear allegiance to the Ukrainian people.

There is no short answer to the question as to what caused such haste. A couple of weeks ago an interview with Colonel General K. Morozov, minister of defense of Ukraine, was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in conjunction with the issuance of the republic president's orders regulating the creation of the republic's own Armed Forces. Konstantin Petrovich stated unambiguously: The troops billeted in the republic would remain within the previous structures and be subordinated to the USSR minister of defense. The USSR was soon dissolved; there no longer is a Union Ministry of Defense. However, the heads of independent states have come out in favor of a unified military command for the transition period. Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov became commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Several days later, General K. Morozov issued an order to turn off the systems of control and notification of the General Staff. Speaking figuratively, the "privatization" of the Army and Navy in Ukraine has begun without sanction. It is appropriate to cite here two phrases from the aforementioned interview by Morozov: "I would like to stress that we will work at all times with the USSR Ministry of Defense and the General Staff... We are creating a legal foundation for the transition period, and we are acting in a balanced and well thought-out manner."

Overall, a quite alarming situation has developed. Of those serving in Ukraine, 75,000 officers are Russian. There are representatives of all former Union republics in the officer corps. They have been told: If you do not want to take the oath, you should go to other CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries to serve, or be discharged to the reserves. This is an extremely harsh ultimatum, if we take into account the fact that as of now about 200,000 families of servicemen in the former USSR have no housing of their own. This is happening at a time when all of us are taking a step into the merciless abyss of unregulated prices.

The emergency nature of the moment prompted Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov to invite journalists to an urgent press conference on 4 January. The commander in chief told it as it is: The disintegration of the Armed Forces is underway. All decisions are being made on behalf of the people. However, it is hard to imagine that an abrupt weakening of the Army and Navy is in the interests of the people. Yevgeniy Ivanovich queried the heads of the independent states about the reasons for their striving to have their own armies. Preventing the appearance of a new State Committee for the State of Emergency was one reason. However, why is it not possible in our time of troubles for such an organ to appear in an individual republic?

It is visible to the naked eye just how hasty and ill-conceived decisions on military issues are. For example,

Ukraine claims its own Air Force, of course, by "privatizing" the one stationed on its territory. However, there is not a single aviation plant in the republic that is capable of providing spare parts for combat planes. In the opinion of Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, in three months, at best half a year, not a single fighter or bomber will be able to take off. The Black Sea Fleet will also face a number of problems which are frequently insurmountable without help from the center.

The presidents of our new states have repeatedly referred to the integration of the economic mechanism and the perniciousness of severing economic ties. Meanwhile, the bonds of integration are even tighter in the military sphere. It is dangerous, to say nothing of very costly, to cut them rashly.

It appears that the press conference on Saturday gave rise to more questions than it answered. Could it be that a republic national army is indeed more effective and devoid of such flaws of the Soviet Army as hazing, desertions, and so on? There is already some experience in this regard. An overwhelming majority of draftees from Ukraine are allowed to serve in the republic, closer to their native hearths, as parliamentarians have demanded. In what did their concern about the young men result? In Lvov Oblast alone, 1,100 draftees are currently evading service. Some employees of military commissariats do catch up with them. The guys pay 10-ruble fines for failure to show up on summonses, and once again run further away from service.

The situation with hazing is approximately the same. However, this time fellow Ukrainians, rather than the natives of Transcaucasia or Central Asia, taunt young soldiers.

Here is a remarkable repercussion of decisions on the creation of the Ukrainian army: As soon as these decisions were made, Azeris, Kazakhs, and soldiers of other nationalities who do not wish to swear allegiance to someone else's state began to run away from the units.

It is most likely that similar situations will occur in other republics as well: After all, they are characteristic of all armies of the world.

Yesterday I called friends I served with when we were lieutenants in the Far East, who happened to continue service in Ukraine. My question was about the oath.

One of my friends said: "I will take the oath. I am about to get an apartment, the first in 20 years in the service. I will resign as soon as I get housing."

Another friend said: "I am thinking. After all, you know an oath is not given twice."

The third friend reminded me: "Ukraine is my motherland, just as it is yours. I see no ethical contradictions in this instance. However, it seems to me that if the Army disintegrates at this rate a new master might appear in the Kremlin by the end of the year, for example, Saddam Husayn."

My friend is a joker. However, might there not be a grain of truth in his joke. A great power and the best army in the world are collapsing before our eyes.

More reports about the formation of national armies, national guards, and carabinieri troops keep coming from the sovereign states. Air defense companies, border guard barracks, and the assets of naval units and Internal Troops are being "privatized." Last year about 15,000 rifled firearms were stolen from military units. If every weapon is "responsible" for at least one victim, our bitter losses in Afghanistan will be exceeded. God forbid.

By all the signs we have indeed put to shame Western military analysts and their predictions.

May we not sadden ourselves.

Agreement on General Purpose Forces Oath

92UM0393A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jan 92 p 1

["Agreement on the Military Oath for General Purpose Forces"]

[Text] The document notes that the participating states to this agreement, proceeding from the need to create a legal and moral-political basis for military service in the armed forces of citizens of the states participating in the agreement, have agreed on the following:

1. To approve the following as the text of the military oath for military personnel serving in the general purpose forces:

"I (last name, first name, patronymic), upon entering military service, take this oath of loyalty to the people of (name of the state of which the serviceman is a citizen) and swear to reverently execute the Constitution and laws of my state and the Commonwealth state on whose territory I am performing my military duty.

I commit myself to fulfilling implicitly the duties which I am assigned, military regulations, and the orders of commanders and superiors.

If I violate this, my military oath, I am prepared to bear responsibility as established by law."

2. The procedure and timeframe for administering the military oath to servicemen performing duty in the general purpose forces is determined by the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces.

3. This agreement enters into force from the moment of its signing.

Executed 16 January 1992 in the city of Moscow in one copy in the state languages of the participating states to this agreement. The original is maintained in the archives of the Belarus Republic government, which will send a certified copy to each of the states participating in the agreement.

Signing the agreement:

For the Republic of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan.

For the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev.

For the Republic of Kyrgyzstan A. Akayev.

For the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin.

For the Republic of Tajikistan R. Nabiyev.

Desertion, Low Morale in Army Unit Viewed

92UM0348A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 2

[A. Dolinin report: "Life in Two Dimensions"]

[Text] Information has been received in the editorial office about the unfavorable situation in one of the military construction detachments near Moscow. Discipline is poor there, cases of desertion are on the increase, and interethnic relations have deteriorated.

Our correspondent, Major A. Dolinin, visited this unit and met with the recently appointed commander of the military construction detachment. Lieutenant Colonel S. Menshikov discusses the reasons for this situation.

Everything is adequate in the life of our detachment. True, there is more that gives cause for concern. Indeed, it would be surprising if there were not. The construction battalions have long had a name for being plebeian. Our detachment is no exception. In the last quarter alone the military construction workers committed dozens of gross acts and violations of the law. Eleven had criminal charges brought against them during the year. And I am aware that the situation is no better in other detachments. I say this not in justification but because it is a cause for grief.

What are the reasons for this? Is it merely that the officers and warrant officers in the military construction units have a poor mastery of military pedagogics? Well, we do not have any Makarenkos or Sukhomlinskiyes. But we build our attitude toward our subordinates strictly by the book. The trouble is that for certain military construction workers, no laws have been written, as they say.

A recent example. According to the schedule, two military construction workers of Azerbaijani nationality were put on a 24-hour detail. Their reaction to this was: "No way!" I spent a long time trying to convince them that the details were being set fairly... I can foresee that some readers may perceive this as a weakness of command. But let me tell you that measures of coercion against particular construction workers have less effect than convincing them. It seemed that they were convinced. But when the guard was mounted, one of them failed to appear. This was explained by the fact that he had just left the unit.

I am no novice in construction units; I have served for more than 20 years. We could cope with Afghanistan, but these kinds of situations lead us into impasse. I cannot recall that even in our units this kind of thing was done. I remember my service as a lieutenant. When I graduated from school I was appointed deputy company commander. There were about 200 construction workers in the company. They had "a threesome of bold people": the commander, his deputy, and the political deputy. Never mind, we managed. And all because then people were different. They had a sense of responsibility for their service. They felt that they were in the Army, and had been seen off by the entire village. There was a pride in the subunit. There was real competition, the kind that even surprised my father—a retired colonel who had fought at the front. There was no discussion about national affiliation when things had to be done. When they were transferred to the reserves the military construction workers exchanged addresses. Comparing that with today, you would not believe that it was even possible. But should we be surprised? For today, military people as construction workers is mere form. We were not even left with our weapons when the military construction detachments were withdrawn from the makeup of the Armed Forces.

Without in any way trying to shift responsibility away from myself, I would nevertheless say that many of the outrages committed in the military construction detachments are programmed in. How else can we understand why to this day staffing is done on the residual principle? January is almost upon us but we have received no reinforcements according to the grand reckoning. And those who were sent earlier for service have been turned out to be "unsuitable." Can you imagine?! Not one man was fit for service even with the lowered standards. And instances of this are increasing all the time. Just recently about 30 military construction workers were transferred to the reserves for psychological reasons. I am not even mentioning those who are defective. The question that we must ask is this: Why are our people the object of such scorn? Who needs this principle in staffing the military construction units?

And those who do remain with us... In the spring we received reinforcements from the district. They were mainly unsuccessful assault troops, artillery men... They explained that they had been tricked into coming to our unit. It is not surprising that after they had arrived, more than half of them ran off.

In general the fact that people leave and desert from military construction detachments is not new. It started as soon as the republics started to proclaim their sovereignty. The decision to serve or not to serve is often made by the parents of the military construction workers. They travel out to the unit bringing republic newspapers containing ukases from their own presidents, and take their sons home.

There are also many problems with the officers and warrant officers. Young warrant officers do not come to

us because of the lack of housing and the niggardly pay. And experienced people who have some service seniority resign. Taking advantage of the cutbacks, they and the junior officers submit their resignations and depart. The motives have to do with their lives. As a rule their wives are not working because there are no places in the kindergartens for young children. A junior officer cannot sustain a family in these times with the pay he gets. Moreover, he almost never sees his family. From early morning till late at night he is at work. Mr. Plan dictates his own conditions. And even the "responsible people" in the company are leaving. They do nothing but dream about their days off.

There is much cause for grief, much that is contradictory. The prospects give no cause for hope. The only ray of hope was when finally in our view the sensible decision was reached to disband the military construction units that were working on national economic projects and staff them according to their own republics. Our military construction units of the former Ministry of Defense were refashioned as engineering units. But will this decision be complied with? All we can do is believe that it will not become a market, or even a political bedlam. And the people who serve with us will not be forced to do so.

At the very least, no matter what the conditions may be, the military construction workers are building houses. Apart from us, perhaps there is no one who cares about housing for servicemen. I would just like this noble task to be resolved in a dignified manner, not at whatever the cost.

Three Commentaries on All-Army Officers' Conference

Politicians, Not Military, Should Decide Future

92UM0411A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Yuriy Orlik: "Maneuvers Around Very Armed Forces"]

[Text] Society had been waiting for the officers' conference with a certain anxiety. There was even talk about the danger of a military coup and the possibility of the Army seizing power. After August, all of us are inclined to consider the worst. Thank God, it turned out all right, however. Commander in Chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov stated that he would never allow "anyone to be dethroned or elevated to the throne with the help of bayonets."

But does everyone in the Army and society share the marshal of the Air Force's views?

It is hard to live and serve these days. It came through more than once from the conference podium that the current condition of the Armed Forces is the direct result of the disintegration of the former Union. I think that the crisis the Army is living through today has a different starting point. Why not recall the unforgivable delays in

the military reform, although the need for it was obvious several years ago. But the Army, its generals, and upper-rank political officers all rose up against reform. Together with the military-industrial complex that serves it, the Army continued to consume the lion's share of the budget. The reasonable sufficiency doctrine had almost no effect on military appropriations; demilitarization of the economy is causing discontent and resistance. Neither should one discount the use of military force in Tbilisi, Sumgait, and Vilnius. Of course, the politicians are the primary culprits in this, but is the Army itself totally spotless?

It is a pity that the officers' conference overlooked these facts. Just like it left practically unregarded the creation of national armies. (In any case, we did not hear from their representatives at the conference.) The point here is not the political ambitions of the leaders. There is no independent state without its own armed forces. They can be formed only by dividing the common military inheritance. This is an extremely difficult undertaking. The politicians are facing a task that is more difficult than the one Hercules had to face—they have to untangle, rather than cut, the Gordian knot of tightly intertwined problems and human lives. The issue is how to separate without hurt and confrontation, and in what timeframe.

It is not the military itself, not the Army, that has to decide what it is to be—the politicians are the ones to do this. I want to emphasize this especially. Because when the Army proclaims its unwillingness to be "an obedient instrument of politics," it can only mean that it is claiming the role of an independent political force. Such feelings are quite widespread both inside and outside military circles.

The heightened interest shown toward the Army by national-patriots, right-wing politicians, and professional communists is not accidental either. Advocating the one and indivisible army, they are in reality advocating the one and indivisible Union. To its credit, the conference booed one such advocate, Ampilov, from the podium. But others did make it there, introducing themselves as if throwing out a challenge: I, major such-and-such of the Soviet Army, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics...

Even when the delegates were talking about the unified armed forces of the Commonwealth, I could not shake the feeling that by this they meant the USSR. The CIS ((Commonwealth of Independent States)) for them is only the new name for the Union. Temporary. Just give us time...

Then what? What will follow?

On the very eve of the officers' conference, the plan of action was proposed by PRAVDA (No. 13). In order not to lose the last defender of the Union—the Army—the editor in chief recommends "suspending the destructive... activities of the parliaments, announcing elections into the popular Assembly from all (!) former Union

republics... and electing to the assembly not just anyone but only advocates of the state..."

Well, we already have enough state advocates. From General Makashov to writer Prokhanov. All that is missing is sailor Zheleznyak. Although the guard is dead tired, one wants to believe that the Army will not for the second time send a sailor engirdled in submachine gun cartridge belts to disperse the democratically elected authorities.

Lessons of Gulf War Combat Cause Concern in Army

92UM0411B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
21 Jan 92 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Viktor Litovkin: "Army Professionals Cannot Rid Themselves of Anxiety"]

[Text] Last week two seemingly disparate events that are nevertheless tied together by a profound and immediate inner connection attracted public attention. They are the anniversary of the Persian Gulf War and the All-Army Officers' Conference that took place in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses.

If the former passed practically unnoticed in our country, the latter generated a lot of comment. But although nobody said a word in the Kremlin about the Gulf War, it would be extremely superficial and naive to explain the seething rallying passions at the conference only by the military professionals' concern for their social position, by the pain, as official documents said, "being caused by the hasty division of the Army and Navy," and by an unprofessional attitude toward officers' problems on the part of newly baked politicians...

Everything is much deeper and more complex. I think that behind everything that was taking place in the Kremlin was shock, also caused by the coalition forces' brilliant victory, although morally our officers remained on the side of enslaved Kuwait. This shock among the officers has not gone away; on the contrary, it has become stronger. Being professionals, they understand better than anybody else that today our Army is not ready to organize combat on such a high technological level, with such massive use modern combat means.

These thoughts, the feeling of professional powerlessness and disarmedness—perhaps not completely understood and internalized—dominated the words and feelings of the officers in the Kremlin.

I remember Lieutenant A. Podzorov, shy and quiet, a mere boy amidst star-decorated distinguished generals and colonels; he is commander of a mobile launch system, one of those 162 heavy strategic systems that did not fall under the cuts stipulated by the START Treaty.

The lieutenant related amazing facts from the podium: His unit has only 60 percent of its intended complement; almost one half of the new draftees do not speak Russian;

100 percent of the ensigns—launch system driver-mechanics (these are the professionals that have been assumed to become the backbone of the new army)—have transferred to the reserves since they are not happy with either the pay or the living and service environment...

Behind these facts is a state secret that is being carefully concealed from the people—but not from serious analysts: If such an elite military unit is not combat-ready, what can one say about the entire Army?!

Since 1990, the troops have not received a single prototype of new armaments, General Staff representative Major General L. Kozhendayev said from the podium. Add to this the fact that during the last few years the Army, instead of being engaged in its primary business—combat training—spent its efforts on construction, harvesting, and other economic activities not inherent to military professionalism, and it will become clear what is behind the complete loss of self-restraint, dignity, patience, and commanding officer's wisdom displayed by some participants of the Kremlin conference, and why officers are beginning to lose self-respect.

The officers' assembly is not a legislative, government, or command-administrative organ; it is a public one. Its influence on the situation in the Commonwealth—whether we like it or not—is extremely limited. It could only express the state of anxiety and agitation among the officer corps, and the critical situation in the Army, but is hardly capable of influencing it.

The situation with the Army and in the Army is directly related to the situation in the country, the state of its economy and production relations in society. The economic well-being that created such high-technology weapons and combat equipment to a large extent explains the degree the victory of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf War. As long as the economy is in a state of crisis; as long as there is no thought-through and effectively implemented reform, there is practically no hope for a fundamental change for the better in the Armed Forces. The generous promises of the leaders of the Commonwealth states to institute a special program to resolve housing problems are hardly a solution.

'Yugoslav Variant' Considered

92UM0411C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Jan 92 Union Edition p 1

[Article by Andrey Ostalskiy: "The Yugoslav Example Is Contagious"]

[Text] The parallels between the situation in Yugoslavia and that in our country are so obvious that it has already become banal to compare them. Still, the latest events force us again to think about the similarities—and to hope for differences.

Actually, something akin to the "Yugoslav variant" is already being played out on the territory of the former

USSR—for instance, in Georgia or in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Nobody can guarantee that the situation will not develop along the same lines in other regions as well. Still, there is one, decisive, difference: So far, the Army is not participating in the bloody drama in any way, while in Yugoslavia it has long been the main actor.

Nevertheless, on Friday some militant speeches at the Moscow conference of representatives of officers assemblies proved that it is too early to rejoice: This turn of events is still quite possible here.

When officers openly say that "it is time for the Army to stop being an obedient instrument of politicians," and that "the 'Yes, Sir' time is over," there is nothing principally new in it. But everywhere and at all times, when the Army refuses to be "the instrument of politicians," when it takes upon itself an independent political role, the well-being of society becomes endangered. Such interference on the part of the Army, such a role for which it is not designed, has never anywhere resulted in anything good—including for the Army itself.

The most tragic, and most recent, lesson has been provided by Yugoslavia, where the Army, for the sake of preserving the unity of the country (but in reality preserving itself), has plunged the country into civil war.

But, some will say, is it not true that our soldiers live in horrible conditions? That the military no longer has the feeling of elementary confidence in tomorrow; that extremists conduct armed attacks on barracks and military posts; and that the officers remain in a state of constant concern for the life and safety of their loved ones? Of course it is true. Something similar was happening in Yugoslavia on the threshold of the conflict. There the army also found itself under the threat of radical cuts. There, the military also suffered from often undeserved insults. There, the barracks were also being attacked and attempts to seize the arms made. But does it mean that there, in Yugoslavia, it made sense to start a war that could have no winners anyway? The entire Yugoslav lesson tells us that it made sense only for communist (now nationalist) generals, who are trying to turn the army into a self-sufficient force, the tool for saving its privileged position in society. It is true that the postcommunist government of Serbia also played a role in fanning up the internecine strife. And the Croatian nationalists are not entirely innocent, also: Witnesses report monstrous cruelties on both sides. Still, nothing compares with a methodical artillery shelling of urban residential areas. That is why the European Community has placed the main blame for the ongoing tragedy at the feet of the Yugoslav Federal Army.

The truce in former Yugoslavia has already been maintained for 15 days. The war was stopped (nobody believes yet that it is for good) at the price of incredible efforts and purposeful pressure on the part of West European countries. It is possible that concerted recognition of Slovenia and Croatia's independence played a

role: it cooled some hot heads that despite the obvious refused to believe that Yugoslavia—sad as it may be—no longer exists.

There is no more Yugoslavia, and this is very bad from the geopolitical point of view. Established political and economic ties are collapsing; the situation in the Balkans is dangerously destabilized, and the seeds of new conflicts and tensions are being laid now. It is still not clear whether the new independent states that are emerging in place of Yugoslavia will survive, and what role they will play in the life of Europe... All of this is true, but this does not mean that there is justification for the senseless massacre, murder of people, and the destruction of culture and of the very fabric of normal human life in the name of a senseless attempt to resist the inevitable.

Whether the truce will survive depends first and foremost on the army. Here, too, much depends on the position of the "man with the rifle." As the gathering in the Kremlin showed, we have no lesser reason to worry than the Yugoslavs had before those first fateful shots sounded—after which it was much more difficult to stop the war.

Moscow Distributors Stop Selling KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Kiosks

PM2401163492 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 92 p 1

[V. Leonidov report: "Why Is It Impossible To Buy KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Moscow"]

[Text] For several days now there has been no KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Moscow's kiosks. Readers are sounding the alarm: What has happened?

This is what has happened. From 1 January, as readers know, we have had to increase the price of the newspaper to 50 kopeks for a four-page issue and 70 for an eight-page one. One reason for this was the new demands put forward by "Soyuzpechat," which intended to charge us 55 percent of the cost of each issue.

But then price liberalization came along. It has its own, often incomprehensible laws. For instance, it is laid down that the trade surcharge cannot exceed 25 percent. But "Soyuzpechat" still needs the same funds. So the Moscow City "Soyuzpechat" Production Association proposed this solution: Let KRASNAYA ZVEZDA set a price of 1.5-2 rubles per issue.

Have mercy, we pleaded, take pity on us and our readers! For heaven's sake, take more than 25 percent, but don't make us put the price up. No, for some reason there is no other way. One wonders: What kind of liberalization is this, when the seller ("Soyuzpechat") dictates to the producer (the editorial office and publishing house) what price he must set? What bizarre mechanisms are operating here? Do you understand, dear readers, why all the other prices are soaring the way they are?

But that is not all! While we are still thinking about the new terms and not signing a contract, L. Kurilina, deputy chief of the Moscow City "Soyuzpechat" Production Association, has given the order—KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is not to be accepted for sale. But then why are PRAVDA, TRUD, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, and many other publications on sale at the old prices? Why this selective approach? What were the objections to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in particular? What lies behind this—is it a question of personal sympathies and antipathies, or something more serious?

And what are we to do in response to such strong-arm tactics? Picket the Moscow "Soyuzpechat"? Start a public campaign? Summon our readers to rallies?

For the moment, we are simply humbly requesting the esteemed L. Kurilina: Please treat our newspaper the same as the others. We are not asking for any privileges, but let us organize our relations in such a way that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is not put in a special position and our blameless readers do not suffer.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Becomes Unavailable in Moscow

PM2701125592 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jan 92 p 1

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Vorobyev report: "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Arrested in Moscow?"]

[Text] It is hard to believe this claim. But your correspondent heard it from the Soyuzpechat kioskholder near the Domodedovskaya subway station in Moscow. Some people even link it with the All-Army Officers' Assembly meeting.

Of course, it is not actually to do with the All-Army Officers' Assembly, on which KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, like other publications, reported. It is just that kioskholders in the capital were not au fait with events. They had not received the 22 January issue, which explained why it is impossible to buy KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Moscow.

The newspaper did not reach Moscow readers yesterday either, nor even today, perhaps.

It is a paradoxical situation, to be blunt. All the mass media have remained at the same price: PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA now sell at 80 kopeks each, TRUD at 50 kopeks. Even NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA costs less than 1 ruble [R]. But the price for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is to rise to R1.50-R2, by demand of the Moscow Soyuzpechat Production Association! They are not even bothered by the fact that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's main readers are certainly not businessmen ready to pay good money but socially unprotected veterans, pensioners, parents of servicemen, former Afghan veterans, and officers and NCO's who are not exactly known for their high incomes.

Meanwhile, the telephones in the editorial office are red hot: People are incensed and are ringing to demand that they be given an opportunity to tell the Moscow Soyuzpechat officials what they think.

Yeremey Sergeyevich Khromykh, a permanent subscriber of ours, gave an emotional assessment of the situation but also expressed a constructive idea, too—he suggested that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA be distributed personally in batches of 500 copies on terms most favorable to the editorial office and the publishing houses.

Well, we pay tribute to this reader for his readiness to help out and for this suggested method of distribution the newspaper which could be an alternative to the monopoly and diktat of Soyuzpechat's Moscow department. But today we are still awaiting a constructive attitude from its leadership. Let us work together so that the readers' interests do not suffer!

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on Sale at Old Price Till 1 Feb

PM2701162192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jan 92 p 1

[Editorial Commentary: "'Detention Order' On KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Moscow Lifted. But Only Until 1 February"]

[Text] The conflict between KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and the Moscow Soyuzpechat Production Association or, rather, with the association's deputy chief, L. Kurilina, has been resolved, albeit only temporarily. As a result of arduous talks the following compromise has been reached: Soyuzpechat will sell KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at the old price but only until 1 February. Our publishing house will transfer an extra 17,000 rubles [R] to the association.

We consciously agreed to this so that we could at least inform our Moscow readers about what is actually going on. Other readers were able to follow the development of events in the 22 and 24 January issues. But thousands of Muscovites, accustomed to buying KRASNAYA ZVEZDA at news stands, were left wondering all this time: Where has the newspaper gone? There was even a rumor that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA had almost been banned in connection with the recent Officers' Assembly.

To be blunt, we have no reason to give the present confrontation political overtones but the Soyuzpechat staffers' actions are bewildering, to say the least.

The point is (this is meant especially for you, dear Muscovites) that we were quite unexpectedly presented with an ultimatum: Raise the price to R1.5-R2 a copy. On 1 January we raised the price at Soyuzpechat's demand but it is now becoming clear that the subsequent revenue is not enough for that organization. Well, we could have negotiated in the normal way and sought a

compromise. But they immediately resorted to ultimatums and strong-arm methods—and halted the sale of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Moscow.

It was even more striking that we were the only ones to be treated so harshly. All other newspapers are being sold as normal at the same prices. Soyuzpechat is now telling us that it will also have to consider the question of raising the price because, it says, talks are already beginning with PRAVDA... This is an amazing approach: Does it mean that with some they are only just beginning to examine the question whereas with KRASNAYA ZVEZDA they are already applying sanctions?

Of course, we cannot accept that other dailies—KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, TRUD, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, IZVESTIYA, and PRAVDA—are sold at one price and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, which is read by veterans, Afghan veterans, soldiers' parents, and servicemen, is sold at a price higher than that of other commercial publications. The problem can only be resolved in a package because no other publication has been knowingly placed in such a no-win situation.

It is difficult to say how this story will end. Perhaps the strong-arm methods will be used again on 1 February. But, dear readers, let us learn our lesson for the future. What happened this time caught us unawares. Let us now think together what we should do to prevent a repetition.

In the first place, all readers have now been informed about the reasons for the newspaper's disappearance. If it happens in future, you will know to whom to complain.

Among the hundreds of telephone calls received in the past few days there have been various suggestions, even including the organization of a kind of committee for the protection of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers' rights. Well, if there are people interested in creating some sort of readers' coordination center, we are ready to help set this up. We would ask you to ring our contact number, 941-24-40, with your suggestions.

We also await other suggestions, opinions, advice, and support. Let us campaign for our KRASNAYA ZVEZDA together, dear readers!

CIS: POLICY

Commonwealth Officials On Military Issues

92UM0295B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 1

[Unattributed Article, "From an Interview at an Aircraft Boarding Ramp"]

[Text] While responding to questions posed by a TASS correspondent at the Minsk airport, B. Yeltsin said, in particular, that in his opinion the years from 1992 to 1995 should be transitional from the point of view of the formation of Commonwealth armed forces, because "it

is a very large organization—three plus million men—and for no particular reason, to take and disband them all at the same time would be impossible."

Boris Yeltsin confirmed for journalists that the issue of the Black Sea Fleet would also be discussed at today's meeting in Minsk. According to him, the Black Sea Fleet was historically always Russian. "However, it is true, the Ukraine also has a rightful claim to some part of the Black Sea Fleet," added the President. "I think that, having consulted with the Ukraine and other states, we will resolve this issue in such a way, so as not to infringe on one another's interests," he said.

The Ukraine's position on nuclear forces has not changed, Ukraine President Leonid Kravchuk told TASS correspondents. We have our own armed forces, he stressed, but are in favor of common strategic forces. Regarding the issue of the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukraine President remarked that a nonstrategic part of it would belong to the Ukraine. In response to a question posed by a TASS correspondent as to whether difficulties are expected to arise while discussing military issues, he remarked that there would be no complications if regard for national legislations is shown in Minsk.

Military issues will be the most difficult at the meeting in Minsk, stated Marshal of Aviation, Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Unified Armed Forces of member countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States. "But we are not losing hope that the disintegration of the army can be prevented," he said.

Answering a question as to whether changes were being made in the mechanism controlling Strategic Nuclear Forces, the Chief emphasized that decisions on that account were made in Alma-Ata, and that no changes were foreseen. He cautioned the press against supercharging the situation surrounding the issue. In particular, he decisively refuted the claim made by the Russian television program "Vesti" that 7,000 rounds of nuclear armament were located in Tajikistan and Zakavkaz [Caucasus region]. "That is nonsense," stated Ye. Shaposhnikov.

CIS Leaders Discuss Military Questions

92UM0393D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 1

[TASS report: "Meeting of CIS Heads of State Concluded"]

[Text] Moscow, 17 January—A conference of the heads of state of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] participating states ended late yesterday evening. The conference participants signed seven documents. The oath was approved for military servicemen in the strategic forces, and the seven states that adopted a resolution on the establishment of a unified Armed Forces approved a general oath. A commission on the Black Sea Fleet was formed, consisting of representatives of

Russia, Ukraine, and the military command. The same decision was made with respect to the Caspian Flotilla. This commission will include representatives of Russia, Azerbaijan, and the Armed Forces.

Regarding the slate of economic problems, Pavel Voshchanov, press secretary of the Russian president, reported to journalists that an agreement was signed establishing a maximum level of profitability at 50 percent, in order to curb unfounded price increases under conditions of producer monopolies. It was decided to direct the heads of state to prepare to examine the question of free transit and the repeal of quotas and limitations on certain varieties of production. "On the whole, the meeting may be viewed as successful," the Russian president's press secretary emphasized. The top leaders of eight states participated in the conference. For various reasons, the presidents of Moldavia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were unable to attend. However, delegations from these states took part in the work of the conference.

Vladivostok Open As Of January First

92UM0295A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by V. Shirokov, Captain 1st class: "From Vladivostok: The City and Port Are Open"]

[Text] A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists took place on the 30th of December in the Vladivostok gorispolkom [city executive committee]. At the conference, Russian President B. N. Yeltsin's Order concerning the appointment of V. Yefremov as head of the city's administration was read. The main reason for the press conference, however, was that starting January 1st the city and port of Vladivostok, which were previously closed, will be open for foreign ships to dock in and foreign citizens to visit.

Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman R. Khasbulatov congratulated the citizens of the capital of Primorye on this event, and on the 1st of January 1992 the first foreign vessel, the Khao Dzhi Yan from Vietnam, will cast off from the Vladivostok port. Having loaded up here, it will depart for South Korea. Everything is ready to greet the dawn of the new era: even a symbolic key which will be presented to the captain.

Republic Positions on CIS Defense Agreement

92UM0334A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 2

["Additions and Amendments by Some Republics to the Agreed Text of the Agreement on Defense Matters"]

[Text]

Article 4

Agreed text: The states of the Commonwealth recognize the need for a joint command for strategic forces and the

preservation of unified control over nuclear weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction of the Armed Forces of the former Soviet Union.

The interested states of the Commonwealth are creating a unified command for general purpose forces.

Position of Ukraine: During the period pending total destruction of nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine they will be under the control of the Unified Command for the Strategic Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States ((CIS)) with a view to their nonuse and destruction. (The position of Ukraine is the following: by the end of 1994, including tactical nuclear weapons before 1 July 1992).

The process of destruction of nuclear weapons located on the territory of Ukraine is to be effected with the participation of the Ukraine and under international control.

The composition of the strategic forces located on the territory of Ukraine and procedure for their reduction and elimination, and also forces that provide support for them, is determined by separate Agreement.

The states of the Commonwealth understand the desire of Ukraine to adhere to the three nonnuclear principles, namely, not to accept, not to produce, and not to acquire nuclear weapons, and not to participate in military alliances in peacetime, as a permanently neutral state.

Article 6

Agreed text: The states of the Commonwealth affirm their legal right to create their own armed forces. In order to prevent any lowering of the defensive capability of the Commonwealth of Independent States, during the transitional period the states of the Commonwealth will create their own armed forces in stages. They will implement a plan for their own military development on the basis of mutual agreement among all interested parties on the transfer of forces and resources of the Armed Forces and Internal Troops of the former USSR to the states of the Commonwealth. The status of Combined Armed Forces located on the territories of the states of the Commonwealth during the transitional period is determined by special agreement between them.

Position of the Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine: For states of the Commonwealth that have announced the creation of their own armed forces, the transfer of troops to their direct subordination will be done from 30 December 1991 after releasing their personnel from the military oaths sworn previously. The status of the Armed Forces of the former USSR is determined by the laws of the states of the Commonwealth.

Article 9

Agreed text: This agreement enters into force from the moment it is signed and its force ceases upon decision of the Council of Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Position of the Republic of Belarus: This Agreement is subject to ratification by the legislative bodies of the members of the Commonwealth.

The agreement enters into force on the day that the instruments of ratification from all the participating states listed in the preamble are presented for safekeeping in the depositary of the Government of the Republic of Belarus.

Position of the Republic of Moldova: This Agreement enters into force from the moment it is signed and its force ceases for each state of the Commonwealth on the decision of its Head of State.

Position of Ukraine: This Agreement enters into force from the moment of its ratification by each signatory state in accordance with national constitutional procedures. The instruments of ratification shall be presented for safekeeping by the government herein named as the depositary state.

The force of this Agreement shall cease with respect to any participating state from whose territory nuclear weapons are withdrawn for destruction in accordance with international agreement and under international control.

Soldiers' Groups Address Military Collapse**Air Force Unit Addresses Army, Navy**

92UM0343A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

["From the Appeal of the Officers Assembly of the Long-Range Aviation Directorate to All Officers of the Army and Navy"]

[Text] It is incomprehensible to us why, at a time when U.S. President G. Bush appeals to the Congress with a statement that only a powerful armed forces can for them constitute a source of confidence and a firm guarantee of security on both the regional and global scale, the very likelihood of a threat to the security of the Commonwealth from outside its borders is ridiculed by many of the parliaments of the independent republics.

We call upon all of you to appeal to state officials of the Commonwealth countries jointly with us and express support for the creation of our own armed forces, to propose that a well-considered and responsible review be conducted of our approach to the establishment of an effective—not illusory—defensive potential for the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Turkestan Officers on Status of Military

92UM0343B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

["From the Appeal of Officers of the Turkestan Military District"]

[Text] In an appeal addressed to the leaders of the independent states of the Commonwealth and to the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] published in FRUNZENETS, the newspaper of the Turkestan Military District, it is proposed to examine the possibility of concluding an agreement among Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the republics of Central Asia, on a unified Armed Forces of the CIS. Not ruled out in this regard is the possibility of Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan joining in. The officers also demand that legislative acts be adopted in the shortest possible time which define the status of military servicemen, determine the conditions of their service, and provide guarantees of their civil rights in the territory of all the Commonwealth countries.

Georgia Troops on Service Conditions

92UM0343C Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

["From an Open Letter from Military Servicemen in a Unit Located in Georgia"]

[Text] An intolerable situation has taken shape around us—reads the letter written by servicemen S. Chikvadze, I. Zirchik, S. Voronin, and their fellow servicemen. For a long time now it has been impossible to accomplish military training tasks, and as a consequence of this—combat readiness tasks. Personnel strength in the subunits is at 30-40 percent of authorized levels, officers and warrant officers are at 50-60 percent strength. In other districts personnel are not being selected for service on a contractual basis (as regulations require), and discipline violators are being "exiled" to our district. Manifestations of the notorious "hazing" and "fraternization" are therefore intensifying.

The food problem is acute. The order regarding significantly increasing the norms for Transcaucasus servicemen greatly raised our hopes. But the lack of many products in the warehouses effectively reduces this to naught. Centralized deliveries are scanty and Georgia is asking either triple the price or barter for them. Can this be tolerated? We find the logistical support situation to be alarming.

The letter's authors demand that the status of troops in the territory of republics which are not members of the Commonwealth be determined, that their mission and purpose of service be explained, and that the necessary conditions for this be established.

Address to Officers' Assembly

92UM0343D Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Jan 92 p 1

["From the Appeal of Officers of the Tarnogskiy Rayon Military Commissariat of Vologda Oblast to Participants at the All-Army Conference"]

[Text] The creation of an armed forces by sovereign states without any legislative basis constitutes adventurism—write Major Korovin and his deputy, Major Sadovnikov, to the editorial office of the rayon military commissariat. In creating an army, it is first necessary to adopt laws on defense, universal military obligation and military service, the status of servicemen, provision of housing for servicemen, and pensions. Only when this is done can troops take the military oath. Without affording guarantees for protection of the rights, interests, and personal dignity of servicemen it is impossible to demand worthy service of them.

In creating their own armies, Commonwealth of Independent States member states must also take into account the financial aspects of this problem. Otherwise, overall expenditures on defense may many times exceed the defense budget of the former USSR and place a heavy burden on the shoulders of the people.

Formation of New Armed Forces Viewed

92UM0434A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Major Yuriy Mikhaylovich Sinkov, chief of staff of a missile battalion, by Colonel D. Povkh; date and place not given: "I Am Hoping for a New Army"]

[Text] Stratification in the officer environment has now reached an apogee. Two wings have defined themselves in a majority of the military collectives—the right, where entrenched conservatives predominate, and the left, which consists of democratically inclined officers who took a deep breath of the healing air of perestroika and are standing up for a quicker reformation of the Armed Forces. To defend their views, the democrats are uniting and becoming members of military public organizations. Many have joined the Union of Officers of Ukraine.

How this process is progressing in one of the units of the Red Banner Carpathian Military District is recounted in a conversation between our free lance correspondent Colonel D. Povkh and Major Yuriy Mikhaylovich Sinkov, chief of staff of a missile battalion.

[Povkh] If it is not a secret, Yuriy Mikhaylovich, why did you become a member of the Union of Officers of Ukraine? What is this, a movement of the heart or cognizance of the time?

[Sinkov] I am not alone in my choice. Many of my colleagues are now joining the union. And there is one reason here: To serve in those Armed Forces that still exist is physically and practically impossible. Where, in

what army of the world is there such a thing as an officer spending day and night in barracks and receiving next to nothing for this? Here, a commander of a battery, although it is considered that he does not have a lot of people and equipment, is forced to be in the subunit from reveille to retreat. Frequently, on days off and holidays. But it would be possible even to accept this somehow.

The trouble is elsewhere. What is frightening is that there has recently been a more and more frequent slipping of legal norms and regulation requirements concerning chain of command procedures. Although they exist on paper, they do not always work. And it becomes very difficult for junior officers who are engaged directly in the education of personnel. In fact, military discipline is held together by their enthusiasm and nerve. There is no help from senior chiefs. They are capable only of arranging severe reprimands.

[Povkh] But, in your opinion, why has such a situation arisen?

[Sinkov] This is natural, perestroika was not called a revolution without reason. I had occasion to read the book "March on Moscow" by Lieutenant General Anton Ivanovich Denikin, the commander in chief of a volunteer army. And I was amazed to discover for myself the great similarity of those troubled times of civil war to our perestroika times. And, indeed, I found a lot that was similar in the fates of officers.

[Povkh] In what is there this similarity. After all, we do not have a civil war, thank God, and the army is functioning within the framework of the Constitution, and it is standing guard over the interests of the people.

[Sinkov] I see the similarity in the fact that, as in the years of the revolution when there was a war of laws everywhere, the leaders are trying in every way to bring order in the army. Wise instructions are given and threatening orders are written. Briefly, they try with all of their might to "bring pressure" on those who work with personnel. But nothing is happening with the lieutenants and the captains. And not because they do not want to work, but because of the reigning lawlessness. And it, as is well-known, gives rise to excesses. Here is a graphic example.

Seven Azeris who were called up back in May, to this day do not wash floors. They consider this strictly women's work, and unworthy of a real man. Watching them, soldiers of later call-ups become indignant: In what way are we worse than they? I am not talking now about "demobs." Owing to this, relationships at variance with regulations and squabbles between different groups of people arise. But the commander of a platoon or battery is powerless to do anything. The intervention of higher ranks is necessary here. But they remain silent.

In addition, a vicious system has set in here: If you report that you are having difficulty with discipline, then right there and then you yourself are in for punishment. At

best, you will get away with a severe reprimand. At the same time, no one wants to look at the root cause and to help you.

[Povkh] But, in fact, how do you strengthen discipline? As far as I know, so many methods and recommendations are sent to the troops that there would be enough to wallpaper all of the offices. But as the saying goes, things are not moving.

[Sinkov] First of all, it is necessary to see to it that all of the laws are working. Every serviceman should know clearly that he will be punished for every infraction of regulation requirements. Moreover, the punishment will be inevitable. But at present, everything is the opposite: The fanciers of the "free life" in epaulets feel themselves rather free and untrammelled. And you do not have to go far for examples.

Private Gamidov was absent without leave three times in the course of three months. After each delinquency, he was warned, and he was punished, but nothing helped. It became necessary to file criminal charges against him. I, as the military investigator, worked on the investigation. But the accused was so confident of his own impunity that he began to threaten the acting commander of the battalion: "If you put me behind bars, then things will turn out badly for your son. Not I, but my fellow countrymen will avenge me."

It would seem that we could file these words in the case, inasmuch as there were witnesses right there. However, the threat worked, and the criminal case was soon covered up. And although several officers after this threw service caps to the ground and vowed that they would leave the army if the wild hooligan is not brought to trial, their demands remained like a voice crying in the wilderness.

Of course, such scandalous cases of impunity have a negative effect on personnel. "If Gamidov gets away with everything, then we can also," some of his followers conclude, and they act according to an already smooth scenario. As a result, a euphoria of permissiveness, like corrosion, eats away at the military collective.

[Povkh] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, aside from those mentioned, there apparently are other reasons for the state of military discipline. How do things stand with deserters? Did their number decrease after the well-known ukase of the president of the former USSR about their pardon?

[Sinkov] If we are talking about those who left the subunit because of non-regulation relationships, then amnesty for them is just. But I assure you that of the total number of deserters there is only one percent of this kind. The remaining 99 percent are slackers and idlers, but also barracks hooligans. Officers go after them, look for them, and call the parents, and they admonish the violators. But inasmuch as the law is not functioning, everything is soon repeated.

[Povkh] But, perhaps, not all of the officers understand their responsibility for the application of a strict regulation order?

[Sinkov] I will answer your question with a question: Excuse me, but who wants to live in confusion? After all, the army is held together with discipline. And when it does not exist, there is no army.

Naturally, there are also those who after several years of service who become lax. Not finding support from the command element, they submit their resignation and join cooperatives. But, still, this is only a few people. The majority of the officers are trying to serve honorably and to strengthen the army ranks.

In this connection, we are setting great hopes on the Armed Forces of Ukraine that are being formed. We hope that there will be sensible laws in the new army that guarantee strict compliance by each serviceman with the demands of the oath and regulations. We place particular responsibility on the newly assigned commanders whose priority will be not personal well-being but combat training. Such evils of the old army as protectionism, corruption, and abuse of the service situation must become nonexistent.

[Povkh] I fully agree with you, but where do you find such personnel? After all, we all came out of the same system and were educated, I will put it frankly, not with the same high ideals of nobleness and honor.

[Sinkov] The military organizational development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine must be conducted on absolutely new principles. And all of the vices of the old army from the very first day must be extirpated with the red-hot iron of the law. Especially because we are building a rule-of-law and independent state. Of course, by far not every one of today's officers answers these requirements. Therefore, in the future it will be necessary to radically reform the training of command personnel.

[Povkh] Now a question to you as a member of the SOU [Union of Officers of Ukraine]. Is your organization being built on a national basis, or can servicemen of all nationalities join?

[Sinkov] We have excluded the national feature. Among the Ukrainian members of the union are Russians and Belarussians. And if you divide into categories, then junior officers constitute the main mass. My former battalion commander called them "kombatulkas." Figuratively speaking, this is that "little dark horse" that pulls the whole regimental wagon. And however strange it may seem, with all of the complexity and absurdity that reigns in military procedures, the desire to serve has not been killed yet.

[Povkh] The "little horse" is understandable, but what about the colonels?

[Sinkov] They rarely go to the union. More often they try to throw a monkey wrench into the effort. But there are

also among them the kind who wait to see which way the wind is blowing, and they watch closely.

I am firmly convinced that the Union of Officers of Ukraine united within its ranks the most advanced and progressively inclined servicemen who are ready to devote all of their energy to the organization of a new army. But I am against giving the union any kind of special authorities. It should not become a filter for highly placed commanders. That is what the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine is for. And our organization must not be viewed as a panacea that will save the republic from all troubles.

One of the defenders of the "White House" in Moscow during the August putsch declared that democracy demands courage. True words. And you cannot say that my military friends who became members of the union are lacking in courage. They have gone through the squall of threats and humiliations, and efforts were made to get rid of many of them. But by overcoming and experiencing everything, the "kombatuls" became even more hardened and ready to serve the people of Ukraine faithfully.

Speculation on Political Utility of a Russian Army

92UM0419C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov: "A '16th Republic' In Uniform"]

[Text] When Estonian Klara Hallik called the Union center the "16th Republic" at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the comparison evoked indignation and incomprehension on the part of the "single and indivisible" proponents. But in the final months of Mikhail Gorbachev's rule, the Kremlin became more and more mindful of a "Soviet Vatican" forced to limit itself to influence and recommendations instead of exerting real power. In order to reveal the "flock" of this "city-state" it was necessary to effect Gorbachev's resignation and the elimination of the Soviet Union. Then it turned out that the dismantling of the power structure was not nearly enough to make the Soviet Union a state of the past. In no way was it the power of dogma that held the great system together—without the support of arms it would have had no meaning. The Bolsheviks were not victorious in parliamentary elections—they stormed the Winter Palace and won a civil war. And from that time forward the powerful god of this system was its invincible Red Army, perhaps the one and only structure that truly served the Soviet Union, and which came to represent the powerful state, the system, and the party, but in no way Russia, Ukraine, or Kazakhstan.

Now, following the painful demise of the powerful state, the Army is left one-on-one alongside the independent states—a new "16th republic," but headed now "not by a weak-willed civilian" but by Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. For the Army—or more accurately, for its supreme

command—nothing has changed: The CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] is perceived here as the USSR with a different name, and Commander in Chief Marshal Shaposhnikov sees nothing unusual in, say, chiding Ukraine a bit—it would seem they are not conducting themselves as well as Kazakhstan...

We get the impression that statements to the effect that the Russian Army will be the last to be established are the fruit of the concept that the existing army is the Russian army. Even after the putsch, that same Marshal Shaposhnikov counseled that the troops be indoctrinated in Russian military traditions. Those discussions on the Black Sea Fleet have always been firmly planted not in real geopolitics and economics, but in the glorious past of a deceased empire.

The military, beyond any doubt whatsoever, with their constant moves, common language in dealing with one another, detachment from the local population and resulting inability to comprehend its desires, more than anyone else constitute citizens of the Soviet Union. But this powerful state will not be resurrected, even with the help of military force. Indeed, the presence on the territory of independent states of the army of another state will hardly help stabilize the situation. The only possible way out of the dilemma would seem to be to transfer most of the military to the jurisdiction of one republic or another. But Russia's refusal to have its own armed forces gives rise to an atmosphere of tension... and hope: Will something else suddenly spring up? In addition, a number of officers would like without any doubt to serve Russia. So here we see a situation where they do not want to take the Ukrainian or Belorussian oath, and cannot take the Russian one—and all of this is accompanied by explanations that taking an oath is a one-time event. As though it were not clear that it is impossible to serve a nonexistent state on the territory of an existing country.

The emergence of a Russian Army and acceptance by the Russian president of duties as its commander in chief would result in uncertainty. It is possible this army would be far larger than the armies of the other Commonwealth countries. And quite a number of officers presently serving in other states would desire to serve in it. On the other hand, for all the republics—and Russia too—the specter of the "16th republic" would disappear, no longer dictating to them its will and unwilling to deal with reality. Then the air force marshal would be transformed from an equal partner among popularly elected presidents into a regular subordinate of Boris Yeltsin or the commander of general security troops, with which citizens of other countries would also serve who have sworn an oath to these countries, and not to the crumbling structure of the CIS...

Leaders Said to Discuss Russian Jurisdiction over Military

92UM0440A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The Union Armed Forces Have Outlived the USSR and Are Attempting to Emerge on the Political Arena Independently"]

[Text]

The Army

On the morning of January 17, the All-Army Officers' Conference began with the active resistance of middle-ranking officers against the agenda and the presidium in general. Initially, they achieved definite success: they renamed the conference the Officers' Assembly and demanded and achieved live television transmission. Thus, the "secret" conference became entirely public even though foreign correspondents could not get accreditation anywhere.

Television viewers saw the remainder: the speeches in support of army unity and also demands to create an All-Army Officers Coordination Council. They also talked about the disintegration of the USSR. Marshal Shaposhnikov said that those officers who had previously attempted to oppose the legally elected presidents are already sitting in the Matrosskaya Tishina Jail.

Nazarbayev read the statement on army problems that was adopted on January 16 by the presidents of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and added that he himself does not consider the statement to be adequate. He, allegedly, proposed other more specific measures to preserve the unity of the army.

At 10:50, Yeltsin left the hall and conducted a 10-minute conference with his advisers. Soon after the break, at 12:15, Yeltsin left and did not appear until 16:00. Yeltsin's assistants and advisers: Stankevich, Generals Kobets, Volkogonov, and Grachev, and also Marshal Shaposhnikov and President Nazarbayev also left the hall to conduct confidential negotiations. We have learned from reliable sources that they discussed variations of a presidential decree on Russian jurisdiction over the greater portion of the former Union's armed forces. At 16:00, Yeltsin finally spoke and promised that he will take the troops deployed outside of the CIS (the Baltic Region, Georgia, Germany, and Poland) under Russian jurisdiction. Furthermore, Yeltsin promised to resolve the army's housing and social issues in the shortest possible and clearly unrealistic time periods and also to fight for the unity of the armed forces. To resolve social issues, Yeltsin thinks that it is possible to export weapons and other similar equipment.

Yeltsin's speech did not cause great joy among the officers. It was like they do not trust him very much anymore and his January 17 speech did not increase the president's popularity in the army environment.

However, the officers' dissatisfaction mostly went into a "whistle." By the end of the day, everyone was tired, having stood in long lines at the buffet and a hungry army, as Clausewitz taught, is not frightening. The officers still do not have an effective organization and, the main thing, authoritative leaders. However, they will still be able to appear and in the very near future.

Efforts to Maintain Unified Army Viewed

92UM0452A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "The Unity of the Armed Forces and the Disagreements of the CIS Presidents: If the Quarrels Among the Politicians Continue, then One Morning They May Wake Up in the Union of Fraternal Military Districts of Eurasia"]

[Text]

PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK: "We do not have a unified state and there cannot be united armed forces."

PRESIDENT NAZARBAYEV: "Attempts to transform the former Union into a new Commonwealth are creating contradictions. Of them, the most serious is the situation of the army."

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: "The direct division of the single army organism is unacceptable. Russia and Kazakhstan will stand 'to the bitter end' for united armed forces. But if the majority of republics begin to form their own armed forces, we will do the same thing."

MARSHAL SHAPOSHNIKOV: "We ask President Yeltsin to take under his jurisdiction the troops on the territory of the Northwestern Group of Forces and other states who do not want to enter the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]."

The Army

On January 17, everyone who followed the All-Army Officers' Assembly saw: the army and its officer corps have become an independent political force. And until quite recently, the overwhelming majority of officers were absolutely apolitical. But the recent actions of the numerous presidents of the former Soviet republics and, first of all, the Ukrainian leadership, have rapidly drawn the army into politics. If the presidents continue in that same spirit in the future, the prognosis for the future development of events is quite obvious: some form or other of military rule in the entire military-strategic space of the former (or not so former?) USSR.

The militarized economy and enormous, ready, and instantaneous mobilization of the army have remained to the extreme in the former USSR. But instead of beginning immediate military reform—the reduction of the armed forces and the VPK [military-industrial complex]—the independent presidents are attempting to divide "fairly" the defense heritage of the deceased USSR. They have forgotten about serious demilitarization: it is easy to find the "resentful" and reduced in one "independent" state and new cordial bosses in another—all prepared to accept "their own" (and at the same time also "aliens"), especially if they will transfer under other banners along with arms and equipment or, moreover, with territory, population, and military production.

Commander-in-Chief Kravchuk is entirely correct when he ceaselessly repeats that the Commonwealth of actually independent states cannot have a united army. But for a totally independent army you need both your own sufficiently independent military-industrial complex (you cannot purchase weapons with hard currency). All the more so since there is defense production in all of the republics and people need to be involved with and build something no worse than their neighbors or flee. Furthermore, you can manufacture weapons for export, in dollars, which is what President Yeltsin said while speaking to the All-Army Officers' Assembly.

However, regional defense production is inferior. Specialization and monopolization in industry have scattered the production of components throughout the entire country. To achieve defense independence, we need to start up new defense plants in all of the republics. And instead of demilitarization—new benefits for the defense complex, a new, already inter-republic, arms race, and also a fierce struggle for world sales markets of the same types of standard "defense" goods. The situation can sooner become unguided. And the military-industrial complex's influence will increase with each passing day.

On December 11, 1991, at the conference of the highest command staff, Yeltsin convinced the leaders of the armed forces that he understands their needs better than Gorbachev did. The army agreed with the Belovezh agreements, with the dissolution of the USSR, and with Gorbachev's retirement since it was promised everything: increased salaries, a solution to housing and social problems, the unity of the armed forces within the framework of a "united command authority of a military-strategic space."

On January 17 1992 at the All-Army Officers' Assembly, Yeltsin said the same thing: he promised to index officers' salaries (and not only on Russian territory) on a quarterly basis, promised to distribute to officers a portion of the dollars obtained from arms sales, and promised to build 120,000 apartments for servicemen during the first six months of 1992. But the promises were met with scant applause and a dissatisfied din. They do not believe Yeltsin. They do not believe politicians in general. Ruslan Khasbulatov's appeal to the All-Army Officers' Assembly (on behalf of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet) was met with hisses.

Incidentally, the delegates from Odessa and Turkestan military districts made the most noise, according to experts from the General Staff. The matter was not only reduced to fiery speeches but also to hissing and stamping of feet. A Coordinating Council (KS) was elected during the assembly: three representatives each from the military districts, groups of forces and fleets, and also from the RVSN (Strategic Missile Troops), Air Forces, PVO [Air Defense], from Moscow Military District PVO and military construction units; from independent PVO armies, VDV [Airborne Troops], combat unit 31600 of the Space Units, Border, Internal, and Railroad

Troops, road construction units, government communications and Civil Defense Troops, from military educational institutions that are not subordinate to the military districts, and also from the central staff—one person each.

All of the 15 former republics will be represented and also the "sotslager" [social camp] (groups of forces deployed in the former GDR [German Democratic Republic] and PNR [Polish People's Republic]). Of course, the powers of the army Coordinating Council have still not been defined in any way and its decisions are not binding on anyone in any way. But, just like the miners' strike committees or the Dem-Rossiya [Democratic Russia] movement, the council can itself also take as much sovereignty as it can cook up and the for now unknown leaders who head the movement of military personnel can become known.

Everything now depends on the independent presidents—the Coordinating Council was elected in order to track their conduct. If the arbitrary republic leaders (including the Baltic Region leaders) manage to delay for several years their unrealizable dreams on the creation of really independent states, and if they can also develop a single military and economic policy for the transition (several years) period in several months and decisively reduce the army and adapt the officers to civilian society, then the movement of military personnel which has already emerged will manage to introduce some sort of officers' "trade union" in the constitutional framework. If the current quarrels continue, then it could suddenly turn out in such a way that all 15 proud and independent republics (also including the Baltic Region, where the military are slowly but surely being reduced to the point that they will soon shoot) will somehow one morning once again become components of an inviolable union of the fraternal military districts of Eurasia.

Several Participants' Impressions of the All-Army Officers' Assembly

General Nikolay Stolyarov (Chairman of the Commission on Work with Personnel) on the course of the All-Army Officers' Assembly which he prepared and where was the chairman: "We had many forecasts—one of them proved to be correct."

Colonel Viktor Alksnis (do not become confused, as it occurred on January 18 on the "Vest" program with Major-General Gunar Alksnis, who has been empowered by the Latvian Republic to represent its interests on defense issues in Moscow):

[Alksnis] Various people came to Moscow. They found themselves in very unusual conditions. Initially, they rushed into battle and later they became dispirited. They thought that if they yelled, slammed someone's door, and expelled Urazhtsev, that would be sufficient.

[Felgengauer] Well they did not expel Urazhtsev, they only tried to...

[Alksnis] Yes. That was all due to disorganization—there was no group of individuals who would just grab the microphones and impose their will. And so, the situation is the same as at the congress of people's deputies.

[Felgengauer] Like Vysotskiy: "There were few really boisterous people—and there were no leaders!" But tell me, how do you assess Yeltsin's speech?

[Alksnis] Many promises. It seems to me that he is bluffing, very strongly bluffing, in an attempt to win the army's sympathies.

[Felgengauer] Did you pin any sort of hopes on the All-Army Officers' Assembly?

[Alksnis] I still had some sort of hopes in the morning but right now I am disillusioned and upset.

[Felgengauer] What is your prediction for the future?

[Alksnis] My predictions are sad. But the main thing is to preserve the unity of the army.

[Felgengauer] Do you think that unity will be preserved?

[Alksnis] The situation and the instinct for self-preservation will compel us to seek support. There will be a total economic collapse. In order to conduct reforms, instruments of power are needed which will be able to force the workers to the plants and the students to the dormitories.

By the way, a social explosion is inevitable and I think that the army will be with the people. Just like in February 1917.

Russia Prepares Draft on Military Doctrine

92UM0475C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 2

[Interfaks report: "Russia's Draft Military Doctrine"]

[Text] The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security is preparing a draft version of the military doctrine and draft laws on military and alternative service, stated Alexander Kotenkov, the committee deputy chairman. He pointed out that it is planned to discuss Russia's military doctrine in the early part of February with the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff.

The committee is also engaged in completing its work on the draft law dealing with the military oath of allegiance. Kotenkov attaches cardinal significance to the draft oath's provision prohibiting the use of weapons against our own people. He also points out that the law pertains only to the Armed Forces.

Military servicemen on duty with state security and internal affairs agencies will sign binding contracts in lieu of the oath.

Threat of Military Coup Frightens West

92UM0443A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA columnist Aleksandr Goltz: "The West Is Concerned—Justifiably? Algeria, Congo, and Then... CIS?"]

[Text] ...Elite airborne units blocked the General Staff building and seized the television center and a number of government offices. They presented an ultimatum, in which they demanded that the military be included in the government, a number of discharged officers reinstated, and the troops paid their allowance. They demanded that an extraordinary all-army conference be convened.

...After the president was forced to resign, authority in the country was transferred to a supreme security council dominated by the military. The troops established control over the capital.

What you see, reader, is not another pessimistic prognosis on the development of the situation in the former Soviet Union. The first item came a few days ago from the Congo; the second, from Algeria. What is happening there, however, is amazingly similar to the scenarios on our own future that right now can be found in abundance on the pages of both the domestic and foreign press! Especially many of them appeared on the eve of the All-Army Officers Assembly and after it finished its work.

No, it was not accidental that Marshal of the Air Force Shaposhnikov, in his emotional speech to the conference, called on the military not to put itself on a par with its counterparts in the developing countries where coup d'etats take place regularly. To the credit of the Officers Assembly's participants, they did not follow the extremists. This fact was perceived positively by most of the mass media in various countries. Also quoted with satisfaction was the official statement that the Armed Forces have no intention of playing a political role in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], and that the army is not going to become a object of political games. However, one can detect in these responses not only an approval, but also a serious concern. For instance, in the opinion of British Secretary of State for Defense T. King, now it has become even more obvious that our army is not satisfied with the situation it is in; so the question that remains is what form this dissatisfaction may take. Will the voice of the army be heard by the CIS leaders when they gather in Minsk to decide on military issues, also asks the French LE MONDE?

It is instructive that this issue that seemingly falls completely and entirely within the competence of the CIS states, very much concerns the leading world politicians. The reason for that is that people in the West today see a direct link between their own security and the general conditions of the CIS Armed Forces. That is why one

after another high-level delegation from Western countries head for the capitals of the CIS republics. American experts on nuclear security issues, headed by a deputy secretary of state, just left the CIS territory this week—only to be replaced by Britain's Foreign Minister D. Hurd, who conducted negotiations on the fate of Soviet nuclear arms. Next in line is his French colleague R. Dumas.

It looks like the sarcastic nickname given to the Soviet Union sometime ago—"an Upper Volta with rockets"—today has acquired in the eyes of the West a meaning that is more than denigrating—it is also frightening. For right now we resemble a third world country not only in terms of our level of economic and social development, but also by profound internal instability. The destruction of one type of state structure and replacing it with others; a fundamental shift in ideological and moral-ethical values in the society; inter-ethnic conflicts; economic crisis that is threatening to grow into full-fledged chaos—all factors typical of a developing country are present. That is, exactly the factors that propel the Armed Forces toward impulsive actions, to put it mildly.

Because of that, the West has no choice but to be interested in the political and moral conditions of the Soviet military. French Minister of Defense P. Joxe said, for instance, that he has doubts in the "psychological maturity" of the commanders responsible for tactical nuclear weapons entrusted to them. This suspiciousness is easy to understand. Where would it come from, this psychological stability, when some politicians are trying to dismember the army and cart off the pieces to national quarters? When after all the agreements and assurances of a unified control over nuclear weapons, the deputy chief of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army tells a Reuters correspondent: "Tactical nuclear arms are under the control of the Ministry of Defense—our control... The system has already been restructured. It is no longer linked with Moscow." One cannot help but agree with the French FIGARO, which points out: "The ability to apply the agreements is very questionable in the situation of complete chaos in the republics—successors of the USSR."

G. Nye, director of Harvard University's Center for International Studies, arrives at this conclusion: "The systems of command and control over nuclear weapons cannot be more reliable than the social system they are a part of." Thus, to ensure security in the world and in the CIS republics, it is high time for their leaders to get busy with creating a reliable social system and to find a proper place for the Armed Forces in it. So we can stop frightening the planet and ourselves by the "unpredictability" of the army.

CIS: STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

Agreement on Strategic Forces Oath

92UM0393B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 1

["Agreement on the Military Oath for Strategic Forces"]

[Text] In conference, the heads of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] participating states, proceeding from the need to create a legal and moral-political basis for military service of the citizens of the participating states of the Commonwealth in the armed forces, have approved the following as the text of the military oath for servicemen performing duty with the strategic forces:

"I (last name, first name, patronymic), upon entering military service, take this oath of loyalty to the people of (name of the state of which the serviceman is a citizen) and swear to reverently execute the Constitution and laws of my state and the Commonwealth state in whose territory I am performing my military duty.

I commit myself to fulfilling implicitly the duties which I am assigned, military regulations, and the orders of commanders and superiors.

If I violate this, my military oath, I am prepared to bear responsibility as established by law."

[No no. 1 as received] 2. The procedure and timeframe for administering the military oath to servicemen performing duty in the strategic forces is determined by the commander in chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces.

3. This agreement enters into force from the moment of its signing.

Executed 16 January 1992 in the city of Moscow in one copy in the state languages of the participating states of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The original is maintained in the archives of the Belarus Republic government, which will send a certified copy to each of the states participating in the agreement.

Signing the agreement:

For the Azerbaijan Republic A. Mutalibov.

For the Republic of Armenia L. Ter-Petrosyan.

For the Republic of Belarus S. Shushkevich.

For the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev.

For the Republic of Kyrgyzstan A. Akayev.

For the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin.

For the Republic of Tajikistan R. Nabiyev.

For Ukraine L. Kravchuk.

Estonian MP: Nuclear Arms at Tartu Air Base

92UM0415A Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian
21 Jan 92 p 11

[Article by Nils Myklebost: "The Backfire Nuclear Bomber in Estonia"—first paragraph is ARBEIDERBLADET introduction]

[Text] Estonian parliamentarian Juri Liim is convinced there are nuclear arms at the large Soviet air base at Tartu in Estonia. The Soviets deny this, but they also denied the existence of nuclear reactors at the marine base in Paldiski, until Liim disclosed this in November.

The Backfire fighter bombers are parked behind the ramparts at the Tartu air base in Estonia. The slim, tall tailfins with the red star reach up like slanted spires in the landscape at this important Soviet air base situated a couple of kilometers outside of Tartu in southeastern Estonia. From certain angles one can see the planes themselves sitting there partly covered by tarpaulins, ready for quick mobilization, next to rows of large transport planes painted in Aeroflot's colors.

According to Mart Kulvik, Greens politician at Tartu, there are 21 Backfire fighter bombers stationed at the base in addition to 40 transport planes, which really are military planes, in spite of being painted in civilian colors.

Restricted Area

The university city of Tartu was completely closed to foreigners until 1989. Because of the air base just outside the city, there have been no foreign students or guest lecturers since the war [World War II] at Estonia's only university, founded in 1602 by Swedish King Gustavus II Adolphus.

However, it is possible today to take a Muskvich taxi for 100 rubles (6 kroner) right up to the fence surrounding the base and photograph the planes a few meters away without interference from anybody.

"But even representatives from the Estonian Government are not admitted to the Red Army's bases in Estonia without politely asking for permission," Allar Ollum at the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed ARBEIDERBLADET.

Soviet Slum

The 100 rubles will also cover a quick sightseeing trip through the part of the city where Soviet soldiers and officers are living in small unpainted houses and apartment buildings, constituting a veritable slum compared to the relatively well-kept Estonian houses close by. The wooden houses are unpainted, with broken windows and torn-off siding, and two-year-old apartment buildings look like they are 20 years old. The yards are full of cast-off bathtubs, car wrecks, and trash.

Incredibly, the conditions might be better here than what awaits them at home in Russia, when some day they are transferred.

"The base is the worst environmental problem at Tartu," said Kulvik to ARBEIDERBLADET. A lake by the base is so full of dumped jet fuel that the water might catch on fire if one puts a match to it. Gasoline and oil have reached the ground water and polluted the drinking water, thereby affecting agriculture also.

Nuclear Arms

It is at this airbase, the starting point for the former Soviet Air Force's sorties over the sounds in the Baltic Sea, as well as in Oresund and Storebelt, that Juri Liim, Greens parliamentarian in Tallin, alleges that the Soviets are storing nuclear arms.

"The Backfire planes have been constructed to carry both bombs with nuclear warheads and nuclear missiles," he said to ARBEIDERBLADET in the parliament building in Tallin. "They have a range of 8,000 kilometers with a payload of 12 tonnes. But after frequent accidents while refueling in the air, they have been reconstructed to carry 20 tonnes of bombs out to a distance of 4,000 kilometers," he said.

The main base for the Tartu planes' nuclear arms is Baranovichi in Belarus, but there are also depots 10 kilometers from the base where Liim believes nuclear arms are being stored. The bombs can be brought to the planes from this storage area in 15 minutes, and the depots can technically be emptied of nuclear arms in three hours.

No Clear Answers

"The Soviet military has never given us clear answers. General Dudaichev, who now is president in the Inguchea-Chechen has said that there were no nuclear arms there while he was commander. However, the Soviet army has officially informed us since then that there were nuclear arms there until the mid-1980's. They informed the bureau in Tartu later that the arms were removed in 1989. But another commander says that they were not removed until 1990. The commander in chief for the Russian army stated two weeks ago that there are nuclear arms in the Baltic countries, without specifying which country," said Liim.

"After I wrote in the papers at the end of November that there were nuclear arms at the base, they maintained that there never have been any. They did, however, cancel an announced press conference on the matter. Now I'm waiting for them to say that they were removed in 1991," he said, pointing out that they claimed the same for the GDR while there were in reality nuclear arms there.

Nuclear Reactors

The same contradictory information came from the Soviet army when Liim claimed earlier that there were nuclear reactors at the large marine base in Paldiski, 30 kilometers west of Tallin.

Liim was able to gain entry to the base and videotape two reactors that had formerly been on submarines and that today are used for training. Not until this point did the Soviets admit that they did in fact exist, claiming however that one of them is not in use. Personnel at the base have said that both reactors, which are linked together, are in operation.

Self-Destruction

Liim says that he also has information indicating that the Soviet military after the Cuban crisis in 1961 built a so-called liquidator at the Tartu base—a nuclear bomb with a 1-megatonne yield that can be detonated from a distance and whose blast would annihilate the entire base preventing it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

"There are rumors of such a bomb at Paldiski too. If this is the case, this will constitute a great potential for extortion of Estonia by the Soviet army," Liim said.

"No one knows what is really happening. We have asked the International Atomic Energy Agency and specialists from Sweden to go in and investigate the conditions at Paldiski," said Liim, pointing out that the nuclear reactors have been placed there with military intentions and without international warning.

Kiev Military District Weapon Withdrawal

92UM0474B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
28 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel A. Koryakin, chief of staff of Missile and Artillery Troops of the Kiev Military District, by *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* correspondent V. Shvyrev: "Strictly According to Schedule—Tactical Nuclear Weapons Are Being Withdrawn From the Territory of the Kiev Military District"]

[Text] In keeping with the agreement among the leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States signed in Minsk, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons has begun, which are subsequently to be destroyed, from the territory of Ukraine, particularly from the bases of the Kiev Military District. This operation is being carried out by highly trained specialists with strict observance of safety measures. The first nuclear warheads from tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition have already been sent to the designated point.

Our correspondent met with the Chief of Staff of the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Kiev Military District, A. Koryakin, and asked him to answer some questions pertaining to the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the district.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, apparently there is no need to show how crucial and complicated the operation for withdrawing nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition is. A great deal has to be taken into account, thought about, and anticipated here. Therefore the first question is about what has been done on the plane of preparing people, technical equipment, and also the nuclear weapons themselves before they are transported.

[Koryakin] Undoubtedly the withdrawal of nuclear weapons is far from being a simple task. It requires, above all, that the specialists strictly observe security measures and that they take precise and coordinated actions in all stages of the performance of this task.

Based on this, we have conducted an immense complex of measures whose main purpose was to check the readiness of the military servicemen for work with nuclear weapons and their ability to perform their duties without mistakes. As a result, the packing and shipping of the items was handled by people who, one might say, can almost read each other's minds. And, as the past days and weeks have shown, everyone who participated in sending the first consignment of nuclear warheads showed a high level of professional skill.

In parallel with the testing and training of personnel, we worked to put the nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition in a minimum state of readiness that would assure their safety during transportation. All the measures planned for this were also carried out well and by the established deadlines.

[Shvyrev] If it is not a secret, tell us what kind of transportation was used to transport the nuclear warheads.

[Koryakin] From the territory of the Kiev Military District they were shipped only by rail, and not a single one of our men was required to accompany them. This task is handled by others.

[Shvyrev] From the reports shown on Ukrainian Television, many of our readers thought the nuclear warheads were located right in the units and subdivisions for combat application. Is this really true?

[Koryakin] Of course not. Nuclear warheads of tactical missiles and nuclear artillery ammunition are located at storage bases where the necessary temperature, humidity, cleanliness, and many other factors have been created and are strictly maintained. Monitoring these things is the responsibility of specialists who, among other things, take care of servicing warheads and performing standard maintenance work on them.

And another thing, which is, as it were, a digression. Among people who have nothing to do with nuclear weapons there is the opinion that a person can have contact with them only if he is wearing special protective clothing. Not at all. Nuclear charges are so safe in terms of health that our military servicemen work with them wearing ordinary lab coats.

[Shvyrev] Anatoliy Ivanovich, let us imagine the day when all nuclear weapons have been removed from the territory of the district. Then what will happen to the people, many of whom have been in the service and working at the bases for many years? Will they be discharged from the Army?

[Koryakin] That question is not being raised that way today. Although, of course, we cannot get by here without transfers, changes in the staff structure, and a partial reduction. At the same time, complete withdrawal of nuclear weapons still does not mean eliminating them instead of storing them. They will remain, since today they carry not only nuclear warheads, but

there are also missiles which, as we know, are not to be destroyed. In the future they will be equipped with ordinary charges, which will also require constant attention from people. Therefore it would be at best unwise to relinquish the services of the people who are working on the bases now, the more so since it costs money to train these people. And a few more words should be said about the problem of further use of highly trained military personnel who have an excellent knowledge of their work.

[Shvyrev] So will the fate of the missile complexes that are now used to arm units and subdivisions for combat application turn out positive as well?

[Koryakin] Absolutely. Let me clarify one point. In the missile forces of the district, in addition to models of new technical equipment, there is equipment that has long outlived its day or, in other words, is obsolete. The use of the latter requires immense material expenditures on maintenance, repair, and operation. Therefore missile complexes that have been around for a long time will be written off.

[Shvyrev] And the last question. Anatoliy Ivanovich, are any difficulties or snags arising during the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the district and what is the deadline for completing this operation?

[Koryakin] Since the first days of the withdrawal of nuclear warheads and nuclear artillery ammunition all work has been conducted strictly according to schedule and without any complications. I personally see this as a result of the deep understanding and high degree of responsibility of the people in charge of this task, which is of historic significance. These words apply fully as well to the officers of the staff of missile forces and artillery of the district, Lieutenant Colonels V. Reznikov, V. Anufriyev, N. Khakimov, and many others.

[Shvyrev] Thank you for the interview and allow me on your behalf to assure the readers of NARODNAYA ARMIYA that throughout the entire withdrawal of the nuclear weapons, they will constantly be receiving information that interests them.

[Koryakin] We do not intend to keep any secrets regarding this from the newspaper's readers. We promise to inform them regularly about all the measures that are being taken, thanks to which we are taking the first steps toward a nonnuclear Ukraine.

CIS: AIR, AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Officers Fail to Receive Trip Compensation

92UM0433A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Captain A. Tolmachev: "A Puzzle for Servicemen on Official Trips"]

[Text] On a recent occasion I visited the Air Force instruction center for the training of flight personnel, commanded by Colonel K. Nikitenko. The following fact came up in conversations with officers: A number of pilots, including Captains V. Shulgin, V. Danchenko, and others, have been unable for a long time to obtain funds for official trips.

The officers stated firmly: "We will not go on official trips anymore."

Impressed by what was said, I headed for the Finance Service in order to get a response to this highly categorical statement. As they say, I wanted number one to tell me the reason for this failure to pay money.

On learning the goal of my visit, Major B. Shevtsov, chief of the Finance Service, eagerly agreed to help me. In the course of our conversation it transpired that he had accumulated more than 300 sets of trip documentation on which payments had not been made.

Boris Dmitriyevich complained: "With every passing day we take in increasing numbers of such documents."

As is usually the case, the explanation was simple: There is no money. During our conversation a senior lieutenant walked into the office of the Finance Service chief. He asked when it would be possible to obtain per diems.

Shevtsov sighed: "I would like to know myself."

"Is there hope at the very least?"

The officer threw up his hands: "Only for field pay."

As we learned, there is no limitation imposed on the Air Force personnel as far as so-called field pay is concerned. As of now, it could be paid to all officers of the unit. However, the people refuse to receive it.

The chief of the Finance Service explained: "The reason is that not all official trips are alike. If one's mission is accomplished within a unit, field pay is provided. If officers are involved in ferrying materiel, they should be paid 20 rubles [R] per day. There is an appropriate order to this effect."

This begs the question about the reason for the failure to pay per diems in full. Shevtsov clarified it yet again:

"Until July, we paid officers R20 per day. However, we soon 'ate away' the monetary quota for the year. This is when the confusion began."

Who is to blame? In the opinion of the Finance Service chief, it is individual commanders who plan patently unjustified trips for their subordinates. Here are just a few examples. For example, Colonel B. Tsurikov goes on month-long official trips to the same location, supposedly in order to "provide control and assistance," as the documents say. However, it is easy to surmise what the actual goal is, given that his family resides in the garrison in question. So, the officer goes there "on official trips" month after month. However, when the chief of the

Finance Service suggested that he draw R10 per day. Tsurikov flatly refused, saying that R20 is the rule, and the payment should be made in full.

Judging by the documents a great many people are fond of "providing control and assistance" in the directorate in question. For example, officers Ye. Limayenko, O. Lavrinenko, N. Chebykin, and S. Sutkovoy have been receiving per diems in full month after month, without fail. Meanwhile, they wished to pay the subordinates of these officers, who frequently accomplished more complex missions, R10 per day. We were interested to know what the superior headquarters thought about this.

In a conversation with me, Colonel V. Melamud, chief of the Air Force Finance Service of the North Caucasus Military District, stressed: "The money has been legitimately paid to the above officers at a rate of R20 per day. The wording which was entered in their official trip certificates makes it possible to circumvent (?) field pay. Therefore, there are no violations of any kind."

Well, as they put it, this does not need any comment.

Bandits Attack Murmansk Military Depot

92UM0442D Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Major A. Ivanov under the rubric "Direct Line: Yesterday's Report from KRSNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS Correspondents": "From the Main Headquarters of Air Defense Forces—Incident in Murmansk Oblast Results in One Sentry Dead, One Automatic Weapon Stolen"]

[Text] Armed attacks on military units and facilities are shifting from "hot spots" to the entire territory of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. Alarming reports come in of one tragedy after another. This time the incident took place in the North.

In Murmansk Oblast, as a result of an armed bandit attack on the fuel-oil depot of an airfield technical-supply battalion, Private A. Bakhmutov, a sentry, was killed. An automatic weapon and ammunition were stolen.

Chechen Republic Air Units Formed

92UM0419A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Jan 92 p 3

[Report prepared by ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA correspondent Aleksandr Aleshkin: "Chechen Air Fleet"]

[Text] An assembly of former Soviet Air Force officers in Grozny adopted a resolution on the creation of the first air squadron of the Chechen Republic. Its material assets will consist of two air units based on republic territory. These contain aircraft of Soviet and foreign production.

Attack on Nakhichevan PVO Site

92UM0441A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 92 pp 1,2

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Major A. Ivanov: "Condemned to Death: People of Duty and Honor"]

[Text] The vehicle stopped in the glen.

The barrels of the assault rifles were thrust painfully into their backs...

"Move forward. We are letting you go."

But the three officers had barely taken a few steps when the bolts of the assault rifles rang out.

They stopped. They tried to find even a minuscule slit in the blindfolds that were tightly compressed against their eyes. And, not having seen light, they turned around.

"What, do you want to live?"

"We want to say goodbye to each other and we do not want you to shoot us in the back..."

"Well, have it your way..."

What is this, an episode from the last war? No, everything occurred in our time—in December 1991 in Nakhichevan. And one of the officers whom they led out to be executed was Lieutenant-Colonel Sikorskiy.

The PVO [Air Defense] Military Command Academy Personnel Department's Chief did not begin to keep his mouth shut. During the first conversation, without beating around the bush, he suggested:

"There is a deputy brigade commander position in the Transcaucasus. They are recommending you, how do you regard this, Sergey Dmitriyevich?"

But how could he, a military man, regard a new assignment? Naturally, he was not particularly ecstatic. Because he knew well what is occurring in the Transcaucasus. But he was not accustomed to refusing, he always considered such suggestions to be orders. That is how it was when they assigned him to Siberia upon graduation from the Vilnius Higher Command School for Electronics, although he could have requested an assignment closer to home—he had weighty grounds to do this. That is how it also was when he accepted the radiotechnical battalion in the Urals. At army headquarters, they also suggested at that time:

"Maybe, if you wait a month or two, a better position will become available, and we will assign you to it immediately. You do not have to serve in 'god-forsaken holes' for a century."

But Sikorskiy would not have been Sikorskiy if he had permitted himself some sort of relaxation of discipline. That is how he was raised—conscientious, stubborn in the attainment of goals, and frank in his dealings with

people. Indeed, not everyone likes his at times unbearable soldier's straightforwardness. But it is this quality combined with his exceptional capacity for work that his commanders and senior commanders have always noted. But not many people would envy Sikorskiy's list of assignments. Judge for yourself. A year at a platoon, a year and a half at an engineer's radar site, a bit more—as commander of a radar center. Two years of service in the position of radiotechnical battalion chief of staff, three—as a battalion commander. The Academy. Since June 1991, deputy radiotechnical brigade commander. And all of this, as they say, by the sweat of his brow, without telephone calls or protection. And I know that for sure.

So then—the Transcaucasus. Just about the hottest "hot spot." They reported to PVO Troops Headquarters from here: since December 10, representatives of the Nakhichevan Republic authorities and armed formations have been nationalizing PVO Radiotechnical Troops property and military equipment. According to the demands of republic commissions, independent companies have been compelled to cease performance of alert duty and servicemen and members of their families have been subjected to humiliation and physical assault. They have practically turned out to be hostages in the hands of well-armed individuals who are arbitrary and who have looted depots, military equipment, and property and have disabled the power generators of radar sites.

In order to stop this lawlessness, the PVO army commander conducted a series of negotiations with the republic leadership. Supreme Chairman of the Medzhlis Geydar Aliyev promised that they would return what has been stolen and that questions of nationalization would be resolved through negotiations.

However, several days later, the Nakhichevan Defense Committee issued an ultimatum to the personnel of the Vanand separate radar company that they had two days to leave the subunit's location.

Guerrillas created unbearable conditions at Soyukh company, located at an elevation of 3,100 meters. The company commander led the soldiers and a pregnant woman down the mountain through deep snow. Everything was abandoned for looting in order to save the people.

By December 25, of the five subunits deployed in Nakhichevan, only four officers and 32 soldiers remained under the battalion's command and control.

The underground acoustics carried the muffled blows and moans. They had beaten up Major Silayev. They beat him professionally and for a long time.

Sikorskiy, who was leaning against the cell's cold concrete wall, tortuously attempted to understand: as a result of what miscalculations had he and his subordinate officers found themselves heaven knows where and with whom.

Having arrived in Nakhichevan on December 23, he began to send out from the "nationalized" and, simply speaking, looted companies, families and then officers and soldiers. He himself was darker than a storm cloud since he understood the tragedy of what was occurring. Not only was a single, well established, effective air defense monitoring system being destroyed, but this question also did not give him any peace: How much will those people who loyally and truthfully serve their Homeland have to pay for the adventurism of the politicians?

During his six-month stay in the Transcaucasus, seven of the brigade's separate companies were subjected to armed attacks and looting. Personnel had to beat off the attacks with weapons in hand, they found themselves under siege, and at times even in a position without rights as hostages. Is this really not a war?

On December 28, they had to carry out the division commander's next to last order for the battalion withdrawal. Under the guise of a trip to the market for food, they loaded the remaining weapons into the truck and they hauled them to a motorized rifle unit for storage. On the return trip, nearly 20 men blocked the road—all of them armed with assault rifles and the majority of them wearing masks. They did not talk for long: a gun barrel in your face, hands over your head, and they put blindfolds over your eyes.

First they threw him, Battalion Commander Major Igor Shevkunov, and Brigade Engineering Services Chief Major Igor Silayev into a cellar. During the evening, they transported them to Nakhichevan and they put them in a cramped stone cell, four by seven paces, where they could only stand.

After the beatings, they did not return Silayev to the cell. But he guessed by the noise in the corridor: they had dragged him into the neighboring cell.

His cell door was unlocked with a squeak, the guards' boots resonated across the concrete floor, and they dragged Sikorskiy by his tied hands.

"Come out."

Sergey Dmitriyevich remembers the route clearly. Five paces straight down the corridor, another seven paces to the left, a low threshold, and a smoke-filled room. They did not remove the blindfold from his eyes. He sensed several men coming right up to him. And suddenly a sharp pain penetrated his neck and his head—they were beating him with the butts of the assault rifles. With his blindfolded eyes, he attempted to intuitively avoid the blows. He almost succeeded. They beat him from head to foot. They kicked him with their boots. About ten minutes later, they asked him:

"We are the people's avengers and we want to know: where are the weapons?"

"We do not have them."

"We have one more uncooperative person..."

After the next series of blows, the interrogation was renewed:

"To whom did you sell the weapons? Why did you come to the republic? Where are the assault rifles and ammunition hidden?"

Someone closed the bolt of an assault rifle and the burnished cold steel burned his temple.

"I will count to three and, if you do not remember, I will shoot you."

Later, Sikorskiy told me:

"There was no fear. For some reason, I was certain that they would not shoot me in the cell."

They spent nearly four days in incarceration, blindfolded the entire time. Silayev attempted to remove his blindfold but was severely beaten for trying to do that. His hands, which were tied with rope, became swollen and turned black. At night, the fan forced freezing air into the cell. Sikorskiy's toes became frostbitten. The guards, who were always outside the door, did not permit them to sleep and thought up various ways to prevent them from sleeping. Once a day, they placed a bowl of boiled noodles and a cup of tea on the floor.

Batya (that is what the guards called him) arrived during the evening on each of the four days. He was interested in who could not remember about the weapons and he would say in a hoarse voice:

"It is time to give it up. My people will transport you into the mountains... to be executed. Anyway that is better than to be tortured here."

The UAZ [vehicle made by the Ulyanovsk Automobile Plant] stopped in the glen a half hour later. The barrels of the assault rifles were painfully thrust into their backs...

"Move forward. We are letting you go."

But the three officers had barely taken a few steps when the bolts of the assault rifles rang out...

The seconds of anticipation seemed to be very long. What were they thinking about then? It turns out that practically everyone was thinking about the same thing—about their families. How will the families be? How will they manage to survive all of this?

Maybe the reader will rebuke me for excessive sentimentality: they say, all of this is like dozens of situations that have been described in literature. But if all of this was just literature!

They were no shots. Instead of shots, the UAZ's doors banged shut, they started the engine, and its sound began to move away. And they all stood there in a stupor without uttering a word. Somewhere in the mountains in the distance they heard the dull echo of a burst of assault

rifle fire. Another burst joined it and later they heard the retorts of hunting rifles and the hissing and burning of signal flares.

"Lads, that is the salute in honor of the New Year," Shevkunov was the first to recall...

Yes, the 1992 New Year had arrived.

It was not a holiday in the Sikorskiy family. While bustling in the kitchen, Raisa Vasilyevna had broken a glass. It shattered into dozens of small fragments.

"What is the matter, Mama?"—Nadyushka asked in a frightened voice. "Are you not feeling well?"

"No, daughter, it is nothing, it will pass. Something pricked my heart. You look after Natasha here, and right now, I, I will soon..."

She hurriedly threw on her coat and ran out into the street. Rockets had scattered green and red stars over the garrison (that is how they traditionally greet the New Year in the Transcaucasus). She ran straight—to brigade headquarters. She caught her breath right at the unit duty officer's post and she blurted out:

"Tell me quickly, what do you know about Nakhichevan?"

The inflamed eyes, that had remained without tears all of these days, pleadingly looked at the major.

The major just threw up his hands guiltily:

"So far there is no news... The pilots are in their cockpits and are waiting for the command to take off."

Toward morning, terrible news was circulating in the brigade: guerrillas had captured the officers. They were holding two as hostages and they had allegedly executed Sikorskiy. Later they would learn that the "people's avengers" purposely spread this rumor to frighten battalion personnel. But on that morning, Raisa Vasilyevna Sikorskaya, while tightly snuggled up with her weeping daughters, herself cried out, said:

"I do not believe anyone. This is all incorrect. Our Daddy is alive. I know, they told me... He is such a good man, so decisive and determined..."

She recalled how she met this young jolly lieutenant at a wedding at a friend's house in Belorussia. The next day he unexpectedly said:

"Will you come with me to Siberia?"

She was flustered for a minute. But he was standing there, so confident in himself, and his cheeks were ruddy. Unexpectedly for herself, she answered.

"I will go wherever you like. I will come with you."

And that is how their fate took shape and they have spent 10 years since that time traveling together to garrisons all over the place. And not once has she regretted her hasty decision.

Sikorskiy and his comrades reached the battalion toward morning. Silayev was vomiting the entire trip due to his horrible beatings and Sergey Dmitriyevich hardly made it with his frostbitten feet.

As soon as he saw them, the orderly could not restrain himself and began to cry:

"But we here went through everything for you."

And soon they announced to the officers that as soon as they were arrested, armed people in trucks led by Defense Committee Chief of Staff Kurbanov arrived at the subunit. The apartments of the officers and warrant officers were robbed blind, they cleaned out the depots and storerooms, and they took the fuel. They were also not averse to soldier's uniforms—they disrobed many of them, took off their shoes, and left them rags in exchange. Under the threat of the use of weapons, they used the personnel for various work. In the morning, they conducted the raising in the barracks of firing into the ceiling. They led the only officer who was in the battalion at that moment, Lieutenant Vadim Chumikhin, into a field and emptied an assault rifle magazine near his head.

The next day, Sikorskiy described all of this at the procuracy. He also burst into a republic Supreme Medzhlis session. But he did not find support among the deputies. They accused him of inciting passions and called him Moscow's spy. Aliyev, having created a commission for an investigation, ordered it to arrest the lieutenant colonel along with Brigade Commander Colonel Zelinskiy who had arrived in Nakhichevan. Here they told Sergey Dmitriyevich that his unavoidable punishment awaited him—execution. They also showed him the cartridge with which they intended to do it.

I will not write about how they escaped from this trap and later transported the personnel along hidden paths and roads along the state border. They asked me not to write about that so that they would not let down the people who helped them. But, having taken my word as an officer, they nevertheless told me how everything occurred. I can only tell the readers one thing—they were lucky in everything. As they later learned, nearly 200 armed guerrillas were roaming along all of the roads to prevent the personnel of this much-suffering battalion from leaving the republic.

Having appeared at the doors of the apartments, the orderly reported:

"Comrade lieutenant colonel, the vehicle is leaving for the airport in 15 minutes."

Sergey Dmitriyevich donned his coat, took his briefcase with everything necessary and only now noted that his

daughters blocked the exit. They stood near the door and, having stretched out their arms, said:

"We will not let you go to war. We do not want Mama to cry."

He nodded and took six-year-old Natasha in his arms.

"I am not going to war... I am going to Moscow, to the All-Army Officers' Assembly."

He caught his wife's worried glance. She knows that this undeclared war has hardly ended for him. Yesterday a reminder had arrived at the unit about the cartridge that had been personally designated for him.

CINC Deynekin Attacked On Mi-8 Investigation

92UM0292A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Dec 91 Union Edition p 12

[Article by I. Burbyga: "Why the 'Black Box' of a Downed Helicopter Has Been Silent Until Now"]

[Text] Our military correspondent reports for the first time from the top secret 13th NII [Scientific Research Institute] for the Use and Repair of Aeronautical Technology.

Having learned of IZVESTIYA's desire to tell about the work being done on deciphering the "black box" of the Mi-8 which met with catastrophe in the sky over the NKAO [the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] Air Forces Commander-in-Chief General P. Deynekin cautioned: the issue is of such importance and is so delicate, that any word spoken carelessly could cost everyone dearly. We are in agreement. Therefore, only specialists will be commenting on what is currently happening who are working directly with the "black box," a flight data recorder (FDR) with a protected memory. This device, as assumed, should have helped to unravel the reason for the accident. But before that, a few words about the institute itself.

...The NII [Scientific Research Institute] for the Use and Repair of Aeronautical Technology will be fifty years old at the beginning of next year. However, despite its venerable age, there has never been even as much as a reference to it in the press. The reason? Secrecy. Although, it is clear: "interested specialists" not only in our country have known about the Lyubertsy Institute.

What does the institute do?

One can insure that complex technological systems and devices are safe for use and work reliably in a variety of ways, explains the head of the NII, Lieutenant-General of Aviation Anatoliy Batalov. One of the most effective is to determine the causes of malfunctions and system failures while studying accidents. This is what the institute is involved in. Our specialists analyze highly technical aviation technology both in the laboratory and on site. This is why we were given the "black box" from the Mi-8. I will briefly reiterate how the "black box" from

the downed helicopter ended up in the hands of Moscow experts. In IZVESTIYA it was already reported: a special group from the Azerbaijan procurator's office, having conducted an initial investigation on the helicopter's debris, encountered an insurmountable obstacle: The investigators were not able through their own means to extract any information from the badly damaged "black box" under field conditions. It became apparent that in order to extract information from the instrumentation, it would be necessary to meet at least two conditions: to find an expert center and top specialists.

Both of these conditions have now been met. An investigation is underway in Moscow in the 13th Institute, where expertise among specialists is quite high. (It is sufficient to say that this is precisely where the causes for the accident involving the MiG-29, the cabin of which broke up in Le Bourget, were investigated.) And, as NII workers see it, there is no other service today with either the ability or means to maintain a similar set up. The institute, for example, has at its disposal a department of airborne laboratories equipped with special technology, the type which allows for conducting investigative work under the most diverse conditions.

Using information obtained from an objective inspection of a flight recording, said the head of the department for deciphering "black boxes," Colonel Yevgeniy Bostrikov, one can determine virtually every action of the flying apparatus and crew.

Now then, the "black box" of the Mi-8. What will it produce? The device was placed in a specially darkened laboratory," explained a special investigator from the Azerbaijan Republic Procurator's General office, R. Aliyev. We work in unison with the military. It was opened in our presence. Prior to that we were given night vision instruments, which allowed us to watch what happened in a dark setting. Unfortunately, instead of a tape, upon which so much hope had been placed, ashes were found inside the recorder.

I will explain: On this Mi-8 the on board memory was the older type. Inside the "black box" there was no magnetic tape, but rather ordinary film. At a temperature higher than 700 degrees (and this is precisely the type of "treatment" the downed helicopter was subjected to) the information store was carbonized, and became caked.

Experience has shown: in 25 to 30 percent of flying accidents the information is partially or completely lost. And it happens that specialists find the information medium altogether burned up, as in our case. It also happens that only scraps of the magnetic medium can be examined. The reasons? When designing flight recording devices the developers did not take into account all the factors that in actuality affect flight equipment during accidents. In addition, many recorders having simply aged. Unfortunately, for the last ten years industry has done virtually nothing to improve the reliability of flight information media. There are, of course, new ideas about how to save the tape from being completely

destroyed. And they have all were devised here at the NII. These innovations are capable of increasing the preservation of information by two to five times. However...the bureaucratic discontinuity between organizations within the Air Force and former Ministry for Aeronautical Production did not allow for incorporating this type of technology into production.

Thus, the first results from the investigations conducted were not favorable. The tape was burned. However, as specialists at the institute see it, they have other parameters on hand, which may make it possible to draw some serious conclusions. Today, however, it is still early to discuss this. Why has the investigation taken so long?

We check every element several times and use different methods, said Colonel Yu. Timchenko, representative of the Security Service of the Ministry of Defense. The conclusions that we come to will be affirmed by the NII scientific council.

Nonetheless: will the true reason for the accident be established?

I think so. Today there are approximately 50 versions of what took place, which include interaction between man, machine, and environment. The crews flight preparation has been investigated, as have been possible flight plan violations, the helicopter running into dangerous weather conditions...and even sabotage, a direct assault on the aircraft...Conclusions, however, have yet to be drawn. They will be made public only after the specialists have thoroughly investigated everything.

CIS: NAVAL FORCES

Navy Attacks Kobets Reform

92UM0294A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 28 Dec 91 p 3

[Open letter to RSFSR President B.N. Yeltsin from Navy veterans: "Save the Navy and Honor of Russia"]

[Text] The unfavorable and in some respects altogether complex situation emerging in the Navy under the influence of the crisis in the state, as well as proposals for reforming it, compel us to address the present letter to you.

The Commonwealth of Independent States is beginning to function in keeping with the agreements adopted in Alma-Ata. As coordinated with the heads of states belonging to the Commonwealth, the role of the legal successor of the Soviet Union in the international arena is entrusted to Russia.

The most significant issue of the new organization, structure, and future of our Armed Forces, including the Navy, hinges on the implementation of decisions concerning the interstate organization of the Commonwealth and the formation of its coordinating institutes.

The aggravation of the economic, political, and nationality crises on the territory of the former USSR in the last three years, the unreasonable conversion of defense industries, disrespect for the law, attacks by the press against the Army and the Navy, and the instability of the state undermine the fundamental basis for building the defense of the country.

The mighty military-economic potential of one of the four power victors over Fascism in World War II is disintegrating. The peoples of our Motherland, the USSR, forged this potential in the postwar decades through a lot of self-sacrifice, with the talent and labor of their best representatives.

It was precisely this potential that made it possible for us to achieve military-strategic parity with the United States and NATO by the mid-1960's, which ensured international stability in the postwar years and in the environment of a bitter ideological confrontation between the two world systems, and prevented the outbreak of World War III.

In recent years these negative factors were exacerbated by failures in the domestic policy of the country in which short-sighted national leaders and parties fighting for power tried to hide from their people and the democratic opposition behind the backs of soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army and Navy while provoking bloodshed.

According to information available to us, a commission for the development of the concept of military reform, chaired by General of the Army K.I. Kobets and set up by an decree of the former USSR President, has urgently prepared preliminary proposals concerning the structure and organization of the United Armed Forces within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These proposals have been developed in private, without the participation of the command and the Main Staff of the Navy.

We believe that the inclusion of the Navy in the composition of the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SSS) as a common participant, along the same lines as the Air Defense and the Air Forces, is not quite justified because, with regard to the Navy, this structure does not ensure either its full-fledged operation or the quality accomplishment of the missions assigned to it.

Apparently, people who are inexperienced in matters of naval construction dominate the composition of and set the tone within the commission for military reform, i.e. people who are not competent in issues of organization, combat, and everyday control of naval forces, operational planning, combat training, and long-range development of the Navy.

The existing military-geographic situation of our state (Commonwealth of Independent States), 60 percent of the length of whose borders run through the waters of 12 seas and three oceans; confrontation with the naval

groups of NATO and especially the United States, two-thirds of whose nuclear missile weapons are concentrated on nuclear submarines and attack aircraft carriers, and its unchanged maritime strategy of "forward naval deployment" despite the peace-loving rhetoric of politicians; the reluctance of the United States and NATO to achieve agreements on mutual restrictions and reductions of naval forces and armaments; and, finally, the experience of the war in the Persian Gulf demonstrate quite definitively the exceptional peculiarities and tremendous scale of operations of our Navy.

The tremendous spatial extent of the zones of operation of our fleets, the variety of Navy forces, without parallel in any other armed service (five types of combat arms: submarine forces, surface vessels with various functions, marines, shore-based missile and artillery forces, and naval aviation—embarked carrier-based aviation and shore aviation with various functions), the autonomous status of the Navy in accomplishing most tasks in the area of defending the country in the sea and ocean sectors, mounting difficulties with conditions for the stationing of naval forces and ecology, centralized services, and all kinds of support, problems with the training and recruitment of personnel to service most sophisticated weapons and materiel systems, an exceptionally peculiar system of weapons supply and shipbuilding which involves virtually all enterprises of the country's military-industrial complex, and so on, account for the specificity of both routine operations and combat use of naval forces under the water, on the water, on the ground, and in the air.

Our Navy is now facing a complex situation in view of the aggravation of the crisis in our country. There are extreme difficulties with organizing full-fledged repairs, operations, and all types of support for ships. Military programs for naval construction are being cut. The ill-conceived and hasty "conversion" of unique shipbuilding enterprises which are without parallel in the world, such as the SMP [expansion not identified] in Severodvinsk, and similar enterprises in St. Petersburg, Nikolayev, and Komsomolsk-on-the-Amur, and cuts in funding, even for scientific research and experimental design work, undermine the foundation for the development of the Navy and render the drain of brains, ideas, and unique cadres irreversible.

Therefore, the debt of science and industry to the Navy in the sphere of ensuring the survivability of vessels, reducing their noise levels, and increasing the effectiveness of their combat use and combat stability from the theoretical, design, technological, and information points of view will go unpaid, and will cause our Navy irreversibly to lag behind the navies of NATO countries and, primarily, the United States.

The Navy is aging. The number of obsolete vessels retired annually is several times greater than that of new replacements. If this trend persists, the order of battle of the Navy will be cut in half by 1996. The Navy may end up being

simply unable to accomplish the tasks of defending the country entrusted to it, which is impermissible.

We who countered the enemy with fire on combat alert in 1941 and vanquished him in 1945 believe that it is important for our current statesmen and politicians to understand this, because some of them persistently impress on the people the view that we do not have enemies, that nobody threatens us, and therefore we simply do not need the Army and Navy.

We do not intend to attack anyone either. Our long-suffering people are facing many other urgent problems on the path toward a free, rule-of-law, democratic state.

However, it would help for all to know that in his annual message to Congress, "U.S. National Security Strategy," U.S. President George Bush wrote in August 1991: "As we face numerous and varied threats to stability, we will become convinced again and again that for us, powerful Armed Forces are a permanent source of certainty and a strong guarantee of security on both a regional and global scale." Further on: "Four fundamental requirements of the new era are already obvious: ensuring strategic containment; presence on forward lines in key areas of the world; effective crisis response; and preserving the ability of our country to mobilize and deploy forces should such a task arise."

While planning to reduce its Armed Forces to the reasonable level of "base forces," by 25 percent between 1990 and 1995, with the Army being cut by 29 percent and the Air Force by 28 percent, the U.S. Navy will be cut by only 17 percent, and then from the level of the "600 ship Navy" planned for 1996. In the process, the overall combat potential of the U.S. Navy will increase by a factor of between 1.5 and two by the year 2000 due to the vigorous incorporation of qualitatively new ships into the Navy.

As we moor our fleet dockside, the United States still maintains combat patrols by between 20 and 23 missile submarines carrying ballistic missiles, and 18 to 20 attack nuclear submarines with Tomahawk cruise missiles. Three hundred such missiles were successfully used by the United States during the first "blinding" strikes against Iraqi air defense in January 1991. All these missiles are still aimed at installations in the former Soviet Union.

The history of post-1945 military conflicts (Vietnam, the Middle East, the 1972 Indo-Pakistan conflict, the Falklands conflict, and the Gulf War) are vividly instructive, and highlight the special responsibility of the Navy for the defense of the country in the sea and ocean sectors. The pulling apart of the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla by the sovereign states will result in no fleet remaining on the Black and Caspian Seas one or two years from now. In the absence of comprehensive support, trained personnel, and combat training, the vessels will burn up or sink dockside.

In view of the above, we propose:

1. To instruct the commission for reforming the Armed Forces to profoundly and attentively consider, analyze, and take into account proposals for reforming the organizational structure of the Navy developed by the Main Staff of the Navy.

We consider it vital and necessary that the preservation of the High Command and the Main Staff of the Navy be envisaged within the structure of the Combined Navy of the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as structures performing the functions of combat command and control of the fleets, the planning of their combat use, the management of combat training and the building of all component services of the Navy: nuclear and diesel submarines for various functions; aircraft carrier, missile, antisubmarine warfare, and combat surface vessels and small naval combatants of all types for the defense and protection of naval bases and the coast; amphibious warfare ships; vessels of all kinds for combat, technical, and logistical support of naval forces; naval embarked and carrier-based missile-armed, attack and strike, fighter, antisubmarine warfare, reconnaissance, and special aviation; coastal defense troops; marines and shore-based missile and artillery forces.

2. To include in the commission for military reform truly competent specialists possessing excellent professional Navy training and extensive experience of service with the Navy from among the cadres of the Main Staff of the Navy, the main directorates and directorates of departments and services of the Navy, fleets, and admirals of the group of general inspectors and the reserve.

3. To ensure, in the course of the forthcoming state-to-state negotiations with the Baltic States, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, the preservation of stationing the united Navy at the bases and posts of its current deployment, as is done by the U.S. Navy in Cuba, the Philippines, Japan, and other countries. All the more so because naval bases on the Baltic, Black, and Caspian Seas have been built at the expense and with the resources of the Soviet state, and formerly Russia.

Esteemed Boris Nikolayevich!

We are aware of your lofty responsibility, persistence, and determination in efforts to reinforce the might of Russia and strengthen its unifying role in the commonwealth of democratic independent states endowed with equal rights. The historic mission to preserve the Navy as one of the most significant pillars of the might of our state—a great sea power for 300 years now—has been entrusted to you.

Along with all honorable citizens who feel for the Motherland, we will support you in this endeavor in every way possible.

[Signed] Navy veterans:

Admiral of the Fleet G.M. Yegorov, Hero of the Soviet Union; Admiral of the Fleet N.I. Smirnov, Hero of the Soviet Union; Admiral of the Fleet N.D. Sergeyev;

Admiral V.K. Korobov, Hero of the Soviet Union; Admiral P.G. Kotov, Hero of Socialist Labor; Admiral A.P. Mikhaylovskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union; Admiral V.V. Mikhaylin; Admiral V.V. Sidorov; Vice-Admiral L.A. Matushkin, Hero of the Soviet Union; Air Force Colonel-General G.A. Kuznetsov, Hero of the Soviet Union; Air Force Colonel-General A.A. Mironenko, Hero of the Soviet Union; Vice-Admiral A.M. Ustyantsev.

Russians Protest Ukrainian Claim on Fleet

92UM0346A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Jan 92 p 1

[Letter "signed by 14 people's deputies of Russia on 2 January 1992"; published under the rubric "Briefly": "CIS"]

[Text] A group of people's deputies of Russia have sent a letter with the following content to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine: "We have learned that on 2 January 1992 the high command of the Black Sea Fleet has been invited to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine where the officers and generals will be asked to take the new military oath of fidelity to Ukraine and required to raise the state flag of Ukraine on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

"There is information to the effect that similar demands could be placed on air force personnel stationed on the territory of Ukraine.

"These actions violate the Alma-Ata and Minsk agreements, on which the ink has not even dried yet, and, in our opinion, they create an explosive situation.

"We ask the Ukrainian parliament to either confirm or deny the aforementioned information, and if it is true, explain to us what brought about these actions on the part of the leadership of Ukraine.

"For our part, we call upon you to strictly adhere to the Minsk and Alma-Ata agreements to resolve any of the most important problems, including the problem of the armed forces, in an open and coordinated way through negotiations with the observance of equal security of the parties and mutual respect. Our parliaments should be able not only to form but also to defend an independent viewpoint, even if on some issues it diverges from the viewpoint of the government or president. We want to remind you of the immense responsibility we have to our peoples."

Ukraine Naval Claims Rebuked

92UM0328A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Captain Third Rank B. Maryukha, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the "Opinion" rubric: "We 'Astonish' the World Again..."]

[Text] The first cannons of the Russian fleet did not fire with cannonballs but with boiled turnips and pots with

peas so that no one would get hurt in the games Peter played. That was the toy flotilla where the youthful tsar with his partners grasped the rudiments of the science of navigation. But then at Azov the cannoneers, firing a real cannonade from galleys and boats, forced the Turkish garrison, which was at the mercy of the victors, to lower their banners. Since that time it became the practice that every Russian potentate who wanted to increase or defend the lands of the Fatherland did not rely only on ground troops but also raised the flags of Andrey Perovzanny over the fighting ships.

We will recall how the country's regular military Navy was created, whose 300-year history we hoped to celebrate four years from now. In accordance with an ukase of Peter, the ships were built by kumpanstvo's [companies]—several peasant farmsteads, boyar patrimonial estates, and a number of merchants obligated themselves to support, as it is now said, the material-technical and financial side of construction. But if the Navy suffered losses in battles, it was restored from the bitterness of defeat with copper 5-kopek coins that were collected voluntarily. That is the way it was in our century—after Tsushima, "noviki" [ship class in Russian navy] and battleships, submarines and minelayers were built not at the expense of a dwindling treasury but by subscription organized by patriots of the Navy and the country.

Oh, how necessary a Navy was to Russia. It played first violin more than once in the European political orchestra, and more than one solo was written for the Navy. Not for the seizure of overseas territories and not for the diktat of Russian policy, but for restraining high-handed foreign aggressors, for the support of peace and tranquility around the Russian empire, for the development of trade and good-neighbor relations, and for knowledge of the seas and oceans.

Could Russia, I will say more precisely our Fatherland, in order not to be reputed to be a great Russian chauvinist, have become a great power if we did not have a Navy? From the time of Kievan Rus and the Moscow principality, the Varangians, the Greeks, and other great and small nations eyed it. For the Russian spirit, to this day not fathomed in the West or the East, could not reconcile itself to secondary roles. Of course, it is possible to live like Switzerland, which is famous for its neutrality, watches, and top secret bank accounts. It is possible to have an army made up of 12 guardsmen with one cannon that it is impossible even to fire, because the projectile will land abroad—and there are such states in the world. Such a mode of life is also worthy of all kinds of praise, but is it definitive in our quickly developing world society?

What is typical. The countries that arbitrate the generally accepted formulas for world development possess powerful naval forces. To the contrary, those who lost such significance left the arena together with the losses of their navies. Like Spain, for example, which never recovered after the destruction of its invincible armada.

Naval forces today by their very existence play the role more of a deterrent to aggression, although at times weightier arguments are used. That is the way it is in the world, but in our society, which at one time occupied one-sixth of the earth's surface and was washed by the waters of three oceans? The aspirations of sovereign states to have their own armed forces, including naval forces, is understandable on the one hand, although it is not clear against whom they will be directed, since an agreement has been reached on the commonwealth, and it was sufficient to preserve the existing armed forces to guarantee general security. But even without going into the problems of the interrepublic sharing of the military structures and their division into strategic and other forces, it is really clear that a part of the unified whole will never replace the whole.

No, as a patriot of my small homeland—Ukraine—where I spent half of my life and where my roots remain as before, I am not against a sovereign republic having a sovereign navy. The Cossack *chayka's* [boat with oars and sails] on which the Zaporozhye freemen defended the southern borders of the country also could be considered the forerunners of the Ukrainian navy. Incidentally, this very opinion is held on the staff of the commander in chief of the Navy, and Admiral of the Fleet I. Kapitanets, first deputy commander in chief, told me that units and large formations have been earmarked that can be transferred to Ukraine together with their structural administrations and rear services organs. But to take the entire Black Sea Fleet, pulling it out of the Navy which is already in a difficult position without this? After all, this is several hundred billion rubles, collected by kopeks and by rubles from one-sixth of the earth's surface! The heir and rightful successor to these systems can only be the emerging commonwealth. And, indeed, the Ukrainian coupons will hardly be able to keep the Navy afloat if there is no injection from the outside: specialists from VUZ's [higher educational institutions] of Russia, from training detachments in Belarus and the Polar region, spare parts, property, and POL materials from all ends of the countries of the commonwealth. Failing to consider all of this means to doom the Black Sea Fleet to the role of a toy flotilla and its gradual transformation into a ship graveyard. Incidentally, an example of similar treatment of the Black Sea Fleet is still rumored among admirers of the old days of the Navy. The division into "Whites" and "Reds" in the 1920's ended up in the same way it could end up now—both of them were left without a navy.

The rebuke of Ukraine for its efforts to possess even a navy that is not amusing and comical in the eyes of the world community can also be addressed to the authorities of Azerbaijan, who are laying claim to the Caspian Flotilla. I fear ending up a prophet, but given the presence of a precedent, dividing the fleet may be followed by other new sovereign formations, which are appearing in the once single space like mushrooms after rain. Enough, we are still not ceasing to astonish the world. Should we also amuse it with the organization of "toy" fleets and flotillas?

Although the decisions in this area are made on behalf of the people, this is difficult to believe. Nevertheless, the interests of the people of all sovereign states lie in a reliable collective system of defense. But, of course, also in the fact that our powerful ocean-going Navy was unified.

Northern Fleet Telegrams Yeltsin on Black Sea Fleet Controversy

92UM0328C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[Unattributed report under the general heading: "How Should We Reform the Armed Forces?"]

[Text] Severomorsk—The Military Council of the Northern Fleet has sent a telegram to President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin and R. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian parliament. It states that the Military Council considers it its duty to report to the Russian Federation deep anxiety and concern over the possible transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to full subordination to Ukraine. The disruption of the integrated organism of the Navy will inevitably lead to an appreciable reduction in the level of combat readiness, will affect the reliability of guarding the sea lines of Russia, and will have a negative effect on the morale of the sailors.

The training base of the Black Sea Fleet, the telegram states, was established for the training of specialists for the entire Navy. The overwhelming majority of officers—nuclear scientists and rocketeers—are trained by naval schools situated in Sevastopol.

Obituary: Admiral Kuzmin, Military Academy Chief

92UM0348B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 4

[Obituary of Admiral L.T. Kuzmin]

[Text] On 9 January 1992 Admiral Loryi Trofimovich Kuzmin, candidate of military sciences and professor, died suddenly in execution of his service duties. He had devoted his entire life to the cause of ensuring the security of the motherland and to selfless service of the people.

L.T. Kuzmin was born on 24 June 1931 in the city of Ochakov in Nikolayev Oblast to the family of a sailor. When he was 18 years old he enrolled at the Black Sea Higher Naval Academy imeni P.S. Nakhimov. After graduating from the academy, L.T. Kuzmin served aboard ships of the Black Sea Fleet. He traversed the naval path from commander of the control group aboard

the destroyer Pylkiy to commander of the big antisubmarine ship Komsomolets Ukrainy. Then he moved to military diplomatic work. After graduating from the General Staff Military Academy he assumed leading posts on the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. He headed a military academy from 1988.

In all the posts he occupied, L.T. Kuzmin carried out his military duties with honor. He devoted all his rich experience and knowledge of his business to training military personnel, ensuring the security of the motherland, and enhancing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. His boundless love for the motherland, his elevated sense of responsibility for his assignments, and his attentive and tactful attitude toward people earned for him a rightful authority and the respect of his comrades.

For his services to the motherland and the Armed Forces Admiral L.T. Kuzmin was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner, the Red Star, and "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of USSR" 3rd Class, along with many medals.

The bright memory of Loryi Trofimovich Kuzmin, fiery patriot of the motherland, will be preserved forever in our hearts.

[Signed] Ye.I. Shaposhnikov, V.N. Samsonov, P.S. Grachev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.M. Semenov, V.A. Prudnikov, P.S. Deynikin, V.N. Chernavin, I.V. Fuzhenko, V.P. Mironov, N.V. Chekov, Yu.N. Rodionov, B.A. Omelichev, N.S. Stolyarov, Ye.L. Timokhin, V.M. Mikhaylov, P.I. Ivashutin, Yu.A. Gusev, I.A. Bardeyev, A.G. Pavlov, Ya.I. Sidorov, G.M. Polishchuk, A.Ya. Gulko, A.L. Andriyenko, V.N. Vashchenko, Yu.N. Yereshko, I.P. Sakulkin.

Division of Caspian Fleet Possible

92UM0444D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Are We Going to Divide the Caspian Fleet?"]

[Text] Aleksandr Bogdanov, Commander of the Central Asian Border District and member of the Turkmenistan Presidential Council, stated that the issue of the Caspian Fleet may be examined at a meeting of Commonwealth heads of state to be held soon. In this event, in his words, "Turkmenistan should take for itself one of its [Caspian Fleet] bases located in the Krasnovodsk region."

New Naval Flag Noted

92UM0393C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 18 Jan 92 p 1

[TASS report: "Ship Flags"]

[Text] Moscow, 17 January—At a working meeting of the heads of state of CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member states, it was deemed advisable to

change naval symbology. Now being introduced as the main (stern) flag of the Navy is the historic Russian St. Andrew's flag. The Navy of the former USSR, conference participants confirmed in the document which was adopted, becomes part of the strategic forces of the Commonwealth, with the exception of a portion of Black Sea Fleet forces, which will join the Armed Forces of Ukraine. When a contingent of ships and vessels of the former Soviet Navy is transferred to CIS participating states, the naval flags of the applicable states are hoisted on them in place of the St. Andrew's flag.

In his ukase, the Russian Federation president approved regulations on the naval symbology.

Cruiser Varyag Construction Said to be Halted

92P50086A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
31 Jan 92 p 1

[Photo caption under headline "The Varyag Is Still Not Finished"]

[Text] In connection with a suspension of financing, the Black Sea Shipbuilding Plant has halted construction of the next generation aircraft-carrying cruiser Varyag.

CIS: REAR SERVICES, SUPPORT ISSUES

Rear Services Chief Fuzhenko Interviewed

92UM0417A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Jan 92 p 1

[Interview with Colonel-General Ivan Vasilyevich Fuzhenko, Chief of the Armed Forces Rear Services and recently appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent P. Altunin; place and date not given: "Rear Services on the Lines of the Market"]

[Text]

[Altunin] Ivan Vasilyevich, your first impressions upon assumption of your new position?

[Fuzhenko] I have to say that the appointment came as quite a surprise. Of course, I had constantly encountered problems of the sustenance of the troops before also. But I was, honestly, involved in earnest with the rear services, as commander of the Turkestan Military District. Support of the troops graphically mirrored the difficult and painful processes which are being experienced now, in the period of transition to the market, by the country's economy. Nonetheless, it transpires that I did not have a proper idea of their seriousness and scale. What was most amazing, perhaps, was that under these, to be blunt, dire conditions the centralized system, which is so "unpopular" today, has been enabling the rear services of the armed forces to maintain the state of affairs among the troops and prevent serious breakdowns in the provision of the Army and naval forces.

I believe that under the conditions of transition to the market economy the legal basis of the troop-supply mechanism must be particularly precise. Today, however, it is hazy. I have already familiarized myself with the draft program of the Army and Navy's entry into market relations. I hope that with its realization we will untie many knots in rear service support.

[Altunin] Which of these problems do you consider the main one?

[Fuzhenko] Separation of the problems of the rear services into main and secondary does not seem to me legitimate. Life is so structured that the least underestimation of what is, seemingly, a secondary question today is fraught with the danger of its solution tomorrow requiring enormous expenditure. Nonetheless, I confess that the problem of providing the troops with food and clothing and accessories disturbs me particularly today. Judge for yourself: Compared with 1990 the price of fruit, vegetables, and dairy products has risen several times over, and of meat and meat products, tens of times. At the same time, however, the increase in appropriations for the purchase of food for the Armed Forces has constituted a factor of only 2.2. Nor is the situation any better when it comes to questions of the personal gear and equipment of the personnel. I believe that the corresponding decisions here should be adopted urgently at a high state level.

We know how difficult the food situation is in the country today and have no intention of standing idly by. We need once again, evidently, to analyze the intrinsic potential for the agricultural production which exists in the Army and Navy and to commission it at once. On the other hand, achieving this with the extremely limited forces and resources which are currently at the disposal of the rear services is practically impossible. We are being forced today to perform enormous amounts of internal work among the troops by diverting the personnel from combat training.

At the same time, however, it is well known that in the armies of the developed countries the support units and subunits constitute 30-40 percent and more of the total strength of the armed forces, but with us the strength of the rear services constitutes less than three percent. No comment needed, as they say.

[Altunin] To what extent, in your opinion, are market relations affecting the rear services? What is being done in this connection?

[Fuzhenko] It seems to me that I have already partially answered this question. Market relations are not simply affecting but most fundamentally changing the economic basis of society and, consequently, the entire supply infrastructure. The fundamental policy here remains unchanged—everything necessary to maintain the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces at a sufficient level should be guaranteed by the state. Budget

financing has been and must remain the principal source of the defrayal of all expenditure on their support and development.

The difficult supply situation is forcing us, without waiting for stabilization, to ourselves actively approach the market, decisively introduce economic methods of the control of institutions under our jurisdiction, and establish direct relations with civilian enterprises and organizations and master commerce. As you know, our military commercial center, which is starting work, specifically, on the sale of assets released in connection with the reduction in the Armed Forces, has been created.

I receive daily a multitude of proposals from various companies, firms, and unions which would like to participate actively in the solution of the social problems confronting the Armed Forces. They are being examined closely, and we will, of course, support everything rational. At the same time the scale of the social problems in the Army and Navy are such that a profoundly considered and coordinated state program is required. The rear services of the Armed Forces are prepared to make their contribution to its elaboration and implementation.

[Altunin] Have you perceived the entire complexity of relations with the departments "feeding" the rear services and with the suppliers?

[Fuzhenko] I could hardly have gotten a feel for everything in so short a time. One thing is clear, these difficulties are growing in avalanche fashion.

I consider the main ones the lack of financing and the refusal of many suppliers to fulfill their contract commitments in respect of supplies of material resources in full. The geography of these suppliers is vast. Many of them are located in what are now sovereign states. For the fulfillment of their commitments in full the supplier enterprises are making increasingly new demands and raising the price of finished products, food, and building materials.

In connection with the liquidation of the Union ministries which were formerly responsible for the placing of military orders in industry we have now been forced to establish direct contacts with tens of thousands of enterprises throughout the territory of the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States. But there is a shortage of resources and, in addition, qualified personnel for this.

Many enterprises are prepared to fulfill our orders, but cannot do so due to a lack of raw material. Specifically, it is a question of supplies of cloth for the sewing of uniforms.

[Altunin] What, in your opinion, are the ways out of this situation?

[Fuzhenko] Work and work. Patient, persevering, enterprising.

We hope that the efforts of the governments of the states of the Commonwealth will immediately establish and legalize the new status of the Armed Forces, the general procedure of their financing and support, the responsibility of the suppliers and so forth. Otherwise the difficulties in the organization of logistics support will increase.

[Altunin] Have you already encountered problems of the rear services in connection with the withdrawal of Army units from the groups of forces?

[Fuzhenko] Yes. I served in the Western Group of Forces and I know that the stocks of material resources on the territory of the East European countries were created over decades. But now a very short space of time has been allotted for their withdrawal, and in full, preferably. There is a shortage of transport facilities and a lack of foreign currency to pay for the use of lines of transportation. We are therefore having to sell some of these stocks locally. To accommodate the stocks of material assets which are being withdrawn it is necessary to build a large number of new repositories, for which once again there is a shortage of both forces and resources. This, in brief, is the situation as regards this problem.

[Altunin] Whom and on what would you care to address through KRASNAYA ZVEZDA?

[Fuzhenko] I would like to appeal primarily to the entire personnel of the rear services of the Armed Forces that it remember the great responsibility it now bears and to display courage, patience, perseverance, and selflessness in the accomplishment of the difficult tasks of logistics support at a time that is so difficult for all of us.

This is the direction indicated to us also by the material of the All-Army Officers Meeting which has just been held and at which full voice was given to questions of sustenance and amenities. We also must take account of this.

Housing Committee Official on Work, Situation

92UM0275A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Dec 91 First edition p 2

[Interview with Moscow Garrison Servicemen's Joint Committee on Housing Issues Co-Chairman Captain 1st Rank Yuriy Nikitovich Soldatenkov by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel S. Dyshev: "The 'Regal Man' Has Nowhere To Live"]

[Text] A year ago, our newspaper published an interview with Moscow Garrison Servicemen's Joint Committee on Housing Issues Co-Chairman Captain 1st Rank Yu.N. Soldatenkov. Let us recall that this independent social organization was founded in September 1990 in order to attract the attention of society, legislative and executive organs, and the USSR Ministry of Defense to servicemen's

housing problems and to attain their most rapid resolution. Our correspondent recently met with Yu. Soldatenkov and asked him to talk about the committee's work.

[Dyshev] Yuriy Nikitovich, as you well know, right now there are 9,250 officers without apartments in Moscow. Last year, there were 1,500 more of them. As a representative of a social organization, what will you say about the housing situation?

[Soldatenkov] The situation is critical as before. The fact is that the reduction of the list is false and has been attained primarily because the influx into the capital of servicemen who do not have housing has been drastically reduced. But this practice cannot be continued for a long time. This is absurd. Headquarters, directorates, and military educational institutions, like, by the way, other ministries and departments that are located in Moscow, cannot exist for a long time without constant replenishment of cadres from the "periphery."

So, the problem has been driven deep underground for only a short period of time. Mossoviet is getting off with promises and we have not received a single square meter of the planned 50,000 square meters plus 40,000 for transients (in accordance with Mossoviet Presidium's 92nd decision). We have repeatedly appealed to this level of authority but there have been no results whatsoever. Thanks only that G. Popov has not rejected the old debts to the USSR Ministry of Defense. But all housing which has been allocated to us, or at least 98 percent of it, has been received thanks to construction through the efforts of the Ministry of Defense.

But the Ministry of Defense cannot carry out this task through its efforts alone. At best, we can hope for 1,700 apartments per year—as USSR Ministry of Defense Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate Deputy Chief Major-General D. Yarmak promises. The problems are deepening with the troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe, an action that is more than hasty, not supported materially, that is associated only with the solution of political goals, and that has been expressed in the tragedies of hundreds of thousands of people. We are expecting troop withdrawals from several republics. Where will they be withdrawn—naturally, the majority of them to the RSFSR. Add to this the further reduction of the army. Reservists will return from remote garrisons of the Transbaykal and the Extreme North to the European part of the country, including to Moscow. No one will remain in those regions—you can only serve there, it is impossible to live there.

[Dyshev] And what kind of way out do you see to this hopelessness?

[Soldatenkov] The housing problem has always been acute. But we lost everything we had as a result of the dismantling of the system that existed. At the very least, there were the well-known CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions, according to which servicemen received a certain amount of housing

from the local authorities. This system has ceased functioning. The strange indifference of our leaders, including the RSFSR President, is also striking. Maybe, the habit that the Ministry of Defense must solve its problems for itself is having an impact? But is it conceivable under conditions of army reductions and the need to maintain combat readiness (no one has relieved us of this duty) to have to deal with the resettlement of nearly a million people? Precisely how many "bums" will we have along with members of servicemen's families. The situation has been inflamed so much that emergency measures are needed. You will not print this but I will say it. Officers are coming to see me and they propose solving the housing problem with weapons—by seizing housing. After all, we cannot play with fire.... Of course, no one will resort to such a senseless step, it was said in the heat of the moment, in a fit of anger.... But the problem has already long since become overripe. How can people who serve the state be treated with such callousness.

[Dyshev] Your committee was the initiator for the creation of a single list....

[Soldatenkov] We came to the conclusion that single lists for people without apartments would normalize the housing distribution process, give everyone equal rights, and help to specify the time periods when a person could obtain housing. They are disadvantageous to the leadership that has become accustomed to using available housing in its own interests. Later we understood that a single chain of ten thousand people was unwieldy and we decided to create lists by branches of the Armed Forces and by units that are on the books at the Main Quarters and Utilities Directorate. But unfortunately there are no such lists at many units and this, by the way, is a violation of USSR Minister of Defense Order No 93 1991. We receive letters: "Come to our area and help us form a common list." But distribution—this is the second question. And the first and basic question is the law according to which a servicemen should be provided with housing. There is no such law just like there is no law on the status of servicemen. You can serve either 10, 20, or 40 years and you cannot submit complaints with regard to the lack of housing to anyone. No one will ask you how long you have been waiting for an apartment: five or 25 years? No document states what kind of housing is appropriate for you. Some categories of military personnel have found themselves in general in an untenable situation—military representatives. They were previously supported by the enterprises, now enterprises are refusing them: "You are—not ours."

I stress that we vitally need a program at the state level, at the very highest level.... But not that one which they have adopted—to provide housing by the year 2000. The program must be strict in time, time periods, the distribution of functions among officials, and material support. And this is primarily directed at insuring that the people who receive housing are those people who in general do not have a corner of their own.

[Dyshev] But does the committee have suggestions on the draft program?

[Soldatenkov] We have worked everything out and we have sent the documents to the secretariat of the Vice President of Russia—this was begun at his initiative. But everything has been frozen for now. The amorphous position of the RSFSR People's Deputies is disconcerting. I did not see a People's Deputy above the rank of colonel raise housing problems at any Supreme Soviet session. The appropriate committees and specific time periods and, besides all of that, nontraditional methods of solving the problem are defined in our draft program: a guaranteed land grant with the subsequent involvement of construction firms, including foreign firms, and small enterprises. You can sell part of the apartments at auction and buy a much larger number of apartments from the mayor with the profits. In Moscow, there are empty hotels and family dormitories which were formerly occupied by "limitchiki" [translation unknown]. Why not lease these buildings to us? Already without talking about the sale of surplus military property. We would also stop demanding housing from Mossoviet: we are prepared to build it ourselves. They have approached me with proposals. They say: find the land and we will agree to build any type of housing. Part of the apartments for us and the greater part for you. But the Ministry of Defense is not disposing of any land. If it was a state program—everything would be quickly resolved. According to this idea, the plenipotentiary commission (name this organ whatever you like) would have had the right to manage land, money and resources. But there is no such organ.

[Dyshev] Yuriy Nikitovich, does your committee have enough power to control the distribution of housing?

[Soldatenkov] We pinned great hopes on the Central Housing Commission, which, incidentally, was founded at our committee's initiative—and it is the first in the history of the Armed Forces. But the committee's composition does not satisfy us: it consists of the officials on whom the distribution of housing depends. Main Bileting and Maintenance Directorate Head Colonel-General N. Gryaznov heads it. The committee has met just once during its entire existence. Incidentally, it does not even have the information about whether housing lists have been established in all units. If the Central Housing Commission was independent and actually worked, there would hardly be discord between the branches of the Armed Forces, headquarters, and directorates: well, they say, pilots obtain more housing than servicemen in the Ground Forces, etc. The supply percentage—equal for all—must become the main criteria. Our committee regularly studies documents on the distribution of apartments and the Main Quarters and Utilities Directorate is meeting us halfway. What we are primarily interested in—is strict compliance with the procedures for supplying housing according to the term of service in Moscow.

The committee has called conferences of servicemen without apartments three times. If G. Popov and S. Stankevich were at our first conference, then none of those invited found the time to address the third: Neither Russian Vice President A. Rutskoy, nor representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense leadership, the mayor, or Mossoviet. Only Comrade D. Yarmak was at the conference. We did not want to set conditions or ultimatums. We wanted to know, how would the problem of the homeless be solved, what could we count on, and how much the contents of our empty purse would be stretched? Incidentally, we wrote a letter to the minister of defense. But a meeting is being postponed for now. But the situation is simply critical. Compensation for housing for a family of four totals 93 rubles. Do you believe that you can rent even a one-room apartment for this sum in Moscow? Incidentally, the actual cost is already equal to our monthly salary. Well, are you thinking about how the "regal man" is going to live tomorrow?

We are pinning great hopes on the Ministry of Defense and Moscow Government joint program that was adopted in June 1991. We would like to hope that it will not suffer the same fate as the Mossoviet Presidium's 92nd decision.

FROM THE EDITOR. During the last month, officials have spoken on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA who are directly involved in the solution of the housing problem for servicemen in Moscow, including Capital Vice-Mayor Yu. Luzhkov and Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate Representative Major-General D. Yarmak. The essence of their statements could be formulated as follows: there will be fewer "bums" in shoulder boards.

As we can see, Moscow's officers without apartments hardly share this optimistic point of view, especially with regard to Mossoviet's contribution to the solution of the housing problem. We had hoped that the capital collegium, which was supposed to meet on December 20, would provide a response to the issues that trouble them. But, alas, it was postponed. So, the questions remain for now....

Moscow To Address Military Housing Question

92UM0295C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 31 Dec 91 p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel A. Oliynik and Colonel V. Guryanov, head of the MVO [Moscow Military Oblast] press center: "Possibly No More Military Homeless"]

[Text] Issues concerning the social welfare of military service members were reviewed at a meeting of the Moscow capital board with the participation of the mayor of Moscow, G. Popov. Board member Colonel-General V. Toporov, Commander of the MVO [Moscow Military District], who addressed this issue, dwelled on

one of the major problems in the social sphere, housing for families of officers and warrant officers.

Approximately 9,500 service members are currently on the list. In connection with this, Colonel-General Toporov directed a number of requests to the government and mayor of Moscow. The latter was in regard to 142,700 square meters owed in general living space (four thousand apartments), plus another 50,000 square meters of housing in ZhK and ZhSK buildings, which Moscow authorities were obligated to provide the military every year.

A working group was created headed by the Moscow government minister Deputy Premier V. Korobchenko. Under the direction of this group a program for the social welfare of military servicemembers in the Moscow garrison will be devised.

The vice mayor of the capital, Yu. Luzhkov summed up the results of the discussion on this issue.

Housing Problem of Returning Troops Viewed

92UM0383B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Major N. Ivanyuk, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Many Military Units Withdrawn From Abroad Are Having To Start From Scratch"]

[Text] The construction of the first settlement for Soviet servicemen under a program financed by the German Government has been completed. Housewarming parties are on in Borisov, in the vicinity of Minsk. This fact is gratifying in and of itself. Alas, it has not generated an outbreak of enthusiasm in the military community. Our editorial mailbag testifies to the opposite: The feeling of being dispossessed mounts on the part of officers, warrant officers, and their wives and children who have returned to their native land.

Major Voyevoda, Captain Oplakanskiy, and other officers and warrant officers from the Odessa Military District wrote: "Our unit left Germany all together, ahead of schedule. Care was given to stress this at a rally devoted to the portentous' event held in the presence of foreign journalists. In March of last year a military transport plane brought us to our Motherland. From today's perspective, our discussions at the time appear childishly naive. We thought that a separate unit was definitely included in the calculation of funds which were submitted for settlement to the Germans as compensation for outlays involved in the withdrawal of the troops. Obviously nobody pulled an amount going into billions of marks out of a hat: The Germans know how to count their money. However, it has been a year now, but for our unit these monies still have not become tangible.

"We may omit mention of the fact that after our billeting at a training center, all blessings of civilization were left out; many families of servicemen are familiar with this problem. However, families who live in an overcrowded

barracks-style structure with walls made of cardboard faced a simple issue when the cold season set in: Where are they to wash their children? In the soldiers' bath where the tiles are ice-cold? However, our children have not taken the military oath...

"Alas, we are of no concern to anyone. Having been entirely forgotten, we still do not know on what waiting lists for apartments our names are, if on any, and what our turn is..."

The perception of being not needed is perhaps the most piercing, acute, and sad motif which comes through in the letters. The Polyakov and Svistunov families from Smolensk complained: "They put us up in a wooden barracks (one family to a room) which by pure happenstance has not been torn down; it has been condemned. Our difficult living conditions and the proximity of parking areas for jet aircraft affect our health unfavorably. Intestinal and respiratory diseases in children have become more frequent. We frequently have to do without hot food and water.

Very often, money, and a lot of it, has to be paid for "participation" in this peculiar survival experiment. Major Dyakonov, Lieutenant Shchedrin, and other officers and warrant officers who, as fate would have it, ended up in a village in Lvov Oblast, wrote in their letter: "For example, a dormitory room with four beds costs a family of four R80. The finance department does not pay these bills; we are considered residents of dormitories to whom housing has been provided, notwithstanding the fact that living here is unbearable: Toilets and bathrooms are out of order; hot water is available three times a week for one hour, or even for 10 minutes; the lighting is dusk-like since there are no light bulbs."

Soldiers and sailors do not have it better upon returning to their native land. Sailors Dudka, Zhdanov, and 27 of their comrades narrated in their short, desperate letter to the editorial office that, after returning from Germany, they have been in the service in Estonia. It is cold in the crew quarters—the temperature is never above 10 degrees; they take showers irregularly; bed linens are changed infrequently, and when they are, the newly issued ones are damp. The sailors finish their letter as follows: "Our commander, Captain Third Rank Ye. Potapov, is aware of all of this, but takes no measures."

There is no argument: Urgent measures aimed at improving the situation may and should be taken in this unit, as well as in others. However, it appears that on the whole the problem will not become less acute. We cannot be blind to the fact that the withdrawal of the troops has turned into yet another noisy campaign, lacking material, technical, or organizational support. This is not even about military units redeployed from foreign countries embarking on combat training and living a full-fledged life immediately, without wasting time. This is about surviving, clinging on to the remnants of optimism and the belief that at least someone needs elite military units.

Those who face calamities in the barracks still have some hope; after all, they have not yet been left out in the cold. Meanwhile, there are many people whose hopes have been completely dashed. Major V. Ulyanov wrote to us: "Our unit was withdrawn from the Western Group of Forces and disbanded. I, who have given the armed forces 21 years of my life, was assigned to the city military commissar with a view to a subsequent discharge to the reserves. Common sense suggests that apartments have already been built somewhere for me and my comrades. However, we have not heard about them..."

Many of our readers are in a similar situation. For example, Lieutenant Colonel V. Nechayev, who, after returning from Germany, is soon to be discharged to the reserves, reported that the command of the Volgograd Garrison had responded to all of his appeals as follows: The city authorities do not allocate apartments for servicemen; go and seek out your apartment yourself. Valeriy Sergeyevich asked us: "Tell me in what other state they treat people who are servants of the state like that?"

We queried Major General D. Yarmak, chief of directorate at the GlavKEU [Main Housing Maintenance Directorate], as to whether at least a document of some kind, if not a law, exists which prohibits literally tossing out into the street individuals who have dedicated the best years of their lives to serving in the Armed Forces. No, there is none. Commanders and the public may accommodate such people or, as our mail suggests, they may not. Other power-hungry individuals issue direct threats: "I will have you discharged without an apartment!..."

It appears that this is impermissible even given the current harsh living conditions. This will signify not only moral but also financial demise for thousands upon thousands of people. The right to a dwelling of a person leaving the Armed Forces, including due to reductions, should be immediately codified.

Here is one more conclusion suggested by an analysis of letters associated with the withdrawal of troops from Germany. The bulk of these letters are from Russia, from the boondocks where the housing problem has virtually not gone beyond the fairy-tale and saga stages: They would be happy to share what they have with the military, but they have nothing. Meanwhile, military settlements are being built full tilt in Belarus, where there will be perhaps far fewer troops than were expected. A discrepancy between plans built into the Soviet-German program for housing construction and the realities of life is already evident. These are complex issues but we cannot pretend that they do not exist. No matter how the issues of structuring the military are resolved in the Commonwealth of Independent States, people should come before materiel.

'Homeless Officer's' Troubles Chronicled

92UM0431A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Major O. Pavlyuk: "What If You Had Such Anguish?"]

[Text] We have happened to hear many stories recently about the ordeal of the families of homeless officers. It appears that our society has begun to get used to this topic. Nobody finds the combination of words "homeless officers" shocking anymore. Still the following episode, which is outright barbaric as we see it, cannot leave anybody indifferent.

Perhaps Svetlana Vasilyevna Dlusskaya understood the innermost sense of the word "happiness" on the day her Irina came into this world. The first-born of the family, Roman, was growing up, but everything was different in Irina's case. She turned out to be uncommonly bright, attentive, and affectionate, as if a fairy tale princess. When her daughter grew up and began diligently doing household chores, all Svetlana Vasilyevna was left to do was exchange admiring glances with her husband and conceal her happy smile.

Suddenly everything collapsed overnight. Childish pranks resulted in a most grave head injury. All that mother remembers is shaking nervously when the doctor said: "Medicine is powerless..." They allowed them to take their daughter home—to say farewell...

For the night, Svetlana Vasilyevna settled on the floor next to Irina's bed and did not get a wink of sleep. Valeriy Romualdovich, as if possessed, made the rounds of hospitals and polyclinics. However, the doctors merely threw up their hands helplessly.

At this point, somebody advised them to see a quack doctor. The weightless body of the girl, with her hands hanging helplessly, was loaded into a car and taken to the granny. She performed a miracle: Three weeks later the girl came back to life. Somewhat later she was so much better that she went back to school for the first time after a long absence.

Irina came back to life, as a flower affected by light frost thaws out. She quickly caught up with children her age in school and became the best student in her grade again. Who could have thought that those happy days would become the last opening in a bank of menacing clouds which were gathering in the skies of their family life?

The eight-year-old girl was suddenly taken ill in the car of a train which was taking the family of Major Dlusskiy from the easternmost to the westernmost border, to his new post. They asked for an ambulance through emergency procedures over the radio. A car with a red cross on its side drove right up to the door of the railway car at one of the stations. However, it turned out that the doctor did not have medicines capable of sustaining the child. Having leafed through the medical record and

encountered the old hopeless diagnosis, the doctor recommended that the girl be moved on. "After all, comrade major, you need to hurry to your new post." However, he had the parents sign a statement to the effect that they were picking up their child voluntarily. He ought to be thanked for remembering to warn them: "For Irina, the vertical position means instant death."

The Dlusskiy's went on. Life continued to face them with still new trials. In Moscow a railway terminal chief, having lent them half an ear, snapped in response: "This is your problem, and you take care of it!" In Kiev a female ticket agent yelled at them: "Don't bother me with your medical certificate. If the child is sick take her to the hospital. This is no reason to loiter at railway terminals!"

Finally they found a "kind-hearted" taxi driver who took the Dlusskiy's to Lvov for 500 rubles.

They had to move into a gloomy and damp semi-basement enclosure. The adults settled on the floor for the night, wracking their brains about where to put the elder son every time. On top of everything else, pain in the spinal cord began to bother Irina more and more. She saw the red eyes of her father and mother, she pitied her emaciated brother, and bit her lips, trying not to moan, especially at night, when her back pain became unbearable.

After a while, the family of Major Dlusskiy moved to a room in an apartment with amenities. However, the landlord refused to seek a residence permit for this room for them: You try and evict them later with a child like this! However, Valeriy Romualdovich and Svetlana Vasilyevna were happy even with this for the time being. They believed that the unit to which the head of the family reported for service would help them soon.

Misery loves company. In December 1988 Irina went blind. Svetlana Vasilyevna discovered this by chance: "Sweetheart, why did you not tell me anything?" Irina stroked her mother's hair with her feeble hand and calmed her down: "You suffer because of me anyway. I thought that there is no reason to pain you still more."

A complicated and unsuccessful operation followed, and after it—a string of hectic days and endless nights each of which could become the last.

One year passed in this way, and then another, and yet another. Officers of the aviation regiment in which Major Dlusskiy has served since June 1988 have arrived and gone to new service locations. Deputy commanders have been given three-room apartments; they have provided for the flying personnel as best they could—they always have priority in the Air Force. In all of this, Valeriy Romualdovich has been invariably told: "Comrade major, be patient. Please understand our position."

He understood.... Of course, he could have slammed his fist against the table. However, he is not that kind of man. After all, the commander always allowed Dlusskiy

to take time off when he was in dire straits. So is he to make a row now and force the issue? It would be awkward...

The blind Irina gradually became immobile. On top of everything, the owners of the apartment came from far away and demanded categorically: "Move out!" Valeriy Romualdovich rushed to respond to an advertisement on housing to let, and then to another... It was in vain. Everybody flatly refused to put up a family with such a child.

He had to approach the chairman of the housing commission of the unit, Lieutenant Colonel B. Rudyuk, yet again, for the n-th time. The response was: "The situation with apartments is tight. Apart from you, half the people on the waiting list are pilots....In addition, there are those discharged to the reserves and entitled to preferences...."

However, they were not straightforward with him in the regiment. I have no doubt that the family of the deputy chief of staff, who has been afflicted with woes, could have been helped long ago. The residential space allocation ledgers which are diligently maintained at higher headquarters testify to this impartially. As long as more than three years ago when Major Dlusskiy took his troubles to the housing commission for the first time, its current chairman, Lieutenant Colonel Rudyuk, was already moving into a three-room apartment. Another officer was also given similar housing by way of upgrading his accommodations. Even two four-room apartments were assigned by the unit that year.

Something else is astonishing: In more than three years, not a single official of the regiment, fellow servicemen of Major Dlusskiy, has set foot in his temporary quarters. Could it be that they were afraid to look into the girl's eyes flashing with pain?

It seems that recently they noticed the Dlusskiy family. If Lieutenant Colonel O. Matuzov is to be believed, the higher headquarters even promised to allocate an apartment to them in the immediate future. However, for now these are promises. Where is the officer's family to live?

Many of those who could help the Dlusskiy family are shrugging them off and turning away. This begs the following question: What if you had such anguish?

In the fall of last year, the blind and motionless Irina turned 12. Of these 12 years, she has been bed-ridden for four....

Official On Food Supplies to Military

92UM0388A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Jan 92 p 6

[Interview with N. Kozlov, head of CIS Armed Forces Central Food Supplies Directorate, by Vasiliy Izgarshev; place and date not given: "Can We Feed Our Army?"]

[Text] Here are three questions for N. Kozlov, head of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces Central Food Supplies Directorate.

[Izgarshev] Nikolay Borisovich, the press keeps informing us that soldiers are starving in some areas because of the deregulation of prices. What would you say to this?

[Kozlov] Well, they are not starving in the true meaning of the word. We will not allow this; but the food situation is difficult. The point is that we exist on a fixed budget. They made their allocations to us without making any allowances at all for the current deregulation, of course. But we cannot buy food at free prices or through barter deals. We have nothing to give in exchange for food. Meanwhile, attempts are being made to make us do barter deals. Everybody is begging—give us this, give us that.

[Izgarshev] Newspapers have reported that disrupted food supplies are being experienced in the Far East Military District and the Pacific Fleet. What about other districts?

[Kozlov] Yes, in the east we really have a shortage of meat, butter, and some other foodstuffs. But things are worse in some other locations. In Estonia it is not only bread and flour that do not get delivered to the units as it was reported in the press, but they do not get meat or fish either. As we entered the market economy many Russian firms and enterprises refused to continue food deliveries to the military. Georgia has completely suspended all food supplies to the Black Sea Fleet. Now Ukraine has done the same. The Ukrainian leaders aim to own the Black Sea Fleet, but their republic does not give it a gram of food. The situation is extremely serious. I will not even talk about the fact that Ukraine ceased to issue sugar to military food warehouses. Here is the last sore point: It has been a year already since the local authorities in Transcaucasia stopped delivering food to the personnel of the Transcaucasian Military District.

[Izgarshev] Do you see a way out, Nikolay Borisovich?

[Kozlov] This is the conclusion we draw for ourselves: We need to intensify our own efforts to produce food, we need to develop our sovkhoses, of which we now have 91. They all are good farms, but we cannot feed the whole Army with their produce alone. I think that our politicians have to understand: Our Army is the child of our people, and all presently independent states have to take care of it. They cannot only tend to their own national forces, which goes without saying, but they also have to think about the united armed forces. We cannot do without them, and it is the people's main duty to keep their soldiers and sailors well-fed, clad, and shod. A hungry man with a gun in his hands—can we allow this?

Baltiysk Garrison Protests Food Prices

92UM0429A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Gromak: "The First 'Hunger Riot' Occurred in our Westernmost Garrison. Apart From the Authorities, It Was Also Aimed at the Military Trade Administration"]

[Text] Twenty days were all it took for the residents of the westernmost city in Russia to feel price deregulation. "People Demand the Resignation of Top City Officials." "How Long Do We Have to Live in Cold and Poverty?" "We Demand a Drop in Prices of Foodstuffs and Essential Goods." "We Do Not Want to Suffer the Despotism of Military Trade Administration Any More!" In brief, this was the essence of slogans and signs displayed at an unauthorized rally in front of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] building.

The situation in Baltiysk is truly complicated. Many houses do not have heat; there are disruptions in the natural gas and water supplies. Huge crowds line up for milk and bread...

Acting top city executive A. Kuznetsov had to authorize the rally. After its participants made their demands public, threats and remarks addressed to the city authorities were heard from the crowd for about an hour. Some of them were also directed at the city military trade administration head, Major S. Khorolskiy.

Even the Baltic Navy Trade Administration head, Lieutenant Colonel N. Setin, would not pretend that everything is fine in the local military trade establishments.

"There are shortcomings in the work of Major Khorolskiy, head of the Military Trade Administration. Recently he was given a severe reprimand, and was penalized financially. The trade administration head has also been warned that if he does not draw conclusions from all this, we will have to consider whether he is right for this position..."

But is the Military Trade Administration solely to blame?

Ukraine Claims Military Medical Facilities

92UM0383A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Yelena Agapova: "Yesterday, It Was the Fleet. Is It Resorts Today?"]

[Text] It appears that a solution concerning the future of the Black Sea Fleet has been found. This may be gratifying. However, a new conflict situation developed on the shores of the Black Sea while passions raged in earnest over combat vessels. Undoubtedly it is not as terrifying as in the case of the fleet. However, it is capable of provoking yet another confrontation.

This time, the transfer of military medical facilities in the territory of Ukraine to the republic, as its property, and the possible consequences of this transfer, are at issue. I will say right away that the issue of military hospitals was resolved quite peaceably. This was to be expected because a network of military hospitals exists in all states of the Commonwealth. Let us note that there are 36 military hospitals in Ukraine (eight in the Kiev Military District, 15 in the Carpathian Military District, eight in the Odessa Military District, and five at the Black Sea Fleet).

Numerous military sanatoriums, recreation facilities, pensions, and pioneer camps in the territory of Ukraine, including the Crimea, are another matter. In this instance, disputes are unavoidable.

From the files of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. There are 29 military sanatoriums and recreation facilities with more than 15,000 spaces in the territory of Ukraine. Sixteen of them are in the Crimea. Out of those, 14 report to services of the Armed Forces, districts, and the GVMU [Main Military Medical Directorate], one to the Kiev Military District (the "Pearl" Sanatorium), and one to the Black Sea Fleet.

It became known in early January that Ukraine claims all military resorts in its territory without exception. (They account for 53 percent of the total number of military resorts). A representative of the GVMU was told this at an official meeting in Kiev. Therefore, sanatoriums of such renown as "The Crimea," "Frunzenskiy" (the Missile Troops), "Gurzuf" and "Alushta" (the Space Troops), "Sudak" (the Air Force), "Truskavets" (the Air Defense Troops), "Yalta" (the Leningrad Military District), and many others were also to be taken over as the property of Ukraine.

In the opinion of Medical Service Lieutenant-General Eduard Nechayev, Chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate, military resorts, which have always been centrally financed, comprise the property of all the Armed Forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]. He believes that the most civilized means of resolving this conflict is to designate a number of sanatoriums for joint use by all the armed services of the Commonwealth.

Interestingly, a list of military sanatoriums in the Crimea in which the servicemen of the Strategic Deterrent Forces, primarily the flight personnel, officers of surface vessels and submarines, and members of their families, could undergo medical rehabilitation and receive treatment has already been provided to the Ukrainian side. However, a proposal to reserve for them at least a minimum of six military sanatoriums has been rejected by the Ukrainian side.

Given this arrangement, the Armed Forces of the CIS will essentially remain without a network of sanatoriums and resorts. Thus, Belarus, Turkmenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in essence do not have military sanatoriums. As is known, the Crimea has

always been a priority; it enjoyed the status of an all-union resort area promoted here by the former Union.

The only center for rehabilitation from gunshot wounds and injuries which treats, among others, Afghan veterans, is located in Saki.

The only tuberculosis sanatorium in the entire Armed Forces is located in Alupka.

All (!) military sanatoriums for children, including a unique one for treating cerebral palsy, are also located in Ukraine.

From now on, recreation for families, consisting of parents and children, at military resorts is out of the question.

The veterans of the Armed Forces, who under such circumstances will not live to see sanatorium vouchers, do not even know about their fate.

The list may be continued, but I believe that everything is clear anyway. It is also clear to Ukrainian experts who, according to our information, expect to make a concession of sorts: to leave several resorts for temporary use by the Armed Forces. However, the issue has not been finally resolved. Meanwhile, this issue affects the interests of not only Ukraine and Russia, as was the case with the Black Sea Fleet, but also those of all servicemen of the CIS and their families. There is no dispute: Ukraine has a right to own resorts in the Crimea, just as other members of the CIS. What are the shares of all of them? This is what needs to be determined. The situation with the Black Sea Fleet has indicated how dangerous it is to approach a solution to such problems from the point of view of a proprietor: This is mine and that's it! Since politicians succeeded in finding a solution with regard to dividing up the fleet, there is hope that a balanced approach will be opted for with regard to military resorts as well.

Recently an officer assembly was held at the GVMU. In their appeal to the parliaments and the presidents, the military medical personnel called for preserving, in the immediate future, the existing system for providing health care for the servicemen and their families, and for ensuring equal opportunities and conditions for the use of military resorts by all.

For now, we have learned that all military sanatoriums in the Crimea have received a telephone message from the capital of Ukraine. Chiefs of resorts have been instructed to appear in Kiev.

Why? For now, the issue remains open.

Centrally Subordinate Units Face Difficulties

92UM0433B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula: "Centrally Subordinate Units: What Can Help Them Under the New Circumstances?"]

[Text] I believe that I will not be divulging a military secret if I say that there are units of, so to say, a special kind, in each district. They are called centrally subordinate units. For example, in the Volga-Urals Military District, there are no fewer such units than those "of their own." The relative autonomy of these units with regard to supplies, as well as their system of control and subordination, made it possible for them to do without extensive contacts with the district. Cooperation was mainly effected within the framework of their common task—maintaining the combat readiness of the troops. However, this is not to say that there were no problems in mutual relations.

Perhaps many of us have heard about a tragedy in a centrally subordinate Air Force unit in the vicinity of Ulyanovsk, where two villains shot the guard detail. At the time the military prosecutor's office rejected complaints against the department of the service of the district troops which arose. In the opinion of military lawyers, the organization of guard duty in the unit was not at all the reason for the incident in the unit.

Colonel S. Yudenko, senior officer with the department of the service of the district troops, told me: "Nonetheless, the lesson has not been learned. To this day, there is a lack of certainty in mutual relations between our service and these units. On one hand, it is our duty to inspect them and make reports to Moscow. On the other hand, we lack the resources to monitor the service in the units of the district... A final decision should be made: Either our staff must be increased, so as to make it possible for us to cover units not belonging to the district, or our supervision over them should be altogether removed."

Indeed, the district was still considered to be a military-territorial unit performing donor functions: This was where food, materiel, and means of material and technical support could be obtained. Commanders of central units seldom showed up at military councils and conferences of the district, and for this reason frequently turned out to be "uninformed." On occasion, petty issues were resolved through Moscow. Moscow likewise played the role of justice of the peace in conflicts, although, as our analysis shows, most of them could have been resolved locally.

Some might say that this is the way it should be. After all, we have just one army for now... However, army solidarity is not the point here; it is rather that under the current circumstances the survival, or, so to say, adaptation potential of the district units and central units differs considerably. The same disruptions in the

delivery of foodstuffs due to a shortage of labor will have a different effect on the situation of, say, a motorized infantry regiment and a motor vehicle pool subordinate to the center. The regiment will trade in training grounds for kolkhoz grounds for a while, and will earn what it needs through its own endeavors. A motor vehicle pool, at which clerical employees account for the bulk of officers of personnel, has more difficulty doing this.

Colonel F. Gavrilov, chief of the food supply service of the district, told me: "Nonetheless, both the district and the central units already have foodstuffs. However, another problem has developed here. Our service acts flexibly and promptly responds to changes in the economy of the region and the republic, whereas officers of the rear services of central units are in no hurry to do this."

Indeed, in the last one and a half years the rear services directorate of the district has developed an integrated program of adjustments to a market economy on the part of the troops. A considerable volume of research work has been done. Dozens of methodological conferences and seminars have been held in various echelons. However, for some reason, the rear services of central units have not yet taken an interest in the experience gained.

It has long been necessary to untie the multitude of knots in the relations between the district and centrally subordinate units in the field of material and technical supplies. After all, paradoxical situations have already developed in this sphere. I was told at the engineering directorate about one central unit receiving bulldozers. It just so happened that this unit is billeted precisely in the city where the vehicles are produced. It would appear that the issue could be resolved in a simple manner, "from your gates to mine." However, instructions rather than common sense still have the upper hand in the bureaucratized distribution system. The plant shipped the bulldozers to a district depot 1,000 kilometers away. The paperwork was processed again there; the machines were once again loaded onto flatcars, and shipped back to the customer unit. They say that such practices date back many years. Therefore, we can only surmise what this merry-go-round costs us.

What does the district propose to do in the area of putting its relations with centrally subordinate units in order, as far as the problem in question is concerned?

For example, the clothing service is advocating the concept of switching to a territorial system of supply, envisaging the creation of a planning and supply department. In the opinion of the clothing service personnel, the department would be able to handle the lion's share of problems entailed by supplying centrally subordinate units.

Since these units do not contribute to the development of the material and technical facilities of depots and POL tank farms, the POL service of the district is prepared to

hand many of these depots over to them, all the more so because a central directorate monitors the consumption of materials here.

These, as well as many other concepts with regard to departments and services associated with reforming the relationship of the two structures, have long been sent to the Rear Services of the Armed Forces. There has been no response so far.

I heard complaints from many officers to the effect that the table of organization of the centrally subordinate units needs improvement.

Lieutenant Colonel A. Lositskiy, a deputy unit commander, said: "Judge for yourselves. We have no authorized positions for the chiefs of the clothing and food services; we have no finance officer. These functions are frequently performed by people lacking training. Hence additional problems in the course of cooperation with the district. The service of officers is yet another issue. It is almost impossible to get a promotion here..."

When I told this to Major General S. Safonov, chief of the department of personnel of the district, he observed:

"A lot could be resolved if we had an opportunity to at least somehow influence cadre issues in centrally subordinate units billeted on the territory of the district. After all, at present hundreds and thousands of officers are between positions. The more officer positions are within our field of vision, the easier it is to decide their fate locally. It is a pity that central and main directorates and main commands are in no hurry to cooperate with us."

At present, the district helps the central units in every way possible: with personnel, materiel, quotas, and housing... This solidarity is also important because the issues of combat readiness depend to an ever greater degree on a relationship with the local authorities. The district has a greater opportunity to make those relations mutually beneficial.

I believe that the new commander of the troops of the district, on assuming his position, immediately took an interest in relations with the central units for a reason. Proposals with specifics on an entire range of issues serving to advance these relations have already been sent to Moscow from the district.

Colonel General A. Sergeyev told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The district and central units are links in the same chain of combat readiness of the Armed Forces. This is what we are going to proceed from in developing our relations. Of course, I do not rule out that a certain adjustment of these relations, taking into account the attainment of a qualitatively new status of combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the troops, will be made in the course of military reform. However, I am convinced that cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance will be permanent in any case."

Border Guard's Family Denied Benefits

92UM0429B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 24 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain A. Veklich: "A Border Guard Was Killed in Action and Now Everybody Ignores His Family..."]

[Text] Novosibirsk—The name of Senior Lieutenant Sergey Movshev, border post deputy commander, has been added to the list of military victims. As reported by the mass media some days earlier, the 26-year old officer was mortally wounded on 16 January during an attempt to apprehend a group of armed Afghans who violated the Tajik-Afghan border in the area of the River Pyandzh.

The people of Novosibirsk bid farewell to the border guard from their city. He was buried with full military honors.

Now the problem has emerged as to who has to pay the insurance benefit to the border guard's family, killed while performing his military duty, and who is going to see that his family gets other kinds of death benefits allowed in such cases.

"It is not a very pleasant situation," Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kulik, military commissar of the Novosibirsk Sovetskiy Rayon Military Commissariat, told our correspondent. "Though we might wish it, the military commissariat cannot from the legal point of view provide

any material assistance specified by the law, including insurance benefit. The reason is that Senior Lieutenant S. Movshev was not subordinate to the Ministry of Defense..."

According to Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kulik, the rayon military commissariat did not receive any orders concerning social protection for border guards. This fact was confirmed also by the Novosibirsk Oblast Military Commissariat.

"This incident is truly unusual," said Colonel A. Khokhrin, deputy head of the Novosibirsk oblast personnel administration of the Russian Federal Security Agency. "Since they split us into various agencies, we have nothing to do with any border guards. It goes without saying that we, together with the military commissariat, did all we could to organize the funeral. Now we are trying to find ways to provide Senior Lieutenant S. Movshev's family with all the paperwork necessary for them to receive the insurance benefits. But I want to say, however, that we have no guiding documents to affirm the legality of our actions. For this reason we have no authority to talk, for instance, about providing other death benefits that a dead border guard's family may be entitled to..."

This is how it is. A border guard died while protecting the state border of the newly born Commonwealth of Independent States, and he never learned that nobody had any more need of either him or his family.

INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

Officer Asks: Does Russia Need Us?

92UM0439A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 3

[Statement by Lieutenant Pavel Ropalo: "Does Russia Need Its Soldiers?"]

[Text] Soviet Army Lieutenants Pavel Ropalo and Oleg Bezruchkin came to Moscow from Nagorno-Karabakh. Their unit, one of the two remaining in Nagorno-Karabakh since the withdrawal of Soviet troops began, is billeted in Stepanakert.

Pavel Ropalo: Our unit is located in the very center of the city of Stepanakert. Officers and warrant officers of the unit live in the city. Prior to the tragedy with an Mi-8 helicopter, life in Stepanakert was more or less bearable. However, as soon as the mourning for those who died ended, the daily bombardment of the city with Alazan-type missiles from the Azeri side began. Azerbaijan cuts off electricity and gas alternately. At times, both are not available for weeks. The availability of water in the city is very poor. There is no bread.

The residents of Stepanakert have repeatedly attacked our unit with a view to capturing weapons. Fortunately, no officer or soldier has been hurt. The families of officers have been evacuated to Russia. The apartments of officers where the latter no longer live have simply been plundered. A tunnel has been dug under the weapons dump of the unit, and weapons and ammunition were carried away by Armenians. Only the personal weapons of soldiers and officers, which were kept in the weapons room in the barracks, remain.

In addition to our unit, a motorized infantry regiment remains in the city which for now provides security for the city and for itself. There have been attacks on the regiment from the Armenian side which brought about the deaths of our Russian guys. Continuous battles with the use of firearms have been going on in the outskirts of Stepanakert. Alazan missiles have repeatedly hit the compounds of the regiment and of our unit. The regiment has been taking aimed sniper fire from the direction of Shusha. The Agdam-Stepanakert road is kept under fire by Armenian and Azeri paramilitary units. The Azeris have stated that if we give our weapons to Armenians they will not let us leave Karabakh. In turn, the Armenians said that if we fail to leave our personal weapons with them they will prevent us from leaving. The Azeri mass media are disseminating appeals to army officers to remain in the territory of Azerbaijan and swear allegiance to Azerbaijan.

Does Russia not need us?

Declaration of Nagorno-Karabakh Units

92UM0439B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Jan 92 p 3

["Extraction" from the resolution of the officer assembly of Unit No. 39828, dated 8 January 1992; prepared for publication by Aleksandr Shanko: "The Officer Assembly Resolved..."]

[Text]

EXTRACTION

From the minutes of a resolution of an officer assembly of Military Unit No. 39828, deployed on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, city of Stepanakert, dated 8 January 1992.

AGENDA:

1. The issue of maintaining the combat readiness and viability of the unit under the conditions of a complex interethnic situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
2. On the infeasibility of the deployment of Military Unit No. 39828 on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

(...)

GENERAL OPINION OF THE OFFICER ASSEMBLY:

While residing on the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, in the city of Stepanakert, we guard our military settlement, military assets, weapons and materiel against attacks by both Azeri and Armenian paramilitary units, thus being between the rock and the hard place.

On 31 December 1991, the mass media stated that the units of the Soviet Army have been fully withdrawn from the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Based on this, the officers of the unit concluded that we have been forgotten and left to our own devices.

THE OFFICER ASSEMBLY RESOLVES:

1. To continuously maintain the combat readiness of the unit until the decision is made to withdraw it to Russia.
2. The officer corps and soldiers of Slavic and Central Asian nationalities categorically refuse to take the military oath of allegiance to the Republic of Azerbaijan.
3. The officer corps of the unit appeals to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] troops and the president of Russia for a decision to withdraw our unit to the territory of Russia.

If the issue of the withdrawal of the unit is not resolved favorably before 23 February 1992, the officers reserve the right to resolve this issue themselves.

(Fifteen signatures of the members of the officer assembly of the unit).

Russia, Estonia Agree on Talks

92UM0442A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Urban under the rubric "Direct Line: Yesterday's Report from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS Correspondents": "A 'Present' Readied for Russian-Estonian Negotiations: Estonia Has Nationalized the Assets of the Armed Forces of the Former Union"]

[Text] Tallinn—According to information available to our editors, Russian-Estonian interstate negotiations are scheduled for 28 January. The main issue, of course, is the fate of our forces presently stationed in the Estonian Republic. It is difficult to predict the outcome of the negotiations since new problems are even now appearing.

For example, on 28 January the Estonian Republic parliament adopted a resolution on the declaration as Estonian property of buildings, structures, armament, equipment, combat materiel, and much of the assets of the Armed Forces of the former USSR located in Estonian territory. The government has been directed to determine the composition of Army and Navy assets and resolve "in cooperation with appropriate organs of the legal successor of the USSR" all problems related to the acceptance of these assets.

Additionally, all acts of the former Estonian SSR on allocating parcels of land to the Army, Navy, and KGB have been declared invalid. The resolution was adopted, as the preamble states, taking into account the necessity for a rapid withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR from Estonian Republic territory. How strange it is that nothing is mentioned concerning Russia, which took the Northwest Group of Forces under its jurisdiction. This will of course introduce certain problems into the upcoming interstate negotiations.

In addition, parliamentary deputies of the Estonian Republic recently received a draft resolution on immigration quotas into the republic for 1992. Specifically stated here, in part: "To declare as invalid the residence permits of USSR Armed Forces servicemen discharged into the reserves or retirement and members of their families, if their permanent place of residence prior to call-up for military service was not in Estonia, unless interstate agreements stipulate otherwise." And so the fate of many reserve officers residing in Estonia is not yet clear.

UKRAINE

Kravchuk Military Conference Speech

92UM0450A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Jan 92 p 1

["Speech by President of Ukraine L.M. Kravchuk, commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, at the All-Ukrainian Conference on the Issues of Military Construction"]

[Text] ...We have heard each other, and have voiced our concerns and difficulties, which certainly occur everywhere at present, in order to arrive at some generalizations, conclusions, and most importantly, decisions, having discussed this very difficult, delicate, sensitive, and acute issue of the construction of the Armed Forces and the status of the Armed Forces at present. Undoubtedly, very many interesting thoughts and proposals were put forth. Perhaps it would be proper to compile a protocol based on the course and results of our meeting today, have the government consider it, and give instructions, or make decisions on certain issues. For example, a decision will be made tomorrow regarding the issue of servicemen who are now in the districts and should receive pay.

I want to say in this matter that we will do everything so that not a single proposal which is realistically grounded and within our potential will be rejected.

Now I will offer several remarks of a general nature.

I believe that nobody will accuse us of approaching the building of our Armed Forces irresponsibly. Not a single republic or state may say at present that it has prepared as formidable a legal base as Ukraine.

We have adopted quite a number of documents. You know them, and I will simply remind you of them: the Supreme Soviet Decree on the Concept of Defense and Building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Decree on the Defense Council, the Laws of Ukraine on the Defense of Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the Border Guard Troops, and on the social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families. There are two documents, two laws on retirement benefits for servicemen and on the comprehensive duty of military service—drafts are available. One is being published in the press today, the other, tomorrow.

Therefore, I have every reason to tell you that, while understandably far from idealizing our efforts and other decisions, we approached this responsibly by creating a legal and social foundation. We have not managed to do everything. However, very soon the Supreme Soviet will adopt these laws, taking into account your remarks and proposals, which I believe you will make upon studying these two important documents. We will also make other necessary decisions.

Obviously we should interpret the processes underway, and evaluate political realities very precisely and in a highly balanced manner. The realities are as follows: The Union is no more; the Union has disintegrated. The empire is no more; the empire has been destroyed. The creation of states, independent sovereign states, has begun on the territory of the Union, the former Union. Understandably, this cannot happen painlessly. Established patterns of life are collapsing; let us not evaluate them now. Relations are collapsing; to a degree, the

relations and future of the people are collapsing. Naturally, the Armed Forces are not some autonomous organization which is immune to this destruction.

You also know well that the destruction of the Armed Forces did not begin today, or in the period of the establishment of independent states, but earlier still. Perhaps many of those in attendance here were present at exercises in the Odessa and Kiev Districts when General Varennikov reported to Supreme Commander Comrade Gorbachev about processes in progress. It was said as early as that time that the Armed Forces were facing a most difficult situation. That is, I would like to say that at present the creation of the states and attempts to establish their own armed forces are not the main reason, the main destructive policy. I believe that this policy, destructive indeed, is at the same time creative, unlike the policy which, by turning a blind eye to what was happening, brought about uncertainty, lack of finality, and ultimately the loss of prestige by the Armed Forces.

We have already embarked on creating the Armed Forces, that is, the second, main stage has begun—that of creation. In this instance, two approaches have clearly emerged, both in terms of policy and with regard to the former Union.

The first policy, or approach, is to preserve a unified army. We now hear it from the mass media. We hear such motives, such nostalgia from the former Ministry of Defense. The following question is legitimate: May there be a unified army when there is no unified state? Who can give us an example of when and where a unified army exists, but a unified state does not? Sometimes they refer to NATO, but it is obvious to all that NATO unifies national armies rather than having some unified army.

I believe that this attempt is associated with the intention to restore the status which has now already been destroyed, politically and actually.

I receive many telegrams from servicemen, officers, and generals. I am not going to read these telegrams. However, one thread is easy to discern in them: Many of them perceive the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] as a unified state.

I would like to recall that, as signed by all in Alma-Ata, the Commonwealth is neither a state nor a state organization of any kind. If, contrary to this policy and to political logic, we now strive to create a unified army on the expense of 11 states, this is simply an unrealistic task in and of itself.

What kind of an army and how it is to be created—these are problems of arrangements. However, the issue needs to be resolved politically, and for Ukraine, it has been resolved. This is why the Commonwealth came to the following agreement: Each state shall, as it wishes, create its own armed forces today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, that is, each at the time of its choosing. As far as the strategic containment forces are concerned, we

agreed that they will be forces under unified command. For Ukraine this means that, until the complete elimination of nuclear weapons (this is our concept which we proclaimed from the podium of the United Nations), we will ensure our protection and our supplies, and provide equal conditions and equal rights for the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine. As was laid down, and agreed upon by all in Minsk, nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine will be destroyed; the strategic forces will be cut until 1994. I think that everything is absolutely clear in this matter; there is no ambiguity, uncertainty, or lack of finality in the interpretation of wordings. They should not accuse us of playing some kind of duplicitous or imprecise game in this instance. No, we have determined our position precisely. Those who do not wish to create their own armed forces currently report to the common command of all military forces. This is also normal—depending on what one's wishes are.

Now let us look at who is violating these agreements. I cannot accuse Ukraine of violating them; we may be rebuked for perhaps striving to overstep real possibilities in some instances or allowing imprecision in arrangements and instruments of execution in some cases. However, I cannot say that we go beyond our legitimate rights set forth at the Alma-Ata and Minsk meetings, to which all heads of states without exception have put their signatures. They say that Ukraine will build its armed forces beginning 3 January. Everybody agreed to that.

However, a kind of difficult to understand response to our actions subsequently began. Everybody agreed; Marshal Shaposhnikov who was present there agreed. Meanwhile, at present contradictory instructions are being sent to the troops. In this instance I really cannot take the blame for us violating anything.

Now for the issue of the strategic forces, or the strategic containment forces. Nobody has raised this issue today; however, it involves not only our internal affairs but also international issues.

According to international agreements, we may have certain numbers of troops in various regions. If all the troops are now reclassified as strategic forces, as the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces is striving to do, then under international agreements Ukraine will be deprived of the right to have its own troops, its own combat units. The agreements define it clearly: Here is Ukraine. In the region specified, there should be 4,000 tanks, so many planes, so many of this and so many of that. If on our land the above are classified as strategic, nothing is left for our own forces. This is a crafty policy!

After all, generals from the General Staff who visited here entered construction battalions, divisions, and what have you, as strategic.

I agree with Igor Vladimirovich Kasatonov as to how this is to be determined. However, if we proceed from the general concept, if we make a judgment along the

chain in purely philosophical terms, even an individual who fuels a plane belongs to the strategic forces.

In this case, the concept in question should be abandoned. However, it exists, and we should sit down conscientiously and make a determination, without speculating and without thinking that some people do not know certain things. For example, I cited this international agreement. If we overlook it and agree, and embark tomorrow on building our armed forces, we will be told: Guys, this is it; you have exhausted your potential.

Now for some problems. I have already discussed social issues. I confirm once again that the Ukrainian state will do everything in order for all components of the Armed Forces deployed on our land to be equally supplied. However, I would like to ask you in this instance to turn to one more human category, that of understanding, which is perhaps more of a moral than military category.

All of you understand well that the situation of the people of Ukraine is most grave.

I would very much not want anyone to believe that all these issues and problems have developed now, or to make taking the oath contingent on the highest material status of the troops.

I would not like for us to have the oath for sale.

The oath does not mean only an apartment, though one cannot do without the latter; it also means responsibility to your people and the desire to defend them.

If our people lived in luxury I would never allow myself to utter this word, never and under no circumstances, because we agreed to frankly say everything to each other here. So, let us begin doing this today, and let us carry this on because there were such motives—first do this, first do that, and later we will take the oath. Ponder this line conceptually and you will discern somewhat different motives.

We believe that our armed forces, or troops stationed on our land, have a proper understanding of these issues. Soldiers and officers who have recently come from their villages and cities have not forgotten how their parents live. This is our common trouble, and we should get out of it together.

The fact that two-thirds of the servicemen who were stationed in Ukraine voted in favor of Ukraine's independence simply cannot fail to reassure us. They thus stated their attitude toward everything. They did not allow the nationalist card to be played in Ukraine; the troops did not allow it, neither did the people. Ukraine, including the Armed Forces, thus made a historic contribution to destroying the horrible evil which was called an empire at the end of the 20th century. This is a credit to all people residing in Ukraine. We have prevented interethnic conflicts. I am convinced that we will prevent them here. I believe in this because we are now talking about the people upon whom woes may be visited if

things are done inaccurately somewhere, rather than about someone present here personally.

Concerning the oath, I agree with comrades who have spoken here seeking that there be no pressure of any kind on the troops. I support this idea very much. However, while eliminating pressure, we cannot eliminate the oath-taking, we simply cannot. It should not be said that you have already taken the oath. Indeed, you have, everybody has. However, both its text and political realities have changed entirely. The army and the armed forces that are being created cannot be called armed forces unless the troops swear allegiance to their people.

I do not want this to be a one-time deal, within one day—for example, it is all mandatory, and those who cannot or do not want to should leave Ukraine. Nobody has given such instructions; if someone has, I am hereby disavowing them; consider them nonexistent.

I would also like the commanders of all units to quietly make a determination. This applies in particular to the officer corps. If someone cannot take the oath now, and has not taken a stand yet, no pressure should be brought to bear on him. However, we simply need to know this: Has he failed to adopt a position for some reason, or does he already know for sure that he will not swear allegiance to Ukraine.

We need to know this. After all, we cannot have a situation where a regiment has taken the oath but the commander has not; this is nonsensical. One needs to take a stand. It should not be this way: You have not taken the oath, you must go beyond the borders of Ukraine. Not at all. We need to talk to this person. For example, I have just learned today that many of those present here do not know the documents adopted by the Supreme Soviet. As we have managed to determine, many documents are available at the headquarters of superior military units. Are we to interpret this as their reluctance to bring the documents to the attention of the troops? There is not only meaning here, but also an implication.

I ask that the laws printed in the newspapers be brought to the attention of the troops and studied.

Specifically with regard to the taking of the oath by the officer corps. We need to know who agrees, who disagrees at present, and who requests dual citizenship—not in order to draw up lists. There will be no lists drawn up and no purge undertaken. There will be no purge! However, we should be aware of the processes underway, of who is ready for it today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow, and who needs which additional opportunities and conditions. I would like to request once again that this be a voluntary oath—a voluntary oath with no pressure and no threats whatsoever, God forbid!

As far as soldiers who do not wish to take the oath are concerned, I have talked to President Mutalibov, President Ter-Petrosyan, and others. They agree with our concept, our position of sending them to their places of

residence in an organized manner. However, it is to be organized and controlled, by plane or train, in order to prevent their flight with weapons. The minister of defense has been given such instructions by the president. I have assumed responsibility for coordinating all these issues with the presidents of other states and chairmen of the Supreme Soviets; all of them agree with this position. This is why arrangements simply need to be put in place in this matter.

There are several issues associated with the Black Sea Fleet. We must now make a determination concerning this complex issue. Nobody else will resolve this issue for us, if for no other reason than that we will not allow anybody to resolve it for us.

The status of the Black Sea Fleet determines the future of not only the fleet itself; it is extremely important for defining the future status of Ukraine. I believe that nobody doubts that Ukraine should be a maritime state. It has every reason to be—more than 1,000 kilometers of coastline. More than one-quarter of the citizens of the republic reside in coastal areas; these areas have tremendous economic potential. It is a natural aspiration of Ukraine to have its own maritime borders and its own navy.

So, they say that Russia is the legal successor in rights to the Armed Forces and the Navy. Let us try to figure out this issue.

In Alma-Ata the heads of states supported Russia only as far as its membership in the United Nations, the Security Council, and other international organizations is concerned. They say: But Russia has proclaimed that it is the legal successor. However, the only issue is what legal, international, and domestic norms exist, rather than who proclaims what.

This is why we need to approach this very calmly, with great precision, but fairly.

I would like to ask this question: Does the decision to make the fleet Ukrainian run counter to the interests of servicemen and members of their families who are mainly concentrated in Sevastopol, have apartments, have housing—not all of them, to be sure, who are paid in rubles today, and will be paid in coupons tomorrow, and in the national currency the day after tomorrow?

I think it does not. If this fleet is considered Russian, Russia should pay for this fleet with its own money. If this is a common fleet, it is another issue. The Crimea is territory belonging to Ukraine; this was confirmed by Russian President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet of the Crimean Autonomous Republic itself.

I would ask everyone to once again study the documents very attentively. I appeal to everyone to not just watch TV and read newspapers but also to study the documents, because there is so much incompetence and bias, so much subjectivity in interpretation of these documents that many questions come up: Why is this being

done? We are people who have a duty to solve problems rather than just discuss them. This is why documented precision, legal basis, and the things that have been signed are necessary for a solution. As far as interpretations by individuals are concerned, this is another matter, this is for popular show. As far as we are concerned, we need to carry out a decision.

I have just received yet another encrypted message from Shaposhnikov: "An extremely tense situation has developed in large units, units, and on vessels in conjunction with attempts by the Ukrainian leadership to subordinate the troops of the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts and to administer the taking of the national military oath to personnel in the service on the territory of Ukraine. Command and control of the troops is disrupted; their combat readiness is impaired. The servicemen are faced with a choice between swearing allegiance to Ukraine or quitting military service. With a view to ensuring stable command and control and averting a relaxation of the confrontation [as published], I propose the following: Until a decision is made with regard to the Armed Forces at the interstate level, the previous procedures for subordination and command and control of the troops shall be maintained. All cases of attempts to destabilize command and control of the troops should be reported immediately; explanatory work among the personnel should be stepped up..."

I want everything to be clear in this matter. I do not accept, I absolutely do not accept, a position which changes every day. It is one thing in the morning, another in the afternoon. In addition, on Monday it is something else, depending on which side of the bed you get out of. This is why I profoundly regret consenting to the appointment of Marshal Shaposhnikov as commander in chief. However, I still have an opportunity to correct my mistake.

About the language—this issue was raised here. I want to tell you officially: Using two languages is a decision of the Supreme Soviet. There will be no pressure.

I would like the spirit of this conference to be conveyed to the troops; I want all issues to be discussed in the units, and I want them to come to a determination calmly.

The policy of the Ukrainian state is to protect all people in uniform, regardless of their ethnic affiliation and subordination. This is the main principle. We will overcome everything else only if this is what we wish; I am convinced of that.

Defense Chiefs Antonov, Morozov on Budget, Fleet

92UM0424A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 1

[Report on press conference given by V.I. Antonov, Ukraine state minister for the defense complex and conversion, and Colonel General K.P. Morozov,

Ukraine Minister of Defense, on 11 January in Kiev, by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Major G. Klyuchikov: "There Will Be Ukrainian Navy!"

[Text] On 11 January in Kiev negotiations took place between delegations of Ukraine and the Russian Federation on military-political issues related to the realization of agreements reached within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].

The negotiations were conducted in accordance with the Agreement between Ukraine and Russia of 19 November 1990 and the commonwealth states' agreement on strategic forces, which stipulates that the parties immediately start negotiations among themselves with the purpose of providing guarantees and working out the mechanism of implementing agreements in the area of international security, disarmament, and arms control.

The parties reaffirmed their readiness to undertake in the nearest future concrete steps in regard to ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USSR and the United States, and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe.

In the course of the press conference that took place after the negotiations, Viktor Ivanovich Antonov, Ukraine state minister for the defense complex and conversion, and Colonel General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov, Ukraine minister of defense, answered numerous questions from representatives of the mass media.

It is natural that during the press conference journalists did not exclude questions related to the process taking place in Ukraine now of the military taking the oath of allegiance to Ukraine. Tendentious coverage of the part of the central press and numerous rumors are distorting the real situation. How are things truly going in this respect?

[Morozov] As of today, more than 46,000 servicemen have taken the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. There are no units on the territory of our state that are taking an oath to the people of Russia. Those servicemen who have refused to take the oath will serve in the CIS Armed Forces. Jointly with Russia, we are striving to resolve the problems of social protection of servicemen. We must be certain that the servicemen who have left for Russia will be met there properly and provided with everything they need.

As to those who chose not to take the oath but will maintain their residency on the territory of Ukraine, they will be protected fully by the law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members."

The rumors that some units are out of money and the servicemen have not received their cash pay for January are not true. Starting 1 January, Ukraine completely finances all armed forces on its territory, including the Black Sea Fleet.[end Morozov]

Practically every third question was related one way or the other to the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. The first thing the

journalists asked was: Does Ukraine need its own navy, and is it able to pay for such an expensive indulgence?

[Morozov] Ukraine is a sea power; it needs a navy in order to defend its borders and coast. Besides, Ukraine took part in the building of the Navy and its financing. However, Russia also needs that part of the Navy that will be carrying out strategic tasks in the interests of the CIS. Therefore, a compromise solution was found in the course of negotiations: Those ships in the Black Sea Fleet that are capable of carrying nuclear weapons and fulfill strategic tasks will become a part of the strategic forces, while the rest will become part of the Ukraine Armed Forces.

[Antonov] Yes, Ukraine is able to finance the Black Sea Fleet. An account has already been opened for this purpose, with 350 million rubles in it.[end Antonov]

The state minister refuted the rumors that only 30 percent of the total number of ships in the Black Sea Fleet go to Ukraine. Experts from both states still need to work out the exact figure. Nevertheless, as announced earlier, before 1 July 1992 all tactical nuclear weapons will be removed from the ships. As the ships' functions change, so will their relation to the strategic forces.

[Question] What is the fate of unfinished military ships at the Kherson and Nikolayev shipyards?

[Antonov] It is true that there are several unfinished heavy cruisers and aircraft carriers at the Kherson and Nikolayev shipyards. Neither Russia nor Ukraine have the resources or the desire to finish their construction. Therefore, a decision has been made to cut these ships for scrap.

[Question] Will the Black Sea Fleet be used in the Mediterranean?

[Morozov] We have no business there.

[Question] Will Sevastopol be opened to visitors?

[Antonov] In the former USSR there were quite a few restrictions and bans incomprehensible to people from a democratic society. This includes the closed city regime. It is envisaged that in the near future many of these restrictions will be lifted. Although the residents of Sevastopol believe that this will create a number of social problems.[end Antonov]

Both ministers noted that Ukraine has a clear program on military issues. In accord with the agreements signed in Minsk, on 3 January it started forming its own Armed Forces. The issue of the fate of the Black Sea Fleet arose because of Russia's unclear position on military issues and the ambitions of some political leaders. However, the just-completed negotiations demonstrated that both sides are ready to work out a compromise in the matter of dividing the Black Sea Fleet. There is no blind alley here. All issues can and will be resolved through further negotiations. This is the most productive way.

The question of military organizational development in Ukraine also attracted the intense attention of both our and foreign journalists. There are quite a few complex problems in this area as well. One of them is: What place will the Ukraine military command have in the CIS unified command?

[Morozov] The composition of the unified command has not been decided yet. However, I can assure you that representatives of sovereign Ukraine will occupy their proper place in it, which will permit defense issues to be efficiently resolved on the basis of equal rights.

[Question] Is it true that there is a plan to leave Ukraine with eight of 34 military training schools located on its territory?

[Morozov] The concept of military education is being developed in the Ukraine Ministry of Defense. There is no doubt that some schools will be closed. However, no specific decisions have been made yet. All higher military schools continue to operate, preparing new ranks of officers for the next graduation. Cadets who are Ukrainian citizens will have the opportunity to finish their education.

[Question] Is a reshuffling of command personnel going on in units stationed on the territory of Ukraine?

[Morozov] The forming of Ministry of Defense structures is actively proceeding. Officers from among the best-trained military specialists are appointed to positions of responsibility. So far there is no reshuffling of command personnel in the troops.

[Question] Will military districts be abolished?

[Morozov] The system of military districts will remain for now. However, it is planned to considerably cut the size of the administrative staff of the districts.

[Question] Has the 1992 military budget been formed?

[Antonov] Until the final determination is made as to which units will be included in the strategic forces, it is impossible to form the military budget for the entire year. Only the military budget for the first quarter of 1992 has been determined down to line items and sent to the military districts. Units included in the strategic forces will be financed by all CIS states.

[Question] How will Ukraine view Russia if the latter joins NATO?

[Morozov] Right now this is not an issue. However, whatever steps Russia may take in the future, we will always try to resolve all points of contention. We are neighbors, after all. We need to find a common language and avoid confrontation under any circumstances.

[Question] The reform of the Armed Forces and cuts in them are closely related to the issues of conversion and the fate of the military-industrial complex. It is no secret that the work of a huge number of industrial enterprises in

Ukraine consisted solely of USSR Ministry of Defense orders. How will the cuts in the Army affect the military-industrial complex?

[Antonov] This has produced a difficult situation. Seven hundred defense enterprises employing a total of 1 million people have been left without orders. There are no orders from either Moscow or the Ukraine Armed Forces. To pull out of the crisis it is necessary to decisively shift most of these enterprises onto the civilian track. We have developed a conversion concept, but we need about \$200 million to implement it. We do not have a cent. We need financial and technical help, including from Western countries.[end Antonov]

In concluding the press conference it was emphasized once again that Ukraine reacts calmly and with restraint to the reoccurrences of imperial mentality on the part of certain political figures in Russia, while striving to preserve good relations with the brotherly people. In the future, Ukraine will continue, letting nobody dictate terms to it, to strive to resolve all emerging problems through legal means. The negotiations just completed prove convincingly that mutually acceptable decisions can be found even for the most tangled and acute issues as long as one follows the road of cooperation based on equal rights and respect for the sovereignty and independence of other states.

Morozov on Oath Controversy

92UM0444B Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 4

[Article by V. Smaga: "Strategic Recreation Bases..."]

[Text] Kiev—At a recently convened press conference, Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov refuted IZVESTIYA and Russian Television reports that soldiers in many units are refusing to take the oath to an independent Ukraine.

In the opinion of Colonel General Konstantin Morozov and Vasily Durdinets, head of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and National Security, the authors of the above-mentioned reports are obviously publishing what they would like to see instead of actuality. The reality of things is as follows. The decision of the republic parliament to create a republic army was affixed to an agreement signed at a meeting in Minsk prior to the new year of leaders of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] member states.

Ukraine intends to become a nonnuclear, neutral country maintaining an army capable of ensuring its defense within the limits of reasonable sufficiency. By summer of this year it will have gotten rid of tactical nuclear weapons. Strategic weapons will be eliminated by 1994—four years ahead of the timeframe envisioned by international agreements signed by the former USSR.

Personnel in units and subunits of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are already taking a new oath. The military command is taking a democratic view of the position of

servicemen who do not wish to do so. All such individuals will be afforded the opportunity of either transferring to an army of another Commonwealth member state or being discharged to the reserves, according to their desires.

It is well understood in the Ukrainian Defense Ministry that the conversion of three strike military districts of the former Soviet Army and Black Sea Fleet into the small armed forces of a neutral country is a painful process. Unfortunately, it is being exacerbated by the inertia of imperial-minded thinking of the highest ranking army officials. Several days after the press conference, Black Sea Fleet Commander Igor Kasatonov refused to carry out the directive of the Ukrainian president and have the oath administered to the fleet.

Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the Commonwealth Armed Forces, went even further. He declared that the order on taking the oath to Ukraine runs counter to the Minsk agreements. Les Tanyuk, Ukrainian people's deputy and chairman of Narodna Rada, believes that tension regarding the establishment of the Ukrainian Army "is being artificially stirred up by the generals in Moscow, who do not wish to lose their seats of power."

This is indirectly substantiated by the following. Moscow has included in the list of strategic forces which are to be transferred to a separate command even construction units, sanatoriums, houses, and recreation facilities of the Ministry of Defense of the former USSR.

"There will be no strategic recreation bases in Ukraine," Colonel General Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense, is certain.

Morozov Press Conference on Fleet

92UM0463A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
9 Jan 92 pp 1,2

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA Correspondents Majors G. Klyuchikov and V. Tereshchenko: "Ukraine Needs its own Navy: The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Conducted Another Press Conference for Native and Foreign Journalists"]

[Text] Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Defense Issues and State Security Chairman V.V. Durdinets and Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K.P. Morozov participated in a press conference.

In his introductory remarks, Colonel-General K.P. Morozov informed journalists in detail about the positions and work of members of the Ukrainian delegation at the recent summit meeting in Minsk.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Defense Issues and State Security Chairman V.V. Durdinets totally confirmed the Minister of Defense's words and once again directed journalists' attention to the

enormous legislative work that has been conducted in Ukraine. This work was conducted at the highest level openly, consistently, and on a solid legal basis. This is precisely why it has received the support not only of the Ukrainian people but also of the delegations of the sovereign states. This work continues even now and the second package of legislative acts on the military issue is being prepared.

Later the journalists asked their questions. We will cite some of the questions and V.V. Durdinets' and Colonel-General K.V. Morozov's answers to them.

[Question] A large number of servicemen serving in Ukraine are not Ukrainian. How do you comment on the IZVESTIYA report that personnel of several units in the Carpathian Military District have refused to take the oath. And one more question: how was the conversation concluded with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and with the Black Sea Fleet Commander?

[Morozov/Durdinets] We learned of the refusal of units from the Carpathian Military District from IZVESTIYA. There have actually been no such reports. And we assess this as not corresponding to reality. We certainly assume that not all servicemen serving in the military districts located on the territory of Ukraine will consider themselves to be citizens of Ukraine and not all servicemen will simply agree to take the oath. We anticipate this and we think that officers and warrant officers who express the desire to be transferred to another state or to another military district outside the borders of Ukraine or if they have the grounds to file for their release from the Armed Forces, then based on the law of Ukraine which has been adopted, we will do everything possible to facilitate and help them to be transferred to a new duty assignment or to be released into the reserve. No forceful pressure will be exerted—all actions will be based solely on the voluntary principle.

With regard to the Black Sea Fleet. This fleet is deployed in Ukraine, Ukraine is a maritime power and must have its own naval forces. During the course of the negotiations that were conducted for two days, several different positions were discovered on this issue. Therefore, we propose continuing the discussion of this problem, naturally, based on the position approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet and based on the concept of creating the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and I think that we did not create a confrontational situation and we will completely sort out this issue.

[Question] Does this mean that lads who did not take the oath, say, from Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, will continue to serve in Ukraine?

[Morozov/Durdinets] It is possible that this situation will also develop. And it will also be resolved. For example, Uzbekistan already has an initiative with

regard to compulsory service personnel who will not be ready to take Ukraine's oath. We will conduct a transfer in service on a reciprocal contractual basis so that it is organized and quite civilized.

[Question] Does Ukraine intend to create its own military-industrial complex or are deliveries still envisioned from the former Union's old VPK [military-industrial complex] structures?

[Morozov/Durdinets] We think that Ukraine is a very rich state with regard to its own military-industrial complex, as you have called it. A whole series of defense enterprises already have orders and will function both on orders in the interests of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and on orders in the interests of the United Armed Forces outside Ukraine's borders. In order to not disrupt deliveries which have already been formed, there is an agreement to maintain maximum contacts during 1992 and in the process of the year to reform the system of orders and financing of military enterprises. These relations will be structured on mutually beneficial terms based on interstate treaties.

[Question] How much time does Ukraine need to dismantle nuclear weapons? Have any sort of steps been taken in this direction? How much will this cost Ukraine?

[Morozov/Durdinets] Ukraine has announced its political decision on the creation of its nuclear-free status in the future. A specific date is mentioned in the Minsk document—by the end of 1994. We need to assume that this is also a political decision and is already the beginning of practical movement in this direction. If all the heads of the democratic states, including the four leaders of the states on whose territory strategic nuclear weapons are deployed, have agreed on this date, then a mechanism to resolve all of these issues will be set into motion from that moment. Today there is no such mechanism. There also has not been a practical beginning of movement because, you understand, of how complicated this problem is. We need to provide technology and to provide transportation and security at the same time for which a large amount of resources is needed. I cannot answer the second question because these are huge expenditures and Ukraine is also ready to accept aid of other states in the realization of its concept. This is a Ukrainian peace initiative and it may cause initiatives of other states for which the peoples of the world will be grateful to all states with regard to the reduction of the confrontation of nuclear potentials. We can only assume how expensive this will be. But practical movement in the development of the mechanism for the resolution of this program has already begun. I cannot say to the journalists that this missile launcher is subject to reduction and I cannot authorize journalists to visit missile sites. First of all, they are subordinate to the united strategic command. Ukraine does not command them but only participates in monitoring their non-use and elimination.

With regard to tactical weapons. The elimination process has already begun. July 1 is the end point after which there will not be any tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

[Question] Has any sort of exchange of information on military structural development been provided for in order to avoid cases of disinformation in the mass media?

[Morozov/Durdinets] Of course, this has already been set forth during the Minsk meeting. As for disinformation, it proceeds from people who are not interested in the processes that are occurring and who are pursuing their own selfish goals.

[Question] How will the issue of those servicemen who today serve outside of Ukraine's borders and who desire to be transferred to its Armed Forces? Will the honored designations of those units which were formed in the Soviet Army be preserved?

[Morozov/Durdinets] There have been very many appeals from officers and I have already stated repeatedly that our capabilities for transfer are tied to the exceptionally important issue of providing housing for servicemen. Many transfers have already been made during these four months. Some of the servicemen who have housing on the territory of Ukraine but who were transferred to other military districts for duty have already returned. For the time being, mass transfers will not occur due to the lack of housing. With the resolution of this problem, we will return all officers to the territory of Ukraine.

Right now the troops are taking the oath with their Colors. This is a symbol of military pride, valor, and honor, and therefore they will retain them until the issue has been reviewed in the Supreme Soviet and until the appropriate decisions have been worked out. And the entire military attribute will proceed from which state symbol the Supreme Soviet will adopt.

[Question] What is the strength of the Armed Forces that are under your command?

[Morozov/Durdinets] I have still not performed this calculation but I can say approximately that the three military districts have been operating according to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense plan since 18:00 hours on January 3.

[Question] What units belong to the strategic troops?

[Morozov/Durdinets] This was one of the main issues during the negotiations. Unfortunately, the delegation that General Pyankov headed arrived with a prepared draft document. Very many division-sized and smaller units and institutions were included in the strategic forces for which the strategic designation is not appropriate. For example, construction troops, rest homes, sanatoriums, repair plants, bases, depots, etc.

We examined in detail the designation and functioning procedures of each of these facilities and an entire series of facilities were withdrawn from the list. Therefore, this issue has not yet been completed. Negotiations and clarification of ownership and procedures for their functioning are continuing.

Morozov on Servicemen's Rights

92UM0462A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
9 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Petrovich Morozov: "Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General K.P. Morozov: 'Servicemen's Rights Will Not Be Infringed Upon'"]

[Text] The majority of servicemen who are serving on the territory of Ukraine have perceived with understanding the steps taken by the President of Ukraine, the republic Supreme Soviet, and the Cabinet of Ministers to insure the state sovereignty of Ukraine. And they consider them necessary and timely. However, during the course of the work that has been done to establish the Ukrainian Armed Forces, questions have arisen among servicemen that require immediate clarification.

Despite the fact that many documents concerning the problems of defense and military organizational development have already been published in the mass media and on the pages of republic newspapers and that articles of an explanatory nature have repeatedly appeared, personnel in military units have turned out to be poorly informed about the actual state of affairs in Ukraine. Obviously those people, who increasingly cannot reconcile themselves to the idea that the Soviet Union no longer exists, have had a hand in this and are attempting to impede the process of historical development, while inciting the atmosphere surrounding defense issues.

Even after a series of agreements have been signed by the heads of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], the central mass media continues to conduct a purposeful campaign, while inciting the atmosphere with their not objective and often biased coverage of the processes that are occurring in Ukraine. The most real propaganda is being conducted among servicemen of units deployed on the territory of Ukraine which is instilling uncertainty in tomorrow among people.

As a result, our correspondent requested that Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel-General Konstantin Morozov answer those questions that disturb army society the most today.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Letters and telegrams are coming into the newspaper editorial office, to Ukrainian television, radio, yes and to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and troubling telephone calls are being received. People want to know the actual state of affairs in the troops that have been subordinate to the President of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Minister of Defense since January 3. Alarm is caused by all sorts of rumors and

conjecture that have circulated around the troops taking a military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and is also associated with a whole series of social problems. Some people are accusing the republic leadership and the Ministry of Defense of illegality and hastiness in the work being conducting in the troops. Konstantin Petrovich, could you clarify the situation?

[Morozov] In the Ukrainian Armed Forces, personnel have begun to take the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. This ritual is being conducted en masse in the troops of the Kiev Military District and in the air army. People have taken the oath in PVO [Air Defense] troops independent units, the Black Sea Fleet, and in a number of units that were previously subordinate to the center.

In the majority of units, this military ritual is accompanied by broad explanatory work and is based on the principle of personal consciousness as citizens of Ukraine.

As for answers to servicemen's numerous questions that have been arriving of late, they are primarily contained in Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's January 5, 1992 appeal. Collections of Ukrainian legislative acts on issues of defense, military structural development, and social protection of servicemen and members of their families have been sent for a more complete explanation of the state of affairs on defense issues that have been addressed to military district commanders.

Servicemen's questions that concern their interests continue to arrive to the Ministry of Defense. Some of them have arisen due to the incorrect and biased reflection of reality in Ukraine by some of the mass media.

As Ukrainian Minister of Defense, I want to assure everyone that servicemen's problems were and remain the most important questions in the process of work to create its Armed Forces from the first days of the declaration of the Act of State Independence of Ukraine.

Today the Law of Ukraine "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Members of Their Families" is already being published again in NARODNAYA ARMIYA, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense newspaper. It contains answers to many questions that disturb people today. Another portion of the questions is being covered in the article on the Law of Ukraine "On General Military Obligation and Service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces" that is being prepared for publication in the next few days. Many desires of servicemen have already been taken into account in this draft.

Right now when active participation in the creation of normative acts that guarantee protection of servicemen in society has increased, we are anticipating new proposals which will be included in the draft laws. They should be sent directly to the NARODNAYA ARMIYA editorial office for general discussion.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] How would you respond to those people who rebuke us today for violating a whole series of legal acts?

[Morozov] Ukraine is creating Armed Forces based on the agreements of the heads of the independent states that were signed in Minsk and based on national law while considering the solution of problems of social protection of servicemen and members of their families. As for the military oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, this is a voluntary matter of citizens of Ukraine who are our servicemen, regardless of their ethnic background. Each servicemen selects his citizenship for himself.

While deciding this issue for himself, each servicemen must determine: whether he will continue service in the Ukrainian Armed Forces, leave for further performance of service in another region, or be released into the reserve.

Those people who do not desire to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine are not released from the previously taken oath and are obliged to discharge all duties that have been assigned to them.

Servicemen who have the desire and opportunity to leave Ukraine and are able to provide for the families in another region must express this to their commander. Their transfer in the service will be organized.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] And what about those servicemen whose documents have already been submitted for release into the reserve or their release has been planned for 1992?

[Morozov] Each officer must decide for himself the issue of taking the military oath depending on their proposed place of residence. In any case, this will not affect their pension. This provision is contained in the draft law of Ukraine on the transition period.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] But there really are many military schools in Ukraine. What will happen to the cadets?

[Morozov] Military school cadets—citizens of Ukraine and other states of the Commonwealth—take the oath on a voluntary basis. Those cadets who do not take the oath can peacefully continue their studies. Their status will be determined based on interstate agreements for training at Ukrainian VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. In so doing, any discrimination is prohibited.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, today the military district commanders have many officers under their command who still have not been assigned to positions as a result of the Armed Forces reductions and the withdrawal of troops from Western Europe. What awaits them?

[Morozov] Officers, who are under the command of military district commanders and who are supported in the social context, that is, they already have housing and

a pension guarantee, are being offered the opportunity to be released into the reserve. For those officers who do not have the right to a pension guarantee (with 20 years service), a provision is being prepared which will be inserted into the Law on Pension Guarantees for Servicemen. And, after this law has been adopted, they will also be able to be released into the reserve with preservation of their civil rights and appropriate benefits. Those officers who have still not been provided housing are being granted the right to remain in the service until they attain that right or are maintained on the lists of those in line in the event that their job placement is resolved by other means.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Today the language problem in the army scares many people. Some people are frightened of Ukrainization of our Armed Forces in the future. How would you respond to these people?

[Morozov] I have already repeatedly stated that citizens of Ukraine regardless of nationality will serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also cannot be a question of any type of Ukrainization of the officer corps, as some officers fear.

And now about language. On November 1, 1991, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration of Rights of Nationalities of Ukraine. Article 3 of this document states: "The Ukrainian State guarantees the right of free utilization of the Russian language to its citizens." The Declaration will once again be published in the press in the next few days.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] I would like to know how the transfer of servicemen who are citizens of other states will be carried out if they desire to do this?

[Morozov] The transfer of servicemen who are citizens of other states, if they consider themselves to be so, according to their desire, will be carried out to other regions by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense based on interstate agreements with the preservation of all of the rights and benefits that they have.

Compulsory service servicemen who are citizens of other states can take the Ukrainian oath and, having served the prescribe term, can leave for their own states. But those who do not desire to take the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine will be transported to a new duty location with all appropriate types of support after the arrival of escorting representatives of the states have been organized. When necessary, Ukrainian Armed Forces air transportation will be used. And, in so doing, no discrimination whatsoever will be permitted.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] With today's free prices, the issue of monetary salaries worries people....

[Morozov] The issue of servicemen's monetary salaries will be resolved while considering the income indices for all of the population of Ukraine.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Many people are asking the question of the possibility of dual citizenship.

[Morozov] The Ukrainian Law on citizenship provides for dual citizenship which citizens select according to their own desire while considering the laws of other states.

[NARODNAYA ARMIYA] Konstantin Petrovich, what else would you yourself say to those people who today are worried about their futures and who are waiting for objective information?

[Morozov] Dear comrades! All of your questions that are being addressed to me and to the Ukrainian leadership today—are the normal manifestation of activity of troop personnel who are deployed on the territory of Ukraine and in the very complicated processes of Armed Forces reform. Your questions and proposals facilitate the development of precise legislation on social and legal guarantees for servicemen and members of their families, whose labor and entire lives have always been devoted and will always be devoted to the people regardless of whether or not that service was performed in the army of the former Union or if they now stand in the ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

I once again appeal to senior commanders, commanders, and chiefs. And I ask you to demonstrate your concern for people's existing problems and to problems that arise. I ask you to prevent coercion and flouting of the rights of servicemen and to promote in every possible way the maintenance of normal relations in the troops.

Ukraine Defense Personnel Chief Interview

92UM0435A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 2

[Interview with Colonel Ivan Pavlovich Khaletskiy, acting chief of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Personnel Directorate, by Major G. Klyuchikov; place and date not given: "Think for Yourselves, Decide for Yourselves"]

[Text] The process of the formation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine proper began on 3 January. It is contemplated that in a short space of time the forces stationed on the territory of Ukraine will be administered the oath and will become a part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Except for the military units that will become a part of the strategic deterrence forces.

Despite the fact that certain military units have already embarked on the administering of the oath to the personnel, servicemen still have questions which remain unclear. Our correspondent asked Colonel Ivan Pavlovich Khaletskiy, acting chief of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry Personnel Directorate, to answer some of them.

[Klyuchikov] Is it necessary to write an application for enlistment in the Armed Forces of Ukraine or will this be done automatically?

[Khaletskiy] Although by a decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine all the forces stationed on its territory will

become a part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, each servicemen must, nonetheless, choose independently in whose army he will serve. The submittal of an application is documentary confirmation of this choice.

In order to stress the importance and necessity of such a step I will say that Colonel General K. Morozov, defense minister of Ukraine, will personally sign each such application of the officers recommended for the Ukrainian Defense Ministry structure.

[Klyuchikov] And what will become of those who are unwilling to swear an oath of loyalty to the Ukrainian people?

[Khaletskiy] We understand full well that for the vast majority of servicemen the need to take the oath for a second time evokes a painful reaction. There will be no pressure here, therefore. Those who decide to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine will take the oath in the army units in which they are serving. Those, on the other hand, who have not made a decision on taking the oath will either be transferred to other sovereign states to continue their service or will be discharged into the reserve. We are already aware, incidentally, of such instances of officers refusing to take the oath.

All that has been said above pertains to officers and warrant officers. As far, however, as those performing their compulsory military service are concerned, they will, unless they wish to take the oath to the people of Ukraine, take the oath whose wording was formulated by the USSR Defense Ministry and which was published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

[Klyuchikov] For officers and warrant officers to switch to service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine is it sufficient for them to write out an application and take the oath?

[Khaletskiy] No, the defense minister's decision that further service by officers and warrant officers is possible only on a certification basis, account being taken of the personal desire of the enumerated categories, has been adopted. The question of the expediency of the continued use in the armed forces of a given serviceman and of the area of work in which his knowledge and experience may be most effectively employed will be decided in the course of the certification. There is no doubt that account will also be taken of an individual's social activity here.

[Klyuchikov] And the final question. Is enlistment for service in the Armed Forces of Ukraine a guarantee against the planned reductions?

[Khaletskiy] Unfortunately, no. After servicemen have taken the oath, we will have to study in earnest the painful process of a reduction in the strength of the army to the level specified by the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine.

Lt-Gen Sharikov on Lagging Military Reform

92UM0436A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General B. Sharikov, people's deputy of Ukraine: "The Process of Creating Ukraine's Armed Forces Is Not Being Halted"]

[Text] After the conference [All-Ukraine Conference on Military Development] a number of those who attended asked the editor to print the texts of their statements which, because of the limitation rule, could not be presented from the podium. Today we familiarize our readers with the thoughts of one of those who attended the conference. At the author's request, the text is presented in full.

I listened attentively to the reports and statements at this conference, and this is what I thought: Why is the military reform, started so actively in Ukraine, sliding? Why are the laws and decrees that have been passed taking hold so slowly? This is the conclusion I have reached: There are a number of reasons, and I would like to share them with you.

First, in this complicated situation, the leading personnel whom President L.M. Kravchuk invited to the conference must first of all rid themselves of their complexes and of the stereotypes that were ingrained for many years. I am convinced that in the consciousness of many military leaders, the Union, Moscow, the Center, unified Armed Forces, and a single Ministry of Defense shaking its finger and telling whom to do what and when regardless of the situation in a region, the availability of the necessary base and material support, or the climatic conditions, still stand out like beacons. I understand that it is not easy to dismiss the old stereotypes and disavow earlier views and approaches, but this must be done because new processes are taking place, processes that are unusual and distinguished from former processes, independent from them.

There is no Union, there is no Moscow as the sole capital, there is no Center, no Ministry of Defense of the former Union. So what is there?

There is, for the present, in form, the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]. In form! But some also want to lord it over the Commonwealth, including in military affairs. But this is not according to the rules, and it infringes on the sovereignty of Ukraine. We must understand this clearly.

Second, I think that everyone needs to understand deeply that there will be no going back, and that the process of creating the Armed Forces of Ukraine that has started, and its subsequent transformations, will not be stopped by any force. Ukraine is independent and free. The people confirmed this in the referendum. Ukraine has chosen its own president. He has become the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Ukraine now has a Ministry of Defense, and from 3

January 1992, in accordance with the Minsk Agreement, it set about forming its own Armed Forces. This, incidentally, has been hidden from no one, but on the contrary has been announced for the whole world to hear. And the competence of this step has been recognized by the world's leading countries, except for Moscow.

It is only there in the former Ministry of Defense of the former Union that they unable to understand this, and continue to sing the old song about unified armed forces. But how does this naivete play?

Without a unified state structure in the CIS how is it possible to have unified armed forces as part of that structure? Well, it would seem that everyone understands this except Ye.I. Shaposhnikov. What is this—a reluctance to understand, the action of a stereotype, or a true inability to think about what is happening? It is most probably the latter, to judge from the behavior of the marshal of aviation.

As a military professional I am ashamed of the actions of the former minister of defense of the former Union, since for 30 years he has had instilled in him, and has instilled in others, the ability to think and weigh decisions, clarity of formulation, logic in what is said, resolve in the choice of path. These are all traditions of the military and the officer corps. Ye.I. Shaposhnikov has everything back to front. Today he issues an order and passes it on to the troops, and tomorrow he cancels it. Today he sends a telegram to the troops, tomorrow he rescinds it. On 30 November 1991 he spoke in the military council of the Kiev Military District and said: "The processes that have started in Ukraine will not stop... we must help Ukraine in creating its own Armed Forces. We have talked about this with Comrade L.M. Kravchuk. What is needed is not talk but help." Several days later, on 4 December 1991, he sent a telegram to the troops that read as follows: "... a decision has been adopted on the unity of the armed forces. Those who wish to serve in other armies can hand in their resignations." What is this? A misunderstanding? No! It is work to someone's advantage. Well, can a person who does not know his own position lead armed forces? In my opinion this is not a minister of defense but a puppet in the hands of politicians. I think that this assessment will be the most correct.

There is one more thought that I would like to express, not essentially new, it has already been voiced, I think, in our parliament, but I would like to affirm it once again: Moscow, B. Yeltsin, and Ye. Shaposhnikov are far from being guided by the concerns of collective security in the CIS, but are guided by just one aspiration, namely, to preserve the hegemonic structure. Statements by the Russian leadership and the actions of Ye.I. Shaposhnikov in recent days confirm this. In this case, who is it who is creating instability in the consciousness of servicemen located on the territory of Ukraine?

Third, in the existing situation we cannot permit maximalism or the categorical in evaluations and decisions, particularly on very acute problems such as the Black Sea Fleet, the oath, and guarantees for officers and warrant officers and the members of their families.

What, for example, is the legal basis that is guiding B.N. Yeltsin when he declares that "the Black Sea Fleet is and will remain a Russian fleet"?

The head of the Russian parliament, Comrade Khasbulatov, has made a similar statement.

By what moral and ethical categories is Admiral Kasatonov guided when he states on television that "The Black Sea Fleet will not be subordinated to Ukraine or the defense minister of Ukraine"?

We cannot permit this to move to conflict. Everything must be resolved in a civilized way, through negotiation, with proofs, but the main yardstick of ownership, in this case of the fleet, should, in my opinion, be the territory on which it is located and that feeds it and provides it with clothing, footwear, and housing.

If there is not agreement on this kind of formulation of the question, it would be possible to reach agreement at the level of the presidents and the heads of the cabinets of ministers to set up an interstate commission, with the participation of state and political figures, professional military people, historians, and representatives of the public, and resolve it properly, and not issue hegemonic statements that the Black Sea Fleet is Russian!

The oath is a swearing of loyalty to the people, and again, first and foremost to those who raised you, with whom you live, who show concern for you, and offer guarantees for your protection.

At the All-Ukrainian conference on matters pertaining to military development, these guarantees were offered quite fully in the report of Premier V.P. Fokin.

The laws that are cited as motivation for counterargument by individual comrades—the law "On Social Protection," "On Pension Guarantees," "On Military Service"—and the drafts of laws have recently been published for familiarization. We have taken a good look at them and discussed them in the Supreme Council Defense and Security Commission led by Lieutenant General V.V. Durdinets.

Now, everyone who has familiarized himself with them can see that these laws are considerably broader and more complete and meaningful than the former Union laws. Therefore, these issues can be set aside, and you can be sure that Ukraine will show more concern for the people in uniform, regardless of their nationality.

For some, these arguments count for little. Carrying out some kind of social order, they make reference to some moral onus and finish up with the almost Philistine principle of "I give you something, you give me something: You give us good laws and we will give you our

oath." At the conference President L.M. Kravchuk wisely remarked that "we cannot speculate on the oath. The oath is a payment to the people whom you serve." And Ye.I Shaposhnikov's telegram with the demand to make units deployed on the territory of Ukraine, who live with the same thoughts as we do, who together with us are experiencing the difficulties of the reform and of extricating ourselves from crisis, swear a military oath to Russia, is, to say the least, ludicrous.

Incidentally, this applies not only to units deployed in Ukraine.

What about the servicemen located in the Western Group of Forces and the Northern Group of Forces, and other places? There are tens of thousands of representatives of various independent states and they have not all simply accepted the demand to swear the oath to Russia.

I think that the leaders at the state-political level must work on and define a mechanism for solving this problem. If anyone believes that the immediate (because of refusal to swear the oath) migration of tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, of people between the republics of the former Union is a simple matter then he is greatly mistaken. It is an enormous undertaking, with its own problems that will distract us from our chief mission—to maintain a high level of combat readiness, organization, and discipline.

Finally, all outstanding problems are being successfully resolved wherever the commander (one-man commander) has studied the situation and listened to proposals from his subordinates, reached decisions, and without looking back over his shoulder has tried to fulfill them.

During the course of the meeting with the president of Ukraine this unity of opinions and views was noticeable by its absence. Division commanders and army commanders support one thing, district commanders the opposite.

What is this? A difference of opinion? Or is it once again those same complexes and stereotypes and the desire to play into Moscow's hands?

We must study this and reveal the truth about who is with us and who against us, and reach conclusions appropriate to the good of Ukraine and its people.

Text of Military Oath

92UM0487A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jan 92 p 1

[“Military Oath”; published in Ukrainian]

[Text] I, (surname, first name, and patronymic), enter the military service and solemnly swear to the people of Ukraine always to be faithful and loyal to them, to conscientiously and honestly fulfill my military obligation and the orders of my commanders, to steadfastly

observe the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, and to preserve state and military secrets.

I swear to defend the Ukrainian state and to resolutely safeguard its freedom and independence.

I swear never to betray the people of Ukraine.

300,000 Take Ukraine Pledge

*92UM0439C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Jan 92 Union Edition p 2*

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Sergey Tsikora: "Three Hundred Thousand Have Sworn Allegiance to Ukraine"]

[Text] **The outline of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is becoming real.**

The number of soldiers who have already sworn allegiance to the people of Ukraine is approaching the 300,000 mark. By now, army formations of all combat arms, with the exception of strategic nuclear forces, are under the wing of the republic Ministry of Defense.

The commanders of Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian military districts found themselves in a quite delicate situation. They have refused to take the new oath, whereas their subordinates—on the average, almost 90 percent of personnel—have done so. Contracts for the continuation of service may be signed with some officers who wish to serve in the republic, and then go to their motherland, to another state; however, what is to be done about the commanders?

The issue of the affiliation of the Black Sea Fleet remains open. As of today, only the sailors of the border guard have taken the oath. Until a special commission completes its work, Commander of the Black Sea Fleet Admiral I. Kasatonov refuses to give the date of administering the new oath to the sailors.

Several days ago, a group of Ukrainian Supreme Soviet deputies returned from Sevastopol. At a press conference held in Kiev, they discussed a meeting with the command and officers of the Navy and the mood among the naval personnel. Journalists were told that an attempt to fly St. Andrew's standard on two ships of the Black Sea Fleet ended in failure—the crews did not accept it. However, the members of parliament were impressed the most by how poorly informed the naval officers, including senior officers, are regarding legislative acts on military building in the republic and the social protection of servicemen. We got the impression that the fleet is under an information blockade, and that the officers are being misinformed, stated the deputies. When legislative acts of the republic on the issues of the army and social protection of servicemen were produced for the officers, the tonality of contacts changed completely. For example, Navy pilots stated that they are prepared to swear allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

The request of the republic Ministry of Defense to reinforce the supreme command personnel of the three military districts and the Black Sea Fleet was endorsed at a meeting of the Permanent Commission of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine for the Issues of Defense and National Security.

Air Defense Demands Guarantees Before Oath

*92UM0444C Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "Date of the Oath—A Military Secret?"]

[Text] Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Defense Minister Morozov met 9 January with the command elements of the military districts and the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, a disciplined throng of officers of the Kiev garrison buzzed outside the doors of the Supreme Soviet. Representatives of seven military institutions and the Air Defense Academy expressed their protest to the parliament which, while requiring the officers' loyalty, could not find the time to adopt a package of laws regulating the lives of military servicemen. Officers are not against the oath, but they would first like to see laws on the performance of military service, on pensions, etc. Going out to the demonstrators, Valentin Lemish, deputy chairman of the parliamentary Commission on Defense and State Security, promised that the laws would be taken under consideration as a matter of first priority at the fifth session of parliament which will convene 28 January.

Ukraine Decree on Military Oath

*92SC0022B Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jan 92 p 1*

[Ukraine Decree on the Military Oath: "Interim Provision on the Procedures for Taking the Military Oath"]

[Text]

1. Upon entry onto military service, each citizen of Ukraine personally takes the Military Oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine and countersigns it with his own signature.
2. Taking the Military Oath places the entire responsibility on servicemen to accomplish their military duty.
3. All categories of servicemen take the oath after they have studied the basic provisions of the military law of Ukraine and the military regulations regarding their rights and responsibilities.
4. The day that the Military Oath is taken is a holiday for a military unit.
5. The time and place the oath is taken is determined by a separate order of the military unit commander and is announced to all personnel.

6. The parents and relatives and also guests of the servicemen taking the Military Oath are invited to the Military Oath taking ritual.

7. Servicemen wear the dress uniform to take the Military Oath. In wartime, the military unit commander determines the uniform to be worn.

8. At the designated time, the military unit with the Colors and an orchestra is formed in line in company (platoon) columns. Those servicemen taking the oath are in the first ranks.

9. The military unit commander opens the Military Oath taking ritual with a short speech in which he reminds the servicemen about the significance of the oath for conscientious and selfless service to Ukraine.

After the speech, the unit commander gives the order to the subunit commanders to prepare to administer the oath to the servicemen.

Subunit commanders, in turn, summon the servicemen who proclaim the text of the Military Oath while facing the formation after which they sign the common list on the line next to their names. After completion of the oath taking, the subunit commanders solemnly hand the lists with the personal signatures to the military unit commander.

The unit commander congratulates the servicemen on taking the oath and the entire military unit on the replenishment of its personnel. After this, the orchestra plays the State Hymn of Ukraine. After the Hymn is finished, the military unit passes in review.

10. Under unfavorable weather conditions, the oath taking is conducted indoors.

11. For servicemen who cannot take the oath on the designated day and time, another day and time is designated to do this.

12. The general lists of those personnel who have taken the Military Oath are maintained at the military unit headquarters and are numbered, tied, and sealed with sealing wax in a separate folder.

13. The military unit chief of staff makes an entry in the serviceman's military service record (personal certificate): "Military Oath taken (day, month, and year)." After the expiration of the designated time period, the lists are submitted to the archives.

14. The military unit commander bears responsibility for the execution of this provision and maintenance of the general lists of servicemen who have taken the oath.

15. For officers who have taken Ukrainian citizenship, the military unit commander designates the day and time for them to take the Military Oath.

16. Taking the Military Oath at military schools and academies is carried out in accordance with this provision.

17. Taking the oath at military district (fleet) headquarters, armies, corps, and military institutions may be conducted in conference halls or assembly halls in a solemn atmosphere with the orchestra playing the State Hymn of Ukraine. Servicemen of the listed military organs take the Military Oath in the procedure prescribed by this provision.

Units Take Ukraine Oath

92UM0427A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
15 Jan 92 p 1

[Roundup of reports from Ukrainian cities: "Swore Allegiance to the Ukrainian People"]

[Text] ODESSA. Last Sunday, district troops took a military oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people.

This event took place in a ceremonial atmosphere. Parents of soldiers and sergeants also took part.

The solemn ceremony was especially jovial and impressive in the Umanskiy Red Banner imeni Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo Communications Brigade. The first one to take an oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people was the commander, Guard Colonel A. Shikhirev. The units in this formation are manned entirely with Ukrainian residents from Zhitomir, Kherson, Odessa, and Nikolayev Oblasts...

In the course of the solemn ritual, the music of the anthem "Ukraine Lives On" sounded. After it ended, veterans, former GULAG prisoners, and parents of new draftees addressed the soldiers.

Whatever point of view is being promoted by Central Television and Moscow newspapers, the officers ranks of the district troops are preparing to take the military oath.

The results of a sociological survey conducted by the Contact group among the Odessa Military District staff indicate that 93 percent of respondents are ready to take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

Colonel V. Voronko

SEVASTOPOL. The Red Banner brigade of escort vessels of the Ukraine Border Troops that protect the Crimean coast is stationed not far from Sevastopol, which is seething with political passions in regard to the future of the Black Sea Fleet. This difficult atmosphere could not fail to affect the mood of the personnel and the way the coast guard was preparing for the act of taking the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine.

The unit command gave the officers, warrant officers, and sailors full freedom of conscious choice. In his interview on Sevastopol television on the eve of the oath-taking the brigade commander, Captain First Rank Igor Alferov, presented his arguments as to why he, a Russian, had decided to take the oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine. However, his open and honest position did not sit well with

everybody. An atmosphere of psychosis started to develop around the coast guard; there were insults and threats. Activists of some public organizations called on the seamen to boycott the oath-taking and distributed leaflets.

"We did not prevent the spreading of this propaganda," says I. Alferov. "On the contrary, we tried to arrange things in such a way that our people would know all the arguments "for" and "against" and make their decision a well-weighed and thought-out one. Of course, we conducted, so to say, counterpropaganda, and explained that there is an agreement between the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] states on border protection. That therefore our tasks have not changed; only the legal base for carrying them out is being changed."

The ritual of oath-taking went smoothly and was well organized. Following the commander and the officers, the sailors went through this solemn act.

M. Stetsyuk, UKRINFORM

LUTSK. The ritual of oath-taking at the Volynsk Oblast border outposts was stirring. The first ones to take the oath of allegiance to Ukraine were commanders of outposts of battle glory and fame—those dedicated to Vasiliy Petrov, Ivan Parkhomenko, and others. About 80 percent of the outposts' personnel also took the oath. Representatives of Russia, Belarus, and Moldova, who will be finishing their service term here, did not take the oath. After the oath-taking, solemn rallies were held at all border outposts; soldiers, kolkhoz members, representatives of local authorities, and people's deputies addressed the rallies; at the end, institutional sponsors presented holiday concerts.

Z. Zhizhara, UKRINFORM

Carpathian MD Units Take Ukraine Oath

92UM0504A Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
24 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Major V. Tarchinets: "Upon the Urgings of One's Heart"]

[Text] This week in the district the taking of the loyalty oath to the people of Ukraine was a major and important event. In a solemn and memorable manner the military ritual was carried out in many garrisons, units, staffs and subunits of the Carpathian Military District.

The time was 1000 hours. Officers from the headquarters, services and departments of the Carpathian MD filled the Great Hall which ordinarily is the site of sessions of the military council and other important measures. Also attending were leaders of Lvov Oblast, the First Deputy Chairman of the Oblispolkom S. Davymuka, the Deputy Chairmen of the Oblispolkom I. Gel, M. Goryn, V. Laskovskaya and many others.

To the tune of a solemn march, the standard bearers carried in the battle flags. Then a brief welcoming speech was given to those present by the Chief of Staff of the Carpathian MD, Lieutenant-General G. Gurin.

"Young, sovereign and independent Ukraine is today realizing its legitimate right to establish its own Armed Forces. The troops of our district are being organically merged in them. With faith and justice we shall endeavor to serve the people of Ukraine honestly."

"To me," stressed Lieutenant-General Gennadiy Nikolayevich Gurin, "a great honor has fallen—to be the first to take the oath."

Smartly, with military bearing, he picked up the folder with the text of the military oath. He vowed to his subordinates, generals and officers to carry out the given oath. Then the taking of the military oath was carried out down through the staffs, services and departments. It was taken in Russian and Ukrainian. On this day, signing the text of the sacred oath of loyalty to Ukraine were all those who definitively had made their choice of loyalty and dedication to the Ukrainian people and who arrived at this decision at the urging of their hearts. This also was done by the author of these lines.

"Well, just how many times are you going to take such an oath? Haven't you done this before?" Yes, there was such a moment in my life as well as for many of the other servicemen. We had all taken our vow to the Soviet government and to our then common motherland—the USSR—to carry out the military oath in a sacred and steadfast manner. But now there is no such state as the USSR. Let us look realistically and with open eyes at our current reality. For this reason I have not the slightest hint of doubt that I am not violating an officer's honor and code.

In swearing loyalty to the people of Ukraine, I have vowed to defend my own and not an abstract motherland. To defend a young and independent Ukraine. I feel that it is worth living and creating for the sake of this.

Ukraine Law on Soldiers Rights Viewed

92UM0444A Kiev *NEZAVISIMOST* in Russian
10 Jan 92 p 4

[Unattributed article: "We Must Protect the Protectors, So That They Do Not Replenish the Ranks of the Most Vulnerable of Our Countrymen"]

[Text] The Law "On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Families," recently adopted by the parliament, should augment the involvement of citizens of Ukraine in military service.

It has finally gotten rid of the traditional, although not very well advertised, discrimination against people in uniform.

So, military servicemen who are citizens of Ukraine and serving in Ukrainian territory participate in all-Ukraine

and local referendums, and elect and may be elected to soviets of people's deputies and other elective state organs (up to and including the office of president). They have the right to establish their own social organizations and submit appeals to a court with respect to unlawful actions of responsible military officials and military directorate organs. Henceforth military servicemen have the right to travel abroad on a par with all citizens of Ukraine. They may profess any religion or not profess any. Persons whose religious convictions prevent them from performing basic military service are afforded the right to perform alternative service.

The enumeration of restrictions imposed by military status is a great deal shorter. Servicemen may not be members of any political parties or movements. Their participation in the organization or conduct of strikes is prohibited. Nor do they have the right to engage in entrepreneurial activity.

The law reads: The utilization of military servicemen to accomplish tasks not connected with military service is prohibited. However, military units may be brought in to participate in the elimination of aftereffects of accidents, natural calamities, and other extreme occurrences upon decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Time spent in military service is credited to an individual's overall and continuous labor tenure. Upon discharge to the reserves, basic-term servicemen maintain the right for a three-month period to job placement at the enterprise at which they were employed prior to call-up. They are afforded financial assistance, to come from the state budget, in the amount of one month's salary. For two years from the date of discharge from military service, they enjoy preferential treatment in the event of personnel strength or job position reductions.

A 41-hour work week is established for military personnel, as is leave from 30 to 45 days, depending on length of service, without taking into account travel time to and from the vacation area. Nor is the rank and file forgotten—the law guarantees soldiers and sailors a 20-day leave, sergeants and senior enlisted—an additional five days.

As everyone knows, the most acute issue is the housing question. The law reads that the state is to provide a roof over the head of every serviceman. Prior to affording permanent housing, the military unit is obliged to afford either official quarters, or a rented apartment, or, at the serviceman's request, provide him a monetary payment for the sublease of housing premises.

Officers, Army and Navy warrant officers, etc., who have served at least 17 years and have not been provided housing have the right to top-priority entry on the housing construction cooperative list or to receipt of a plot of land for individual construction. They are issued credit for 20 years, with debt cancellation through funds of the military formations: of 50 percent—for those with

over 15 years of service, 75 percent—for those with over 20 years of service, and 100 percent—for those with over 25 years of service.

Upon discharge to the reserves, they are provided financial assistance in the amount of five-months monetary allowance.

Servicemen and reservists called up for periodic training are covered by mandatory personal insurance in the amount of 100 times the minimum subsistence wage.

Upon the duty transfer of their husbands to a different locality, wives of military servicemen are provided monetary assistance by work place in the amount of a monthly salary. They are paid 100 percent medical disability compensation, regardless of labor tenure.

Finally, this law is applicable to servicemen who are on duty in Ukrainian territory, as well as to citizens of Ukraine performing military duty outside the state. Its protection also applies to the families of those killed or injured while performing their service obligation.

Law on Armed Forces of Ukraine

925C0022A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
4 Jan 92 p 1

[Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Resolution and Law of Ukraine on Armed Forces of Ukraine, Kiev, December 6, 1991: "Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Procedures for Bringing into Force the Law of Ukraine 'On the Ukrainian Armed Forces' and Law of Ukraine on Armed Forces of Ukraine"]

[Text]

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Resolution on the Procedures to put into force the Law of Ukraine "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces"

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet resolves to:

1. Put into force the Law of Ukraine "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces" from the moment of its adoption.
2. Task the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers to develop, prior to January 1, 1992, proposals with regard to the general structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, its strength and the size of the budget appropriations for their maintenance.
3. The Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers will develop a draft Law on the Status of the Armed Forces that are temporarily deployed on the territory of Ukraine and will submit it for Ukrainian Supreme Soviet review.

I. Plyushch Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Chairman Kiev December 6, 1991.

Law of Ukraine "On the Ukrainian Armed Forces"

Ukraine, as an independent state and subject of international law, and while proceeding from the fact that

defense of the country is the cause of all people of Ukraine, proclaims the creation of its own Armed Forces.

Article 1. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are tasked with the armed defense of the independence, territorial integrity, and inviolability of Ukraine.

Article 2. The utilization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to carry out missions not associated with the defense of the state is decided exclusively by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Article 3. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are structured and carry out their activities based on:

- democracy and humanism;
- the hierarchy of the law;
- accountability of legislative and executive power to constitutional organs;
- one-man command and collective development of decisions;
- universal military obligation of citizens of Ukraine;
- the voluntary nature of entry into cadre military service;
- observance of military discipline;
- glasnost in the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and preservation of state and military secrets;
- no affiliation with any political party; and,
- guaranteed socio-legal protection of servicemen.

Article 4. The Ukrainian Armed Forces consist of these services:

- the Ground Troops (ground defense forces);
- the Air Forces (air space [vozdushnogo postranstva] defense forces); and,
- the Naval Forces.

The structure of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, its strength, weaponry, and economic, financial and logistics support are approved by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet upon submission by the President of Ukraine.

Article 5. The President of Ukraine, as Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and Chairman of the Ukrainian Defense Council, exercises overall leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Article 6. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense exercises direct leadership of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The functions and powers of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense for leadership of the Armed Forces are determined on the basis of this Law, the Law of Ukraine on Defense, and other legislative acts of Ukraine and the Provision on the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense that has been approved by the President of Ukraine.

Article 7. The structure of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and other organs of military command and control is approved by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers upon submission by the Ukrainian Minister of Defense.

Article 8. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are manned by servicemen in accordance with the Law of Ukraine on "Universal Military Obligation and Military Service."

Workers, whose work is regulated by Ukrainian legislation on labor, are hired in accordance with a concluded labor contract to support vital activities in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Article 9. Deployment and billeting of armies and division-sized and smaller units and subunits is carried out in accordance with the requirements of military doctrine and with the strategic and operational plan developed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense carries out changes in the deployment and billeting of troops from division-sized and larger units with the authorization of the President of Ukraine.

The composition, structure, deployment, missions, and support of troops that are part of the system of Strategic Deterrent Forces are defined and implemented based on interstate treaties.

The status of the Armed Forces that are temporarily deployed on the territory of Ukraine is determined by legislative acts of Ukraine.

Article 10. The Ukrainian Armed Forces are authorized to perform economic activities if they do not affect their combat readiness and combat capability. The procedures for carrying out economic activities are determined by the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 11. The state language is used in the Ukrainian Armed Forces in accordance with existing legislation.

The military-patriotic education of servicemen is carried out based on national-historical traditions of the people of Ukraine.

The activities of any political parties and movements whatsoever in the Ukrainian Armed Forces are banned.

Article 12. The Ukrainian Procurator General and the procurators authorized by him carry out supervision of the compliance with the law in the activities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

[Signed] President of Ukraine L. Kravchuk

Kiev December 6, 1991

Discussion of Proposed Law on Military Service

92UM0354A Kiev. NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
11 Dec 92 p 1

[Report by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Press Service under the rubric "We Recommend You Consider": "Colonel-General K.P. Morozov: 'The Defense of Ukraine Is the Sacred Duty of Every Citizen'"]

[Text] No one today doubts the irreversibility of the political processes that are occurring in Ukraine. In the 1 December referendum our people unanimously came out for the free and independent development of their Motherland. One of the guarantees of the sovereignty of Ukraine must be its armed forces. Their formation is being carried out in a civilized way and on a firm legal basis.

The Ukrainian parliament continues to examine the package of laws on the military force development of its own armed forces. On 6 December of this year the "Law of Ukraine on Defense" and the "Law of Ukraine on Armed Forces" were published. The text of the military oath was approved. During the work of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine one of the basic drafts—the Law "On Universal Military Service and Military Service" will be submitted to the attention of the people's deputies for consideration in the first reading.

This draft law was developed on the basis of the "Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine," the "Act of Proclamation of Independence of Ukraine," the decree on the service of servicemen on the territory of Ukraine, adopted laws of Ukraine on development of military force, and a number of other laws and resolutions adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

Members of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on Questions of Defense and State Security, representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, prominent specialists of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, representatives of other interested ministries and departments, and an initiative group of the Union of Officers of Ukraine actively participated in the elaboration of this draft law.

I would like to direct your attention to a typical detail. While taking into account foreign analogies on military legislation, the draft law at the same time has features in a number of articles in the approach to military force development of the armed forces that are based on the historical experience of the development of the statehood of the people of Ukraine.

The general provisions of the draft law define the most important functions of the state for its defense. The defense of Ukraine is the sacred duty of every citizen.

The articles of the draft law reveal the main directions and ways of acquiring manpower for the armed forces, the general obligations of citizens, the complement of servicemen and persons subject to military obligation, their ranks, and their positions.

During the discussion of the draft law, the article on the procedure for granting deferment from the draft resulted in debates. Proposals were made fundamentally to broaden the rights of citizens for obtaining deferments.

Together with the traditional reasons, it is proposed to grant the right of deferment to citizens who have a child up to three years of age, or older than three years being

reared without a mother. Deferment from draft into active military service for a period of up to three years will also be granted to induction-age youth in families with two or more sons, one of which is in military service. Provision is made for the introduction of deferments of up to two years for immigrants from natural disaster rayons, and for those who have begun to engage in individual farming for a period of three years from the moment of acquiring land.

Citizens who have family members that died or became invalids during active military service are fully exempt from the draft.

Recently there has been widespread discussion of the question as to what principle of manpower acquisition is the most effective for the Army? The so-called mixed principle of manpower acquisition for the armed forces has proven itself well recommended in a number of developed European countries. Under conditions of the economic instability of society, this principle should promote a phased transition to the future manning of the Army on a professional basis.

It is proposed to establish compulsory military service for a period of 18 months. For those subject to the draft whose religious convictions do not permit the performance of military service, alternative service for a period of 27 months is stipulated. Thus one of the problems of complying with the civil rights of the individual will be resolved.

Taking today's realities into account and the aspirations of Ukraine to establish its own armed forces on a new basis, provision is being made for the performance of service by various categories of servicemen on a contract basis, and service promotions, on a competitive basis.

Soldiers, sailors, and ranking noncommissioned officers who have served not less than one year who have the appropriate professional training will undergo military service on a contract basis in a strictly voluntary arrangement. Warrant officers, who have served for a period of not less than five years.

The draft law provides for the acceptance of women for military service aged 19 to 25 who have a military occupational specialty, on a strictly voluntary basis, and the conclusion of a contract with them for a period of not less than three years for the performance of service in positions of soldiers, sailors, or sergeants.

Cadets of military educational institutions will also conclude a contract for officer positions after completing the first year. The draft law also takes into account the qualitative changes in the training of students of civilian higher educational institutions. Thus, the registration of students for military training envisages the conduct on a voluntary basis, with the preliminary conclusion of a contract on performing service in the permanent establishment or in the reserve. Those students who are not certified for the officer staff, or did not go through compulsory or alternative service, will be called up for

active military service for a period of one year. For students in the day form of schooling in higher civilian and ecclesiastical educational institutions, deferment from the draft into active military service is granted one time during the period of education.

It is necessary to dwell separately on the military service of officer personnel. We reckon that the concept of the system of uninterrupted military education developed in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will facilitate not only a significant increase in the effectiveness of training specialists but also the standardization of diplomas issued in institutions with the general levels of the civilian education system, which will guarantee the social protection of officers.

Provision is made for the establishment of the following maximum age qualification in the performance of military service:

- for soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and ranking compulsory service noncommissioned officers—30 years;
- for warrant officers and servicewomen—45 years;
- for junior officers—45 years;
- for senior officers in the military ranks of captain major or their equivalent—45 to 50 years; and lieutenant colonel and its equivalent—up to 55 years
- for senior officers in the military ranks of colonel, major general, lieutenant general, and their equivalent—55-60 years; colonel general and its equivalent—65 years, and general of the army of Ukraine and its equivalent—by a decision of the president of Ukraine.

On the initiative of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, for the purpose of maintaining the intellectual potential of the personnel of the armed forces, the service of officers who are candidates of science and also officers who have a high professional level, who are also physically fit for further service, can be extended beyond the established maximum periods by the minister of defense on a petition from command elements, scientific councils, and appropriate scientific committees for five years, and that of doctors of science for 10 years.

A significant step in the matter of increasing the social-legal protection of servicemen, in my opinion, is the introduction in the draft law of a provision according to which for the first time a serviceman is granted the right to resign from the armed forces on a voluntary basis on condition that, after completion of military school, he serve not less than five years in officer positions.

Following the historical traditions of Ukrainian military formations, the present draft of the law proposes to place the military rank of colonel in the general and flag officer category. This will unquestionably raise its significance, and will lead to a reduction in the numbers in general officer ranks.

Thus, the draft Law "On the Universal Military Obligation and Military Service" proposes the principle of mixed manpower acquisition, provides the armed forces of Ukraine and other troops with qualified personnel, and it also envisions the training of the population in the defense of a sovereign state.

It is necessary to emphasize that the work on the draft law will be continued after it is examined in the first reading in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. Therefore, the author's group of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will accept with gratitude business-like and well-reasoned proposals for this draft of the law.

Ukraine Military Posts Designated

92UM0387B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
3 Jan 92 p 1

["Appointments in the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine"]

[Text] **By order of the Minister of Defense, the following appointments are made:**

Colonel **Vladimir Savelyevich Mulyava**—Chief of the Socio-Psychological Service of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;

Colonel **Petr Ivanovich Volynets**—Chief of the Administrative Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine;

Major-General **Anatoliy Vasilyevich Palamarchuk**—Chief of a directorate of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

Major-General **Valeriy Pavlovich Vasilyev**—Chief of a directorate of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;

Major-General of Aviation **Vadim Aleksandrovich Grechaninov**—Chief of a directorate of the Main Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine Military Appointments

92UM0464B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
4 Jan 92 p 1

["Appointments Within the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine"]

[Text] **By order of the Minister of Defense of the Ukraine, the following appointments are made:**

Colonel **Stepan Ivanovich Volynets** as Chief of a Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine;

Colonel **Yuriy Mikhaylovich Prokofyev** as Chief of the Military Education Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine;

Colonel **Ivan Ivanovich Shtopenko** as Chief of the Finance Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine;

Colonel Vasiliy Danilovich Matirka as Chief of the Reception Office of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine;

Major Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Kluban as Chief of the Press Service of the Ministry of Defense of the Ukraine.

Ukraine Representative on Military

92UM0328B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 10 Jan 92 p 1

[Report by Major S. Knyazkov under the general heading: "How Should We Reform the Armed Forces?"]

[Text] "Ukraine will free Russia from excessive military concerns," is the way it was put at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists held in the building of the Ukrainian mission in Moscow by V. Kryzhanovskiy, the authorized representative of Ukraine to the Russian Federation, explaining one of the motives for beginning the organizational development of Ukrainian armed forces.

True, one does not know what there is more of in this statement—irony or cunning; nonetheless, it did not ease the torrent of questions from the journalists. Responding to them, representatives of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine announced in particular that according to their data 90 percent of servicemen will take the Ukrainian oath, and this will also be done by the leaders of the former Kiev, Carpathian, and Odessa Military Districts. Of course, nothing specific was heard regarding the basis for such confidence.

As for the Black Sea Fleet, as Colonel V. Lazurkin, an adviser to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine said, Ukraine does not view it as constituting part of the strategic forces of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], and therefore it is free to act according to its own discretion.

Judging by the answers, the Ukrainian side was not troubled by B. Yeltsin's statement about the indivisibility of the Black Sea Fleet, about it being part of the strategic forces of the Commonwealth. Well, apparently the contradictions over military questions will remain on the agenda in the immediate future. For the time being, the parties are not compromising.

Possibility of Ukrainian Loss of Control Over Army

92UM0335A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 3 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Disagreements in CIS on Defense Questions"]

[Text] Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are demanding their shares of the Armed Forces of the former USSR.

For almost five hours on 30 December in Minsk the heads of the independent states discussed the partially coordinated draft of the agreement on defense questions during the transition period, but they did not manage to reach a compromise, even in the most general, superficial form.

Moldova and Azerbaijan are creating their own armies for quite obvious local purposes. Correspondingly, the military threat presented by the few units these independent states are capable of creating will be fairly local. Ukraine is another matter, since it intends to "nationalize" the troops and arms of three military districts (Carpathian, Odessa, and Kiev) and also the Black Sea Fleet.

Ukraine's position seems quite simple: No mutual (Union) commitments regarding members of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States]—benevolent neutrality in any case. Such is the will of the current Ukrainian leadership and, like it or not, adjacent countries will have to deal with it. Incidentally, the Ukrainian government is achieving not simply neutrality but armed neutrality, with its own independent and fairly powerful armed forces.

As a result of "nationalization," Ukraine is acquiring an army which it will find extremely difficult to maintain. True, people are expressing opinions about the fact that after the division of the Army the part left to Ukraine will quickly be reformed and reduced in size, and some of the arms will be sold (which disturbs many countries in Europe, the Near East, and America to the extreme). It is quite possible that these are the real goals of the current Ukrainian leaders, but they will not be able either to reform the Army independently or to arrange for the export of arms. The sale of modern weapons is quite different from grain trading: A fighter or a tank cannot simply be sold and forgotten—it is necessary to organize service and spare parts, and most of them are produced in Russia.

It is not difficult to envision the consequences of the maneuvers of the Ukrainian leadership: The existing (by no means ideal) system of supply and control of troops will be destroyed and they will not be able to create a new one. The threat that they will lose control of the troops is quite real. The Army could quickly become completely independent and at the same time a fairly uncontrolled political force. The consequences of this kind of development of events would be most regrettable both for Ukraine and for the other states which now seem to be independent.

Referendum Military Vote Viewed

92UM0310A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
3 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by NARODNAYA ARMIYA correspondent Captain V. Knysh: "No One Will Be Able to Knock Us Out of the Saddle Now..."]

[Text] It was no accident that I arrived at this military unit on election day. In previous material I reported on

the course of preparations for the referendum as to what thoughts the officers and soldiers of the Army collective have on this subject. This material elicited an ambiguous reaction. There was the view that ardent "samostiynyky" [Ukrainian separatists] had been selected, their words rendered in tabloid style. Well, truth is not always pleasing to the ear. And I do not feel I have the right to smooth over the utterances of adult individuals responsible for what they say...

Two flags were hoisted at the entry control point—the blue-yellow and red-blue. It is not often you will see such a peaceful neighborly arrangement. All the more so in such a place as this.

"For us they symbolize a transition period, the irreversibility of the processes of restoring Ukrainian statehood," explained Major Aleksandr Fedorchenko, chairman of the electoral commission. Then, as if reading my mind, he added: "Soon you will again become convinced for yourself regarding for whom and for what our soldiers are voting." Although I never had any doubt as to their choice.

By 1200 noon peace and quiet was established at the election precinct. Most of the communications personnel had voted in organized military fashion and started following the free-day schedule. It is not at all a matter of some tradition hanging on which all must follow, like the behavior of the morning lark, to move from reveille to the election precinct. It is simply that regulations do not envisage any time for the soldiers to "warm up."

Vasiliy Lazarenko, Ukrainian Republican Party representative and member of the electoral commission, stated:

"I have been here since 0630 this morning. Like all the rest, I was present when the ballot box was sealed. Everything is proceeding strictly according to the law. The soldiers began arriving at 0700. In March I was permitted to be here only as an observer. You would have to agree—it is a role with no standing. Now I am a commission member. Although I came here with bias. I thought I would be met coldly, with ill will. But it all turned out otherwise. I immediately felt comfortable, on a par with everyone else. They offered me tea and breakfast. In short, everything is fine."

Major Aleksandr Fedorchenko, chairman of the electoral commission, is impatient. He simply cannot wait to learn the election results. But not everyone has voted as yet. There remain the newly assigned personnel, arriving the day of the referendum, who were immediately sent to the bath house—a sacred ritual taking precedence even over politics.

Sergeant Aleksandr Osinin, from Brest, is also a member of the electoral commission:

"I do not consider myself an outsider. No matter what anybody might say, this is very important to me—how everything turns out in Ukraine. I voted for sovereignty.

But when it came to which candidate for president to vote for, I wavered—Kravchuk or Chornovil? But Kravchuk "won out" all the same. Why did I vote for Ukrainian sovereignty? All the republics, including Ukraine and Belarus, are fed up with maintaining a disoriented center, of those who are at the top. It is time to do something for ourselves. My countrymen also feel this way. The only regrettable thing is that the elections should be on a holiday. But I think that will come."

Indeed, there is no big hullabaloo. No holiday. But we must admit that there is a striving to decide the two main questions very quickly and finally get down to work. Everyone understands this, as well as they understand that there is no place for "a banquet during the time of plague." Ukraine is not far removed from totally impoverished Russia. And our food situation is not just bad—it is very bad. So it is too soon to be shouting "Hurray!" All our difficulties lie ahead. But the ambiguity of the moment is felt by each person who has made his final decision.

"Everyone was disposed to vote. But there were some who considered this not very necessary for themselves," Senior Warrant Officer Valeriy Skripak relates. "Sergeant Babich tells me, for example: 'I am going to the election precinct. But I don't see the sense in it. We already have an elected president in Russia. We are a sovereign state, and soon I will leave the service.' He is right. And it is a pity that Ukrainians who are serving there did not get the opportunity to make their legal choice here."

But Major Viktor Pobolov believes (and he asked that it be emphasized that this is his personal opinion): "Following the declaration on depoliticization and departyization of the Armed Forces, military servicemen should not take part in political campaigns, or—as a variant of these—in elections. Although my men were in a frame of mind to participate in them."

Each individual has the right to his own opinion. No one intends to accuse an officer of lacking patriotism when his position is entirely lawful and shows common sense. But can it be that today, when such issues are being resolved, someone has the right to leave our men in uniform by the wayside, prohibit them from saying "yes" or "no"? They will do this all the same. And from politics there is nowhere to hide. Politics is everywhere, including in the military community.

Now—the outcome. As Lieutenant Colonel V. Zimin informed me, the results of voting by the military communications personnel are as follows: 90 percent voted in favor of state sovereignty of Ukraine; about 50 percent would like to see Leonid Kravchuk as its president, and a somewhat lesser percentage—Vyacheslav Chornovil. The remaining candidates trailed far behind.

Military personnel serving in the territory of Ukraine actively participated in the referendum and in the elections of the president of Ukraine.

Second Congress of Ukrainian Soldiers' Mothers' Congress

92UM0310B Kiev *NARODNAYA ARMIYA* in Russian
4 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Major G. Klyuchikov: "In Protecting Our Sons We Are Protecting Our People"]

[Text] At first glance it would seem that the Second Congress of Ukraine Soldiers Mothers does not stand out in any way in the long list of events which have so enriched our lives in recent times. All those same angry faces in the setting of multicolored posters, leaflets, and slogans. That same absence of prominent political figures, preferring to send their representatives or greetings. The solemn service, mournful silence for those who perished, and harmonious chorus of voices singing the hymn of Ukraine.

All the same, a very great deal has changed over the time elapsed since the first congress. We have traveled the long road of struggle to create an independent democratic state, to consolidate legality and law and order in the Armed Forces.

"For the first time women have joined together and are beginning to exert a real influence on the politicians," emphasized L. Trukhmanova, director of the coordinating council. "Even today it is impossible not to take note of this social force, not to take it into consideration."

A year and a half ago, when the Committee of Soldiers Mothers was just being established in Ukraine, its demands were perceived as reactionary extremist expressions against the holy of holies—unity of the country and its Armed Forces, as an attempt to slander our officers "invincible and legendary."

"Yes, soldiers are dying. Yes, we have not yet managed to eliminate hazing. But all of this amounts to temporary difficulties alien to our socialist society," political and party leaders tried to persuade us.

But the mothers of servicemen whose sons perished in the Army were unwilling to wait for the Army leadership to deal with defects in the Armed Forces. And indeed they did not believe that would happen. Every year 6,600, according to official data—8,000 according to recently published information—zinc coffins were shipped to mothers of the country.

In short order, members of the Committee of Soldiers Mothers fell into the ranks of "the violent." They were chased out of military registration and enlistment offices, not permitted to visit military units, and hushed up in the press.

This is what is surprising. In literature, in the propagandistic stock phrases, one observed widespread use of the collective mother who personifies the Motherland. This mother was endowed with such qualities as wisdom, justice, and courage. But when it was not a conjured-up mother but a real one who walked into the military unit

or the office of an official, they avoided her like the plague. And she was even reproached for all of her marvelous qualities.

No one liked the courage a mother displayed when fighting for the life of her child.

No one liked the justice a mother tried to attain at all levels of authority.

No one liked the wisdom mothers displayed when drawing up draft laws that would protect military servicemen.

Here is the truth of our lives: We squandered millions on the Mother of the Motherland monument but could not find a few miserable pennies to provide compensation to a specific mother whose son died or was killed in the line of duty. Although there is no way to even talk about any kind of compensation. The life of a child is priceless to a mother, to all of us.

Today a great deal of what the committee demanded at its first session and for which it was ostracized has become actuality. The organization of our own armed forces is well underway, a resolution has been adopted on duty service by conscripts in Ukraine, the issue has been critically raised regarding the need for dismantling the organs of the military procuracy. It is even being said that a plan has been developed for a presidential commission for the protection of servicemen. It has just become bogged down somewhere in the corridors of power.

All these things are unquestioned successes. But the sons of Ukrainian mothers continue to return from the Army to their homes in zinc coffins. S. Kasyan certifies that 100 conscripts died in Cherkassy Oblast in 1990, and 40 this year. A report on the deaths of five more was received literally on the eve of the congress.

So, what is it these women want, who have gathered together for their second congress from all corners of Ukraine? Do they thirst for retribution against those who tormented their sons or with whose silent agreement unlawful acts were perpetrated? No. They want to be heard by all women of Ukraine. They want to give warning—too often mothers come to them only after their sons have begun to complain in letters about the brutality of barracks hoodlums.

It is necessary to reach out, to cry out to every mother's heart to convince her that action must be taken at this very moment, immediately.

At times it was only with great difficulty we could believe the women assembled at this congress would be able to do this. The forum was conducted in quite an unusual fashion. In breaking voices mothers told of incidents of servicemen being exposed to derision, and were unable to hold back the tears when empathizing with another's grief reminiscent of their own tragedy. The rigid presidium wept, the entire hall wept. But hidden in these

tears, in this readiness of mothers to understand and share their human grief, a tremendous amount of energy was concealed capable of sweeping aside the most sophisticated bureaucratic obstacles and softening the most callous hearts.

Representatives of numerous political and social organizations present at the congress have been able to take note of this energy and evaluate it. Some of them have not been averse to utilizing the potential capabilities of the Committee of Soldiers Mothers to their own ends. However, the congress concentrated all its attention on problems in the Army.

During the course of presentations, serious accusations were leveled against us, officers. Representatives of Kiev Military District Headquarters, the military commissariats, and the Ukrainian Defense Ministry were required to listen to quite a number of bitter, reproachful comments regarding indifference, failure to observe government laws and resolutions. In this regard, every presentation was underscored by many such scandalous incidents, each of which could easily serve as the basis for a criminal investigation.

However, the greatest number of accusations were leveled as a result of the persistent unwillingness of many unit commanders to cooperate with members of the Committee of Soldiers Mothers. Lidiya Iosifovna Bulavchuk of Ivano-Frankovsk told of how they had intended to set up a holiday for soldiers of the unit located next to the city. They wanted the soldiers to be able to spend at least one day in a home environment and get better acquainted with the everyday life and customs of their region. But the women were not even permitted to set foot on the threshold of the command headquarters.

This circumstance can be looked at in a variety of ways. But I am personally suspicious of those commanders who exert every effort to seal off their units from monitoring by the community.

I know of no instance in which the fact of soldiers mothers providing assistance would be to the detriment of a military unit's combat readiness. There are more than enough examples which show a positive effect. Nina Ivanovna Lysogor, chairman of the Dneprodzerzhinsk Committee, attracted general attention in the congress hall. Through her hands passed more than 500 deserters whom she had personally taken to the military unit of Colonel A. Makarchuk. I saw myself how mothers vigorously beseeched Nina Ivanovna to intercede so that their sons would be sent to this unit. We are talking about a construction battalion.

Yes, often mothers who have lost a son and are broken by tragedy do not show enough restraint in a conversation with the military leadership. Indeed, they do not like half-steps, and they hate compromise. Their lives have taught them to rely solely on their own efforts. But members of the committee are sincerely striving to achieve cooperation with the military. They want to

direct what remains of their strength to seeing to it that our Army becomes civilized, that our sons are not derided and killed there.

"The Army must not be quarreled with," committee chairperson V. Artamonova argued convincingly. "It must be structured—structured so that in it law reigns supreme."

Words of wisdom. Can it be that they do not coincide with the aims set by the command, by each commander? So why are there those who continue to hang political labels on the committee? The time has come to understand that the mothers of Ukraine are not protecting Rukh or the Officers Union. They are protecting their children, and in so doing—their people.

All-Ukraine Military Conference

92UM0437A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
14 Jan 92 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "To Serve the People of Ukraine With Faith and Truth"]

[Text] Today we complete publication of materials from last week's All-Ukraine Conference on Questions of Military Development.

Ukrainian Defense Minister K.P. Morozov presented a report. Revealing the main content of the policy of Ukraine since the December referendum, he singled out the steps taken to consolidate its independence. He offered a detailed interpretation of the most important stage of this policy, namely, practical resolution of matters pertaining to our own Armed Forces and the creation by the Supreme Soviet, president, and defense minister of the legal foundation for this. Those attending the conference were informed of the content of the agreements signed on 30 December last year in Minsk, one of whose most important points is the agreement that Ukraine will start to exercise its right to create its own armed forces from 3 January 1992.

Revealing the essential nature of the idea of building the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the defense minister emphasized that formation of our own army requires in-depth reorganization of the groupings of armed forces located in Ukraine because their composition and numerical strength are at variance with the basic provisions of our military doctrine. In particular, it is planned to reduce the management structures for ground troops and set up three operational commands on the basis of the Transcarpathian, Kiev, and Odessa Military Districts. The air force command set up in the second stage will include the Ukrainian air defense command. The concept of creating naval forces, reorganizing military training establishments and the railroad troops, and also troops that do not fall within the categories of the branches of the Armed Forces, was reported.

As a result of completion of all reforms in the troop groupings, their numerical strength will be lower but

adequate to provide defense against aggression and guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. By 1 January 1996 the Armed Forces of Ukraine be made up of three branches—ground troops, whose mission is land defense, air forces, with the mission of defending the air space, and naval forces. The Armed Forces of Ukraine will also include formations and units and establishments of special troops, the rear, technical support, military training establishments, the railroad troops, and units and establishments of the Ministry of Defense. After separation from the entire group of the composition of strategic forces, the numerical strength of the troops, which will be subject to cutbacks and reform during the transition period, will be on the order of 450,000 to 500,000.

The following stages were outlined for development of the Armed Forces: 1992-1993, reform of the management structures for the three military districts, and of the armies, formation of combat-ready, fully manned divisions, creation of a strategic grouping, work on military and combat regulations and manuals for the combat use of weapons systems and military equipment by the combat arms. During 1993-1994 the system of rear support will be reorganized, a system will be put in place to develop and fill the orders for weapons, military equipment, and military scientific research, a system will be developed for operational support for the Armed Forces, including intelligence for all combat arms, an electronic warfare system, and engineering and chemical support, and the system used to staff the Armed Forces and train young men for service will acquire new features, and creation of the naval grouping will be completed. Work will be completed on a unified plan for strategic use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the basis of a defensive doctrine and a plan for preparing the defense infrastructure, and a system will also be developed to train citizens for service and for the planned creation of state strategic reserves.

Lieutenant General K.P. Morozov went on to deal with the problem of the military oath of loyalty to Ukraine, which is being organized on the basis of the ukase of the president of Ukraine. This process has already started and will continue through January. There really might be a situation in which a serviceman refuses to swear loyalty to the people of Ukraine and expresses the desire to serve in the armed forces of another state, from where he was drafted or which is his own homeland, or to be discharged from the Armed Forces... In all such cases the question of continuing his service should be resolved positively, on an individual basis for each serviceman with proper explanations and assistance. No discrimination is permissible in such cases.

An unusual situation may arise when the oath is sworn in military training establishments, in particular by students and cadets accepted for study from regions outside Ukraine who do not wish to serve in Ukraine after they graduate. In these cases, the principals of the schools must reach their decisions on a strictly individual basis

for each serviceman. On the basis of appropriate agreements reached with interested states by the leadership of Ukraine, training for their citizens may continue at these schools.

The question of the transfer of officers who are Ukrainian citizens from other regions was touched upon. During the initial stage of the military reform this can be resolved only to a limited extent and on an individual basis, giving due consideration to their material security. In the future, however, the wishes of all officers who are Ukrainian citizens will be considered.

The minister of defense clarified the mission of troops and naval forces for 1992.

First he made public the size of the military budget for Ukraine for the current year; it will be 26.8 billion rubles [R]. This figure does not include payments for land. Some local authorities are insistently demanding this payment from military units, and this will require an additional appropriation of more than 18 billion rubles. The Ministry of Defense considers this inadvisable at this time and so will not be increasing allocations from the state budget for military spending. In turn, the Ministry of Defense is taking steps to transfer to local authorities land that is not being used or is being used irrationally.

Commenting on the law on social and legal protection for servicemen and the members of their families passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Lieutenant General K.P. Morozov pointed out specially that what is new in the document are the provisions guaranteeing freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic creativity, the 41-hour work week, and longer periods of annual leave according to term of service.

Formulating the procedure for providing servicemen with housing and pensions, he reported that provision is being made to enter into special agreements between states and members of the Commonwealth, defining the retention of pension support for servicemen who change their place of residence and move to another state after discharge to the reserves. All matters pertaining to the transfer of officers will be resolved on a legal basis. It is envisaged that by the end of January discharge papers will be requested from the Main Administration for Personnel for generals, admirals, and officers who are serving on the territory of Ukraine, and also that interim provisions be drawn up for the nomenklatura for assignments for officers, the conferring of military rank, and discharging officers and warrant officers to the reserves.

Concern was expressed for the very inefficient use of military scientific bodies, the lack of documents providing guidelines in operational-strategic and other matters, and the absence of an up-to-date methodology for personnel selection for crucial duties.

Work to strengthen military discipline remains urgent. The principles of social justice and legal protection for personnel must be introduced into military life, along

with democratization and glasnost in military service relations. Close contact must be maintained with parents and close relatives of personnel, and with the committees of soldiers' mothers. The responsibility of all officials at all levels must be enhanced in the matter of organizing the reception of visitors and reaching immediate decisions on all matters connected with their needs.

In conclusion, Ukrainian Defense Minister Lieutenant General K.P. Morozov emphasized that the guarantee for stability in the troops is an understanding of the situation by everyone and selfless work by all for the good of the Ukrainian state.

The next to speak was Ukrainian Prime Minister V.P. Fokin. He said that people in uniform had earned the right to the deepest respect and a solicitous attitude toward them. And the government is aware that prompt resolution of these questions is the sole condition for maintaining the combat capability and combat readiness of all military units and formations.

V.P. Fokin covered in detail the content of the law on social and legal protection for servicemen and the members of their families—a law that has no analogue in a unified state, and he also reported that from 1 January the Cabinet of Ministers had assumed responsibility to fund the Armed Forces.

In connection with the reform of military structures, the problem of employment for servicemen will be very acute. In the final quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year alone something on the order of 18,000 have been and will be discharged from the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the reserves. The prime minister noted that finding employment for this number of people is not a particular problem since something on the order of 300,000 work places remain unfilled in the Ukrainian national economy each month. Moreover, a number of servicemen possess good civilian skills that will help them to adapt more quickly to the new conditions of life. For others, however, a certain amount of professional retraining is needed, and in many cities specialized faculties have been opened or will soon be opened at the higher educational establishments to retrain specialists with higher education in six-month and nine-month programs so that they can gain a second higher education. In addition, about 400 vocational-and-technical schools are already prepared to handle retraining for working occupations. All spending for this purpose will be assumed by Ukraine in the entity of the employment service.

The leader of the government expressed concern for the status of housing provisions for servicemen. Some 62,000 families of servicemen in the Ukraine do not today have their own apartments, and taking into account rotation of personnel and the planned withdrawal of troops from the groups in 1992-1994, this figure may reach 95,000 to 110,000.

Because of this a very large construction program must be completed. In four years it will be necessary to build

housing with a total area of 6 million square meters. This will require about R7 billion to R8 billion of capital investments.

Major assistance is being provided by Germany; it is planned to use funding from there to build 17 cantonments with 18,600 apartments and more than 100 social and everyday facilities. An Austrian company is already building a housing cantonment of 1,500 apartments in the area of Krivoy Rog city. By the end of last year servicemen had already received 600 apartments there.

V.P. Fokin talked about measures undertaken by the government to organize material-technical support for the troops and provide servicemen with essential goods and foodstuffs.

The first to speak in the debate on the problems set forth in the report of the defense minister and the statement by the prime minister of Ukraine was the commander of Ukrainian border troops, Lieutenant General V. Gubenko. He told those present about the specific organizational work done among the troops over the past four months, since the formation of the Ukrainian border troops. The process of establishing the troops is moving ahead calmly and consistently. The border troops are ready to swear the oath, and nothing unexpected has occurred in this matter. The commander expressed bewilderment about the incomprehensible attacks being made by the mass media serving the center of the former Union. I do not understand people, he said, who do not wish to swear the oath; if they do not want to do it, no one is forcing them. The danger is that they will be doing demoralizing work in their own collectives, harming the general cause.

The commander of a motorized infantry formation from the Transcarpathian Military District, Major General Averyanov, talked about the haste with which, in his opinion, they want to bring officers to swear the military oath. An ukase, he said, is not a law. The more so since officers are concerned about the lack of any law on their service, or a law on pension provisions. The major general proposed that officers be offered service contracts for one to three years, without swearing an oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine, and that during that time the government could resolve the question of their transfer to a new place of service.

In his statement, the commander of a division in the Transcarpathian Military District, Major General V. Grechaninov, noted that many people are trying to justify the need for unified armed forces by pointing out imaginary pluses but saying nothing about the minuses. The speaker categorized those minuses as voluntarism in the leadership of the Armed Forces, the very poor level of professional training for officers, the monopoly of the military-industrial complex, terrible protectionism, and very poor training for personnel in colleges, the production of long obsolete weapons... The many proposals offered included humanizing service, changing the relations between chiefs and their subordinates, changing

the daily routine and the procedure for allowing soldiers and sergeants into the town... The major general reported that 90 percent of officers and warrant officers entrusted to him in the 128th Motorized Infantry Division were ready and want to swear the oath of loyalty to the people of Ukraine. At the same time he declared himself in favor of ensuring normal relations with those who do not swear an oath to Ukraine.

Entering the dialogue, Ukrainian President L.M. Kravchuk remarked that, as the first statements and reactions in the press had shown, the question of the oath is very pressing, and it is therefore necessary to provide some information. The essence of this is that all those living in Ukraine are Ukrainian citizens. No person may be hurt because of national affiliation, and everyone will be equally guaranteed. I would like everyone to understand this and defend the interests of the land on which they live, and the army that must defend that land.

The president expressed bewilderment about the actions of the commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Commonwealth, who, despite the agreement reached in Minsk, has sent to the troops deployed in Ukraine instructions to take the oath of loyalty to the Russian Federation. He made an appeal for open and honest dialogue.

What will be the fate of the school, and will it or will it not train personnel for the engineer troops of Ukraine? This was the question posed by the principal of the Kamenets-Podolskiy school, Major General Sirosh. He proposed giving cadets who did not swear the oath the chance to carry on studying in their former places until 25 July, and then effect an exchange of personnel with other schools.

The commander of a division of strategic aircraft, Major General M. Bashkirov, asked the president to accelerate resolution of the political question of strategic troops and to explain precisely what sort of oath servicemen in the strategic forces should take so that they do not have to make a choice between their means of existence and their own honor and dignity.

The chief of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Military Education Administration, Colonel Yu. Prokofyev, talked about the lag of 50 to 70 years in the system of education. He revealed certain aspects of the reform in training for military experts for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He expressed the opinion that personnel in the strategic forces deployed on the territory of Ukraine should take the oath of loyalty to its people.

The commander of the Ukrainian National Guard, Guard Major General V. Kukharets, reported that today 18 guards units are now ready to carry out the mission set for them by law. All units had taken the oath on 5 January.

The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral I. Kasatonov, stated that there is no political decision on the fleet and that the fleet belongs to the strategic forces.

This resolution will remove the unnecessary tension and confrontation about the fate of the fleet and will promote measures of trust and good relations. The admiral did not respond specifically to the president's question: "What is your attitude toward the statement issued by some Russian leaders that the Black Sea Fleet should belong to Russia?"

Colonel V. Martisoyan expressed the hope that no officer from Ukraine would go to Moscow for the upcoming Officers' Assembly, and that the Union of Officers of Ukraine, which he heads, will do everything possible to strengthen the friendship between the representatives of all nationalities doing their service on the territory of Ukraine. Giving due consideration to the fact that the regiment entrusted to him during the time of the State Committee for the State of Emergency was subordinate to Yazov, and that it was the first to raise the flag of Ukraine and the first to swear the oath, Colonel Martisoyan asked the president to name the unit the 1st Ukrainian Regiment and confer on it the name of T.G. Shevchenko.

The commander of troops in the Odessa Military District, Colonel General I. Morozov, reported that organizational and indoctrination work was being done in units in the district to induce personnel to take the oath. The parents of servicemen and representatives of the public had been invited to the units. At the same time the commander formulated a number of questions concerning procedure for taking the oath by persons drafted in from other regions.

The commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army, Lieutenant General Radetskiy, dealt with the results of studies of the mood of personnel carried out in connection with the problem as it pertains to the Ukraine's development of its own armed forces. More than 60 percent of officers and 85 percent of warrant officers are ready within a certain time to take the oath; this is the main result of work in the units. Many servicemen want to be declared released from their military oath given earlier, and many declared themselves in favor of having a package of laws on the armed forces confirmed before they start to take the oath. The commander himself, a Ukrainian by nationality, had made a firm choice—to serve the people of Ukraine with faith and truth.

The commander of troops in the Kiev Military District, Colonel General V. Chechvatov, believes that it makes sense to create an interstate inventory commission to determine the share of each former Union republic in the building of the armed forces, and then to submit claims for their part of these armed forces. Speaking about the extraordinary fast rate of the processes, the commander made reference to the experience of France, where four years were allocated to equip a brigade withdrawn from West Berlin with services and amenities, while in our case these schedules are several times shorter and the grouping of forces considerably larger. It was stated that at this stage the troops in the district are not prepared to take the oath painlessly.

The commander of troops in the Transcarpathian Military District, Colonel General V. Skokov, stated that in resolving the army question we cannot take into account the actual realities without concerning ourselves with and taking into account the interests of each individual. Within the district there are 15,500 families without apartments, and from 1 February more than 2,000 officers will be receiving money just for their military rank. Therefore, pending the solution of these and many other questions, the commander deemed it premature to take the oath.

Responding to questions at the end of the conference, V.P. Fokin reported to those present that literally there, in the hall, the president and he had decided to pay all officers whose term of payment of salary for duties had expired a monetary allowance on an equal footing with everyone else.

On the same day Defense Minister Lieutenant General K.P. Morozov met with a large group of teachers from military schools.

Desertions Up in Ukraine

92UM0442B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Colonel A. Polyakov under the rubric "Direct Line: Yesterday's Report from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS Correspondents": "A Mechanism for Exonerating Deserters Has Been Perfected—We Are Seeing More and More"]

[Text] Kiev—From all appearances, the oath of loyalty to Ukraine has inspired many individuals to desert. Leaving their units in other regions, they are heading for Ukraine. There is information to indicate that even officers "are breaking into flight."

A special "company of deserters" has been created in one regiment in Kiev where all who have left their military unit are assembled. Already several thousand deserters have passed through this company. And a mechanism for removing guilt from them has also been perfected. Parents make preliminary agreements with the command of the nearest military unit with regard to entering their son on the unit's rolls. Then, after he has deserted his previous duty location, they go with him to the commander and obtain appropriate papers for reporting to the deserter company, as already being officially on the rolls of a certain unit.

Lvov Officer on 'Homeless' Officers

92UM0355A Kiev NARODNAYA ARMIYA in Russian
13 Dec 91 p 2

[Article by Major G. Klyuchikov: "Social Protection of Servicemen: Homeless Continue the Fight"]

[Text] The social organization headed by Captain Second Rank of the Reserve V. Yatsenko is called unofficially the Union of Homeless Officers of Lvov. It originated after the Lvov Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] decided "to stop deductions from all sources of financing being directed at housing construction for the military department, troops of the KGB and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], and also for officers of the reserve." But in an interview with a correspondent of a city newspaper, a people's deputy declared that in his opinion the category of servicemen is in an overprivileged position.

Servicemen of the reserve suffered most of all from this decision; after all, after discharge from the armed forces they ended up practically thrown to the whim of fate. Under conditions of open indifference to their problems on the part of local authorities, retired servicemen, in order to defend their legal rights, joined together in a social organization whose sole purpose is to fight for the social protection of servicemen and members of their families.

Many of the retired officers possess specific skills, including in the registration and distribution of housing. However, the city authorities immediately and point-blank refused this kind of cooperation. They say that they were not born yesterday. Only one route remained—to get what the law stipulates by going to numerous offices.

The members of the Union of Homeless Officers appealed to everyone: to L. Kravchuk, when he came to their city, to V. Fokin, and to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. It cannot be said that all their efforts were in vain. A certain result was achieved. Gosplan [State Planning Committee] of Ukraine paid for 4,000 square meters of total living space for the retired servicemen, which was later reduced by the city soviet to 2,000 square meters.

So, all the results were "trials and tribulations." Repeated appeals to the rayon military commissariats, to the city and oblast military commissariats, to various municipal organizations, and to the commander of the Carpathian Military District brought no result. Up to November 1991 not one reserve serviceman received an apartment.

Although, according to a statement by O. Semkiyev, deputy chief of the city military commissariat on housing questions, Gosplan of Ukraine paid for 4,170 square meters of total floor space for servicemen of the reserve in the city of Lvov. The city military commissariat planned to allocate an additional 3,000 square meters. All told, more than 7,000 square meters (this is approximately 110-120 apartments).

But they split hairs over the plans for so long that, after the increase in prices, the allocated sums could buy a total of 4,235 square meters.

In October the union succeeded in getting the city military commissariat to allocate 75 apartments to it. They began to call the retired servicemen and draw up the documentation. But Yu. Savchenko, chairman of the housing commission of the city soviet, refused to review these documents, inasmuch as, he said, he did not know anything about the allocation of the apartments to the officers of the reserve. So the retired servicemen did not receive even one apartment.

What is more, of the 75 apartments allocated to the union, six have already been removed because the construction plan is not being fulfilled. How can there be talk here about the "overprivileged" position of officers of the reserve! Perhaps such indifference to the problems of this category of citizens will not be encountered in all of Ukraine.

At the beginning of winter 376 apartmentless families of servicemen of the reserve were in line for apartments. Another 30 files were under examination for acceptance for registration. Altogether more than 400 families. The date for getting an apartment was extended to five-six years.

Speaking at a meeting of the Union of Homeless Officers, the former mayor of Lvov promised under oath to assign apartments to all those on the 1987 waiting list. But seven persons on the waiting list since 1987 are to this day awaiting apartments.

What is most regrettable is that some retired servicemen are dying without succeeding in providing their families with their own "roof over their heads." Warrant Officer P. Mudrik died a year ago, but his family is now number 178 on the waiting list.

It is hardly worthwhile trying to show that life is difficult for the military homeless. But in the most difficult situation are those who were discharged into the reserve in 1987-1989; i.e., until the well-known Council of Ministers Decree of 7 September 1989, according to which those discharged into the reserve have the right to reserve an apartment in a garrison and can be placed on an apartment waiting list without showing a certificate on surrender of housing.

Those who surrendered their apartments in garrisons now take shelter wherever possible, paying enormous sums for rented corners. All available savings that were put away for a "rainy day" are spent on this. For the retired servicemen, this day has arrived. In order to maintain themselves, retired officers set themselves up for two and even three jobs—senior watchmen, guards. This is the only way to survive.

But, after all, we are talking about officers who have high qualifications and a lot of experience. But they are forced to use their capabilities in this irrational way because there is an extreme reluctance in Lvov Oblast to give jobs to retired officers.

The retirees, who are accustomed to solidarity and unity, have joined together in a union in order to be able to cope through joint efforts with the difficulties that have befallen them. Of course, a social organization is a considerable force, which is difficult to ignore. Nonetheless, it is necessary to pass a law or a resolution that would place responsibility on local organs of authority to provide this category of citizens with social protection.

The process of the formation of a sovereign and independent Ukraine and its armed forces is in full swing now. This will lead to new reductions and, consequently, to an appreciable growth in the requirements for apartments for those being discharged into the reserve.

If the Supreme Soviet does not adopt an appropriate resolution, the situation with housing space for retired servicemen may become not just crucial but even catastrophic.

Well, in the meantime, the union of apartmentless officers is continuing its fight against indifference and the sluggishness of those who have always seen in servicemen not defenders of the people but an annoying burden.

Ukraine Officers on Housing, Readiness

92UM0464A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
14 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Vadim Fomenko; "'Shoulder Boards Do not Embellish the Shoulders; the Head Embellishes the Shoulders' a Soldiers' Song Says"]

[Text] Mainly people with big stars on their shoulder boards were assembled in the Session Hall of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. And if enlisted men need to be clever, this goes double for their commanders. Particularly today, when passions are being whipped up so greatly around the formation of a Ukrainian army, when every word is like a smoke-puff charge, every sentence literally a Bickford fuse. Here is a word-for-word quotation from a recent broadcast by the Mayak radio station: "The Ukraine is rushing to split up the military pie, but we should not forget that this is a metal-filled pie, and we could break our teeth." And what about the inflammatory articles in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA? I am impressed by the vigorous style of its Kiev correspondent, Olga Musafirova, but why is she increasingly trying to sound like "Machine-Gun Annie"?

The conference participants puzzled over who needs these firing matches, this exchange of accusations? Why can't we sit down and calmly sort things out? The subject, as L. Kravchuk expressed it, is indeed a difficult, subtle, delicate and urgent one, but this makes it all the more important to have a cool, intelligent, clear and sober head.

Colonel General K.P. Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine, compiled his "supporting" report in this deliberative style. He described precisely, in the military

manner, the legislative acts which are the basis for the republic's formation of its army and navy, explained the structure of the armed forces and the missions facing the various branches, analyzed the budget allocated for defense and commented upon the measures approved by the government for the social protection of servicemen and their families. I would like to cite just a few of the figures spread throughout the report. This year the republic's military budget will amount to more than 28 billion rubles; by 1994 it will reach 30 billion, but in 1995... it will be reduced by half. How will this be achieved? With a prudent reduction of the armed forces and weapons, of course, and particularly all sorts of administrative services and educational institutions. While there are presently 34 higher military schools in the Ukraine, for example, soon only nine will be left.

The Ukrainian army being formed will receive constant attention from the people, Prime Minister V. Fokin assured those present. He also cited numerous figures, most of them, alas, not cheerful ones. More than 82,000 families of officers and warrant officers in the Ukraine presently lack housing, and the number will be increased during the 1992-1994 period by many thousands by troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe. The government will allocate 7-8 billion rubles over four years to provide them with apartments, but this will not be enough. The prime minister reported that a Committee for the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families has been set up in the Cabinet of Ministers to find the best solutions to these problems. He stressed the fact that the material and technical provisioning of the defense complex will be at the forefront of the government's attention.

The debate was then begun. Opening the debate L.M. Kravchuk informed the conference:

"No one has registered in advance to speak, and I am therefore prepared to turn the floor over to anyone wanting to speak."

That is how the conference went: Someone in the auditorium would raise his hand, introduce himself and speak from the speaker's platform, candidly and not from a written text, about what was troubling him most.

And there was plenty of this.

Here are a few excerpts from the addresses:

Maj Gen V.F. Grechaninov, division commander:

"The discord in the army began a long time ago. The neglect of military science, the poor training of the officers, the production of long-obsolete weapons... All of this is hurting the armed forces greatly. If, in addition to this, the navy and air force are taken away from our republic, this will set the Ukrainian army back 20-30 years."

Col V.A. Martirosyan, chairman of the Officers' Union of the Ukraine:

"The army must have not only modern weapons but new relations as well. After all, we still have the attitude that if an officer swears at every step—like the deceased Grechko—he is a strong military leader, but if he is polite, he is a wimp. We need to worry not just about the general living conditions of the officers, but also about their spiritual and cultural growth."

Lt Gen Radetskiy, commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army:

"Our army is the lowest-paid army in the world. Half of the officers do not have housing and are forced to pay three fourths of their pay to rent apartments. In addition, 30% of the officers' wives cannot find work."

The auditorium fell into an alarmed silence when Adm I.V. Kasatonov, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, ascended the speaker's platform. The evening before, he had spoken on Central Television and stated categorically that his fleet should not belong to the Ukraine. What would he say in this hall, where almost all of those present advocated the establishment of a Ukrainian army?

The admiral, it turned out, was not afraid to swim against the current. Although Kasatonov announced that he was prepared to help the Ukraine form its own navy, he then abandoned diplomacy and launched a frontal attack. He said that it was not right to split the navy up into strategic and conventional components, that not a single cruiser carrying nuclear weapons would go to sea without an escort of auxiliary vessels, reconnaissance aircraft, and so forth.

"How can we butcher the navy alive, destroy crews built up over the years?" the admiral asked with indignation. "Only 25% of the crew on the ASW cruiser Moskva are Ukrainians. What will I do with the other 75%? How can I force seamen from other republics to swear allegiance to the Ukraine?"

It should be mentioned that on the matter of the oath the admiral was supported by all three commanders of military districts: Carpathian, Odessa and Kiev. Colonel General V.S. Chechevatov, for example, frankly stated that troops of his Kiev Military District were not presently prepared to take the oath, that the process needed to be postponed at least until the end of the year.

"The commanders have surrounded Kravchuk. The president won't escape their claws now," my neighbor, a colonel, whispered.

He did not know Kravchuk though. Calmly and deliberately, with the aid of only one weapon, logic, he broke up the "battle orders" of the commanders and went on the offensive himself.

First of all the president noted that the taking of the oath of allegiance to the Ukraine is entirely voluntary, that there can be no pressure and that people have to work

this matter out for themselves. He emphatically disagreed with those who demanded that the troops first be provided with everything they need and only then turn to discussion of the oath.

"I do not want us to barter with the oath. The oath is more than just apartments, although we must have them. The oath is also honor and responsibility to one's people and a desire to protect them.

With respect to the Black Sea Fleet, L.M. Kravchuk said that this is a complex matter but that we have to resolve it ourselves.

"We will not permit anyone else to do that. The Ukraine must be a sea power. The approach has to be calm and just, however, as demanded by international legal standards."

Protesting subjectivism in the interpretation of the Minsk documents, the president called upon those present not just to watch television and read newspapers, but most importantly to study those documents.

Recent events have shown that the situation in Kiev has become less tense since the conference. The Ukraine's border troops took the new oath on Sunday. There was a meeting of authorized agents of Russia and the Ukraine on the conflict over the Black Sea Fleet, and an agreement was apparently reached. Today, however, 14 January, the general officers' meeting against which participants in the conference in Kiev spoke out so resolutely opens in Moscow. Will the "firing matches" not be renewed?

BELARUS

Belarus Stance on Troop Loyalty Oath

92UM0394A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 14 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by Igor Sinyakevich: "Only the New Recruits Will Take the Belorussian Oath: Parliament Has Placed All Formations of the Armed Forces on the Territory of the Republic Under the Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Belorussian politicians are keeping a very close watch on the development of the Ukrainian-Russian confrontation, preferring not to interfere. But the Russian leadership's decision to administer an oath of loyalty to Russia to servicemen outside of the republic has prompted Minsk to take more decisive action. At a meeting with officers of the Belorussian Military District, Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich said: "Belarus would not claim to take all forces under its jurisdiction.... But whose will you then be? To whom will you present complaints?"

Included as a supplementary item on the agenda of the republic Supreme Soviet eighth, special, session, the military issue became the main topic of debate. Last Friday and Saturday the parliament agonized over the

choice of which it should show preference—national interests or stability in interrepublic relations. Ultimately the members of parliament succeeded in finding a solution corresponding to both.

The parliament converted the Ministry for Defense Affairs into a Defense Ministry, approved the wording of the oath "Loyalty to the Republic of Belarus and its People," and adopted a decree in accordance with which the "military oath is taken by servicemen serving on the territory of the Republic of Belarus who were drafted in November-December 1991 and subsequently." The document says nothing about whether officers will take the oath. But the oath itself, on the other hand, makes it incumbent upon servicemen to comply with the laws of the state on whose territory they will perform their military service. I would recall that the fall draft of 1991 stayed practically in full to serve on the territory of Belarus. Thus the parliament's decision on the introduction of the military oath looks extremely cautious.

The decision on the subordination of the Armed Forces stationed on the territory of the republic was adopted by the Supreme Soviet in a "softened" version. The first version of the decree on this issue submitted by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet specified that formations of the Armed Forces deployed on the territory of the republic would be subordinate to the Supreme Soviet, except for the troops which are a part of the strategic nuclear forces. The decree did not pass in this form. Following additional work, a second version of the draft decree was presented with a number of essential revisions. Specifically, it was contemplated placing the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers, not the Supreme Soviet, and not only the nuclear but also other strategic forces constituted the exception.

Prior to the appointment of the defense minister of the Republic of Belarus, the Supreme Soviet confirmed the authority of Colonel General Anatoliy Kostenko, commander of the Belorussian Military District, entrusting him with control over all Armed Forces on the territory of the republic.

Simultaneously the parliament adopted a statement, which says: "On the question of the fate of the armed forces of the former USSR there is no alternative to a negotiating process.... The Supreme Soviet appeals to all the states which are a part of the CIS to embark immediately on negotiations on the fate of the Armed Forces of the former USSR.... In the event of this negotiating process breaking down through the fault of the other parties concerned, the Belarus Supreme Soviet reserves the right to unilaterally adopt decisions pertaining to realization of the military policy of the Republic of Belarus."

The decisions on defense problems adopted by the Belarus Supreme Soviet mirror the position of the republic leadership as a whole on infusion of the

declared sovereignty with real content. Minsk does not aspire to force events and assigns the honorary, but not easy, role of "trailblazer" to Kiev. Belarus will take the next step en route to genuine independence only when this does not threaten to destabilize the situation.

BALTIC STATES

Lithuania's Butkevicius on Baltic Region Defense Issues

92UN0640A Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
19 Dec 91 pp 1, 15

[Article by Audrius Butkevicius at the Conference of the North Atlantic Assembly on 17 December 1991 in Vilnius, by LIETUVOS AIDAS: "National Security and the Baltic Region"]

[Text]

[Butkevicius] National security is an indispensable condition for a nation's survival and development, a guarantee for its continuity.

In our view, national security encompasses the spiritual, ecological, economic, civil and military defense of the state and its citizens. In a more narrow sense, it includes: the international systems of collective security and the process of demilitarization; the protection of the state against internal and external forces that illegally violate its stability by violence and the use of arms; the protection of the citizens in the case of natural disasters, catastrophes, cataclysms, and the liquidation of their immediate consequences.

In this report I shall speak about our principles for organizing national security, about the potential threats to the Republic of Lithuania during this historic interval and how they can be neutralized, and about what we expect from other states.

We conduct the national security policy of the Republic of Lithuania on the basis of the principle that collective security is the only possible way at this time and that no country in the world can guarantee total security by relying on its own strength alone. Therefore, as we broaden the international contacts of the Republic of Lithuania, our imperative goal is to join the common European defense system. To guarantee national security, we must conclude the necessary international treaties.

The geographic and the political situation of the Republic of Lithuania, its economic situation, and the international links that were developed in the course of history require that we should conduct a policy that would lead to Lithuania's and other Baltic States' joining the zone of stability and trust in Europe. No weapons of mass destruction of any kind would be stationed in this zone; there would be no strategic offensive armaments;

only limited military contingents for strictly circumscribed defensive purposes would be stationed; the primary task should be to solidify the international agreements on disarmament control and enlarged trust.

In our view, the main potential threat to Lithuania's security at this stage of history is linked with the unstable situation in the territory of the Soviet Union.

A look at this century's experience shows that Lithuania was never attacked directly.

In 1918, Soviet Russia maintained that it was sending Red Army units into Lithuania in order to assist a socialist revolution. The government of Poland disguised its seizure of the Vilnius territory with the fairy tale of General Zeligowski's mutiny. In 1939, Germany tore the Klaipeda territory away from Lithuania, justifying this action as assistance to the German minority in the Klaipeda territory. And, finally, the Soviet Union characterized its occupation in Lithuania in 1940 as assistance to the socialist revolution in Lithuania.

We believe that similar methods may also be used today. The rather frequent statements by Soviet military units stationed in Lithuania's territory that they might refuse to carry out the orders of their leadership that are unacceptable to them is nothing else but an attempt to create a myth about "leaderless and autonomous" Soviet army units for whose actions nobody bears any responsibility. Yet, as destructive processes in the former USSR territory are accelerating, one cannot exclude the possibility of the emergence of truly autonomous army units. Should the democratic forces in the former USSR territory prove themselves unable to halt the disorder, the disturbances and the violence may spill over into the territory of the Lithuanian Republic.

We also see as a threat to our security the increasingly more frequent expressions of nationalistic tendencies in the Soviet Union's press, the nostalgia for an authoritarian regime, the activities of one of the political leaders, Mr. Zhirinovsky, who received six million votes in Russia's presidential elections, and the particularly active attempts to popularize the idea of an authoritarian regime in Russia as well as blatantly anti-Baltic attitudes inside the Soviet military units.

Another threat is linked with potential actions of political terrorism. For instance, an accident or an act of sabotage in the Ignalina power plant would pollute the territory of the Republic of Lithuania with radioactive waste. In the event of an explosion at the Kaunas hydroelectric power station, an area inhabited by 94,000 people would be flooded in four minutes... This threat to Lithuania also includes its closest neighbors because ecological dangers have no boundaries.

How could we neutralize these potential dangers?

In our opinion, the most important step in this direction would be for Lithuania to join the zone of stability and trust in Europe. We can achieve this goal by utilizing on

a broad scale the possibilities offered by the Helsinki process. However, this mechanism is very slow and its application is difficult in the event of a crisis. We think that participation in the economic activity of the European Community might provide a minimal guarantee of security. However, the events in Yugoslavia have revealed the limitations of this mechanism.

Following the disintegration of the Warsaw bloc and of the Soviet Union, NATO is changing its role in Europe. Therefore we view with undisguised hope the emerging possibilities of cooperation with NATO.

We think that a mechanism to ensure regional security might play a considerable role.

According to our information, Sweden and Finland are reviewing their traditional notions of neutrality. This could become a premise for the formation of a Baltic Sea countries' security subregion in the European context.

The second very important step to ensure the security of the Republic of Lithuania would be the withdrawal of the Soviet military units, which are illegally stationed in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania.

The following Soviet military units are at present stationed in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania:

The 3rd coastal defense division in Klaipeda, which consists of the 9th motorized Rifles regiment in Klaipeda, the 22nd artillery regiment in Klaipeda, the 86th separate reconnaissance battalion in Klaipeda, the 126th separate tank battalion in Klaipeda, the 273rd motorized Rifles regiment in Klaipeda, the 277th tank regiment in Klaipeda, and the 287th motorized Rifles regiment in Telsiai;

The 7th airborne landing division in Kaunas, which consists of the 6th separate maintenance battalion in Kaunas, the 97th airborne landing regiment in Alytus, the 108th airborne landing regiment in Kaunas, the 119th airborne landing regiment in Marijampole, the 143rd separate Engineers' battalion, the 185th separate air squadron for military transportation, the 173rd separate battalion in Kaunas, the 744th separate SAM-AAA battalion in Kaunas, and the 114th artillery regiment in Kalvarija;

The 53rd fighter-bomber regiment in Siauliai;

The 66th radio technical brigade in Zagare;

The 107th motorized Rifles division in Vilnius, which consists of the 304th separate auxiliary battalion in Vilnius, the 379th mobile artillery regiment in Vilnius, the 640th separate reconnaissance battalion in Vilnius, the 660th motorized Rifles regiment in Ukmerge, the 664th motorized Rifles regiment in Vilnius, the 695th separate rocket battalion in Ukmerge, the 980th separate anti-tank artillery battalion in Vilnius, and the 1400th separate communications battalion in Vilnius;

The 143rd weapons maintenance plant in Kaunas;

The 148th separate heavy transport training battalion in Kaunas;

The 232nd separate civil defense regiment in Taurage;

The 242nd airborne landing training division in Jonava;

The 346th weapons maintenance plant in Kaunas;

The 367th separate helicopter regiment in Kaunas;

The 384th heavy artillery regiment in Plunge;

The 918th reactive artillery regiment in Telsiai;

The 1044th separate landing assault battalion in Taurage;

The 5191st rear warehouse in Pabrade;

The aviation maintenance plant in Panevezys;

The aviation maintenance plant in Siauliai.

The Soviet military units in Lithuania are occupying 68,000 hectares, or 1.2 percent of its territory. They are stationed in all the major cities, including the capital Vilnius.

The bitter historic experience of almost 50 years indicates that, in addition to a direct military threat, the Soviet army raises an additional and very serious threat. It is the ecological, economical and socio-cultural threat.

During April-October, 1991, scientists of the Institutes of Physics, Geography, Botany and Ecology of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Lithuania, who were commissioned by the State Defense Ministry, conducted a special scientific-technological investigation in the former Vepriai rocket site, the airport of the transport aviation regiment in Kedainiai, the tank staging and training ground at Cepkeliai, and the Pabrade multi-purpose firing ground.

The scientists investigated the impact of the above mentioned Soviet military bases on the natural and cultural elements of the landscape, the changes that have transpired and the possibilities for the further use of the areas affected by military technology.

The investigators state that in all these sites the landscape has been distorted. More than 1,500 hectares of soil cover were destroyed at the firing grounds of Cepkeliai and Pabrade, wastelands are spreading.

The military sites thus investigated are polluted with lead, zinc, copper, manganese and other heavy metals whose concentration exceeds the norm in many places by 5-10 times.

The hydrographic network has been totally altered in the Kedainai airport and in the Vepriai rocket ground. The supplementation of an aquifer at the Kedainai airport has been reduced by about 15 percent, or by ca. 120,000 cubic meters annually. The surface waters have been polluted by naphtha products. The permissible norms (of

pollution) have been exceeded 10 times in the Vepriai ground, 3 times in the Kedainiai airport, and 9 times in the Cepkeliai firing ground.

The 4 above mentioned Soviet military objects alone have cost Lithuania 700 million currency rubles in damages.

The former 6 military forestries in the Republic of Lithuania covered an area of 54,603 hectares. The direct damages to the Lithuanian economy, using the prices of 1989 as a basis for an estimate, amount to 1,300,430,000 currency rubles.

This list could be continued. A special threat arises from the fact that the Soviet forces remain uncontrolled by the real masters of the land, while the disintegrating inner discipline has increased the danger of catastrophes and potential damages.

It is still not clear who represents the army of the former Soviet Union stationed in Lithuania and whom it serves? Such a situation increases tension and instability not only in the Baltic countries, but in the entire region.

According to the treaty on the reduction of military armaments, the divisions stationed in the Republic of Lithuania must be reduced. Therefore, in our opinion, the questions of the transfer of military technology and property, of social guarantees for officers and non-commissioned officers, and the removal of the draftees must be examined separately.

On the basis of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, the entire military property in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania belongs to the Republic of Lithuania.

The Soviet military units stationed in the territory of Lithuania must not be supplemented by draftees and those still in service must be demobilized.

In the effort to attain a more effective solution of the social problems of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the former Soviet army, related to their removal from Lithuania, one must know how many officers and non-commissioned officers are leaving Lithuania so that one might be able to estimate the extent of assistance they require.

The above mentioned assistance may be offered by countries that are interested in increasing stability in this region, including Lithuania.

Lithuania could utilize the capacities of its own construction companies to build housing for the military personnel in places where they would be transferred.

Seeking to avoid possible problems, a mechanism must be devised for the removal of the Soviet army from the Baltic States. This mechanism could be examined in greater detail during the discussions.

The third step to increase our security is the creation of our own defense system. The views of the people of

Lithuania concerning this imperative necessity are reflected in the results of the sociological investigation conducted during March-July and in August. The following groups were ready to resist: men - 32 percent in March, 34 percent in July, 51 percent in August. The following were ready to join in the underground activity: in March - 45 percent of the Lithuanians, 19 percent of the Russians, 13 percent of the Poles; in July - 40 percent of the Lithuanians, 12 percent of the Russians, 13 percent of the Poles; in August - 59 percent of the Lithuanians, 34 percent of the Russians, 29 percent of the Poles. The following percentages were ready to wage armed resistance: in March - 25 percent of the Lithuanians, 10 percent of the Russians, 9 percent of the Poles; in July - 26 percent of the Lithuanians, 8 percent of the Russians, 13 percent of the Poles; in August - 35 percent of the Lithuanians, 36 percent of the Russians, 31 percent of the Poles.

Men were more ready to use various forms of active resistance than women: 32 percent of all men were ready to resist by force of arms in March, 34 percent in July, and 51 percent in August.

The contemporary defense system in Lithuania is being developed in the following directions:

1. **Border Defense.** It encompasses the control of the land and sea boundaries, of the economic zone and of the air space.

2,500 people are employed in border defense at present. Plans call for the increase of the border guards to 5,000 people.

The chief problems have to do with personnel training and the shortage of modern weapons.

2. **Territorial Defense.** It includes the protection of important state objects (the nuclear power plant, the railways, the oil pipelines, the lines of communication). About 1,000 people are employed in the protection units protecting such objects at present. Also included is the nucleus of the Lithuanian National Guard. People are being trained each week after working hours according to a special program. They number 12,000 at present.

Some 3,000 draftees are being called up for service in the Lithuanian state defense system.

3. **The Regular Army.** A unit of rapid military response is being formed at present. It now has 1,500 soldiers. Plans call for the increase of this unit up to 5,000 soldiers during the following year.

4. **Civil Defense.** This program provides for the reorganization of the civil defense system that has been functioning until now. Units are being formed that could go into effective action in the event of natural disasters, catastrophes and major accidents. In addition to the nuclear power plant, people would have to be evacuated from 18 industrial objects in Lithuania in case of a major accident. This program has two additional components: information defense and non-violent resistance.

The military conversion program is of importance. Two aviation maintenance workshops, as well as helicopter maintenance, tank maintenance, and military electronics plants are located in Lithuania.

The Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union used to commission military technology, which was manufactured by Lithuanian Academy of Sciences specialists in vibro-technology, cosmic biology and the use of laser technology in the military area. This is a separate question.

An effective program of military conversion in Lithuania is impossible without the methodological assistance of the Western European states.

We think that Lithuania's national security can be guaranteed through active cooperation with the Western states.

Our imperative needs are:

- advisory, expert and methodological assistance to help us create a defense system. We are a small country and therefore we cannot use the great powers' defense strategy or their philosophy for the use of weaponry. In our view, the system of total defense that is used in Scandinavia would also be suitable for Lithuania;
- international control during the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent from Lithuania;
- information links between Lithuania and the European states on the aspects of security;
- training defense system specialists in the military academies of the Western European states;
- material support for Lithuanian defense programs.

The choice of weapons system is not a technological, but a political question. Therefore we all together must find the answer to the most important question for us: who will help to arm Lithuania's soldiers?

CAUCASIAN STATES

Azerbaijan Efforts to Create Army Viewed

92UM0419B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Aydyn Mekhtiyev: "Still No Success in Reaching Agreement With the Military"]

[Text] The dramatic events in Georgia have introduced tension into the political life of Azerbaijan as well. At the republic's Forum of Democratic Forces, the People's Front and a number of other parties adopted a resolution calling for political forces to "refrain from the conduct of rallies and demonstrations during the present period." The demand echoed in that same resolution to "remove all Union Army subunits from Baku" sounds logical in a situation where military units, refusing for the time being to join the armed forces of Azerbaijan, are

becoming a destabilizing factor. And this is not just the opinion of opposition forces. On 13 January at a briefing organized by the presidential press service, Minister of Defense Tadzhammad Mekhtiyev acknowledged that the military command is ignoring the decision of the parliament on inventorying the assets of Soviet Army subunits. Additionally, according to the head of the republic's defense department, an encrypted telegram was intercepted quite recently in which Marshal Shaposhnikov calls upon soldiers and officers serving in Azerbaijan to swear loyalty to the Russian president. The Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense registered its official protest in this regard with the commander in chief of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Armed Forces.

From all appearances, there was no success in reaching agreement during negotiations 10 January at one of the Baku military garrisons between representatives of the republic leadership and the command of Union forces (State Secretary Mitat Abbasov and deputy speaker of the republic parliament Tamerlan Garayev had an extended conversation with Major General Nikolay Popov, commander in chief of the Southern Group of Forces). Thus, implementation of Mutalibov's ukase on the inclusion of most of the Soviet Army forces within the armed forces of the republic is today still problematical.

Disagreement between the opposition and the republic defense department on the question of ways to structure the republic armed forces apparently was the reason behind the recent resignation of opposition leader Fakhmin Gadzhiev from his post as deputy minister of defense. Nor was there any success in achieving cooperation between the minister of defense and the Defense Council of the republic, as a result of which the latter was dissolved.

At the same time that the republic defense department has adopted a wait-and-see posture on the question of the status of Soviet Army forces and is in no hurry to spur events on prior to Marshal Shaposhnikov's arrival in Baku, the Supreme Majles of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic adopted a resolution presenting an ultimatum to the Soviet Army and Border Troops command "to submit within 10 days its proposals on the legal status of the Armed Forces in the territory of the autonomous republic." In addition, the Nakhichevan parliament took control of military and economic structures, demanding as well that it be presented written information concerning on-hand assets of troops—which were prohibited from being taken out of the autonomy. But the deadline of the Nakhichevan ultimatum had not yet approached when it became known that Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov issued a directive to evacuate all equipment and assets out of the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. They managed to take out the air defense assets. However, military motor pools and the local airfield were blockaded by the Nakhichevan police.

Poti Crisis Situation Reported

92UM0442C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 25 Jan 92 p 3

[Article by Captain 2d Rank V. Pasyakin under the rubric "Direct Line: Yesterday's Report from KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and TASS Correspondents": "New Ship Squadron Commander Does Not Rule Out Further Attempts to Seize the Headquarters-Garrison At Heightened Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Poti—As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, Captain 1st Rank Aleksandr Tsubin, ship squadron commander and chief of the Poti Naval Garrison, was wounded during an attack on the headquarters and brought to Sevastopol, where he underwent an operation in the hospital's trauma ward. I visited the wounded man 23 January and can assert that he feels entirely satisfactory.

But the situation in Poti is as follows. Captain 2d Rank Vasilii Kishchin has been appointed the new squadron commander. In a conversation with this correspondent he called the situation in the city tense. Shots being fired has become an ordinary occurrence here. Prefect Tengiz Baralidze submitted his resignation and stripped himself of all authority. Power has been transferred to the "military council"—three of the prefect's deputies. Also joining the military council: the port director and Timur Sigiya, Sukhumi commandant who arrived here. Captain 2d Rank Kishchin told me that as far as he was aware, these people are siding with the former president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia. The supporters of Tengiz Kitovani do not want bloodshed; therefore, negotiations are being conducted between the opposing sides.

But our garrison, the squadron commander noted in conclusion, remains at heightened combat readiness since new attempts may be made to seize the headquarters at any moment.

MOLDOVA**Decree, Law on Carabinieri-Style Militia**

92SD0073A Kishinev NEZAVISIMAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 17 Dec 91 pp 1,3

[Decree: "Decree of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova Concerning the Putting Into Effect of the Law Entitled 'Carabinieri Troops (Internal Troops) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs'"]

[Text] The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova decrees:

1. The putting into effect of the Law entitled "Carabinieri Troops (Internal Troops) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as of the day of promulgation.

2. Within two weeks the government is to submit recommendations for the making of amendments to the legislation that is in effect, in conformity with the previously named Law.

3. This Decree is to go into effect on the day of its enactment.

Chairman of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Aleksandru Moshanu.

Kishinev, 12 December 1991.

Law of the Republic of Moldova Concerning the Carabinieri Troops (Internal Troops) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs**Chapter I. General Principles****Article 1. Carabinieri Troops (Internal Troops) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs**

Carabinieri troops (internal troops) are intended to maintain, jointly with the police or their own forces, public order, the defense of the rights and basic freedoms of the citizens and the private-owner's property, and to prevent violations of the law.

The carabinieri troops, as a component of the organizational structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, pertain to the Department of Carabinieri Troops and execute their functions and tasks on the entire territory of the republic under its administration and supervision.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs bears complete responsibility for administering the carabinieri troops, for organizing the execution of the tasks assigned to them, for training the personnel, for the observance of military discipline and the standard operating rules, and for their material-technical, financial, and medical support.

All the activities of the carabinieri troops have been depoliticized and are carried out exclusively on the basis of and in execution of the law.

Article 2. Basic Tasks of the Carabinieri Troops

The basic tasks of the carabinieri troops are:

a) the constant guaranteeing in conformity with the law, jointly with the police, the measures to protect law and order and to defend the rights, basic freedoms, and legal interests of the citizens;

b) the providing of assistance to the agencies of the police in maintaining public order and in fighting crime;

c) the guarding of corrective-labor institutions and the conveying of arrested and convicted individuals during their travel;

d) the guarding and defense of especially important projects and shipments;

e) the guaranteeing of the observance of the legal rules governing a state of emergency;

f) participation in eliminating the consequences of natural calamities, catastrophes, and other emergency situations.

It is forbidden to involve the carabinieri troops in the execution of tasks that have not been entrusted to them by legislation.

Article 3. Principles of Operation of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops construct their activities on principles of legality, centralized administration, one-man management, social justice, humanitarianism, and the observance of the individual's rights.

Article 4. Structure of the Carabinieri Troops and the Principles of Guiding Them

The carabinieri troops are organized on army principles and consist of the troop command element, brigades (regiments), and territorial battalions.

The structure and numerical composition of the carabinieri troops are approved by the President of the Republic of Moldova.

The units of the carabinieri troops, depending upon the official tasks, can be: mobile-operations units; units for guarding especially important projects; units for guarding special shipments; patrol-post units; units for guarding corrective-labor institutions and providing convoys.

The tables of equipment and organization for the units and subdivisions of the carabinieri troops are approved by the minister of internal affairs.

The administration of the carabinieri troops is carried out by the deputy ministry of internal affairs—the chief of the Department of the Carabinieri Troops—through the unit commanders.

The following individuals have the right to issue orders to the mobile-operations units of the carabinieri for purposes of executing tasks in emergency situations:

- a) minister of foreign affairs—to all units of the carabinieri troops;
- b) chief of the Department of Carabinieri Troops—up to the brigade (regimental) level;
- c) brigade (regimental) commander—up to the battalion level;
- d) battalion commander—up to the company level.

In emergency situations when there exists a clear danger of actions that threaten the security of the state and the life of the citizens, or in the event of natural disasters or catastrophes, the units and subdivisions of the carabinieri troops can be used at the discretion of the commanders of brigades (regiments) and battalions, who

subsequently report to the superior command element concerning the steps that were taken.

The battalion is the basic operational unit of the carabinieri troops, which guarantees the protection of public order in one or more *uyezds* [districts].

The battalion consists of a variable number of companies, platoons, and squads of carabinieri.

A company of carabinieri guarantees the protection of public order in several communes. It is commanded by a senior officer. He has in his subordination a variable number of platoons. In places of deployment he has at his disposition the necessary number of officers to administer and supervise the performance of official duties, as well as a reserve of fixed-period military personnel for the execution of operational tasks.

A platoon of carabinieri guarantees the protection of public order in from three to five communes. It is commanded by a junior officer. He has in his subordination a variable number of squads. In places of deployment he has at his disposition a reserve of fixed-period military personnel for the execution of operational tasks.

A squad of carabinieri guarantees the protection of public order in a single commune and is subordinate to the police precinct. A squad consists of from three to five carabinieri. It is commanded by a noncommissioned officer (sergeant), who is operationally subordinate to the precinct police inspector.

Article 5. Deployment of Carabinieri Troops

The deployment of carabinieri troops is approved by the President of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with a recommendation by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 6. Legal Basis of the Activity of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops in their activities are guided by the Constitution, this Law, by other legislative acts, ukazes issued by the President of the Republic of Moldova, decrees issued by the Government, military regulations, orders, and instructions of the minister of internal affairs and the chief of the Department of Carabinieri Troops.

When executing tasks involving the maintaining of public order and fighting crime, the carabinieri troops are also guided by the Law entitled "The Police" and by other legislative acts that regulate those activities. The interactions between the carabinieri troops and the local self-government agencies are constructed on the basis of the principles stated in this Law. No one other than state agencies and officials who have been specifically empowered by legislation has the right to interfere in the activities of the carabinieri while they are executing their official duties.

Article 7. Obligation of the Officials to Assist the Carabinieri Troops While They Are Executing Their Official Duties

The administrators of state agencies, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and other officials are required not to hinder the carabinieri troops and to render assistance to them while they are carrying out their official duties.

Article 8. Equipping of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops have the following at their disposition, as allocated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs: housing and other structures for the military units and subdivisions; military-training institutions and their material base; plots of land and training areas; and material and financial means intended for the training of the carabinieri and their execution of their official duties.

The local self-government agencies allocate the following to the subdivisions of the carabinieri troops for their permanent or temporary use: plots of land to be used as military housing areas, training areas, or as sites for warehouses, social-cultural and sports institutions, and agricultural structures. The carabinieri troops carry out land use in conformity with the legislation that is in effect.

The carabinieri troops receive part of the profit from the production activity of the projects being guarded by them.

Chapter II. Administration of the Carabinieri Troops

Article 9. Powers of the Minister of Internal Affairs

The minister of internal affairs:

- a) administers the carabinieri troops on the entire territory of the republic;
- b) makes recommendations to the President of the Republic of Moldova and to the Government concerning the numerical size, organizational structure, and deployment of the carabinieri troops;
- c) makes recommendations concerning the appointment of the commander of the carabinieri troops;
- d) appoints, in accordance with a recommendation made by the commander of the carabinieri troops, the deputies to the commander of the carabinieri troops, and the commanders of the brigades (regiments), separate battalions, and training centers;
- e) issues orders and instructions relative to the activities of the carabinieri troops;
- f) under conditions of the legal rules governing a state of emergency, in order to administer and coordinate the actions of the carabinieri units that are being called in to eliminate the consequences of the emergency situations, and also to guarantee the interactions with the other

forces that are being called in, creates, on instructions from the President of the Republic of Moldova, a joint operations staff and appoints a commandant for the appropriate locality.

Article 10. Powers of the Commander of the Carabinieri Troops

The commander of the carabinieri troops is responsible for:

- a) maintaining the permanent combat and mobilization readiness of the troops;
- b) the execution of official tasks and duties, and the combat training of the troops;
- c) the introduction of advanced experience; the reinforcement of the material-technical base; and the guaranteeing of the necessary social and everyday-living conditions for the personnel;
- d) the development of recommendations concerning the organization and structure of the carabinieri troops, and for carrying out organizational measures in conformity with decrees issued by the minister of internal affairs;
- e) the development of plans for manning the carabinieri troops with fixed-period military inductees, and, on a voluntary basis, by contract;
- f) the placement of fixed-period military personnel in the reserves in conformity with orders issued by the minister of internal affairs;
- g) the resolving of questions involving the performance of military service by the officers in the carabinieri troops;
- h) the assigning of officers to positions up to battalion commander and the conferring of ranks up to major, inclusive.

Article 11. Military Council

In the Department of Carabinieri Troops, a Military Council is created as a consultative agency under the commander which works out recommendations dealing with the main questions of activity.

The composition of the Military Council, its organization, and its activity are defined by a Statute approved by the minister of internal affairs.

Chapter III. Duties and Rights of the Carabinieri Troops

Article 12. Duties of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops are entrusted with:

- a) the performing of patrol-post service and the guaranteeing of public order on the territory assigned to them;
- b) the carrying out, in conformity with orders issued by the minister of internal affairs, jointly with agencies of the police, activities to prevent antisocial actions;

c) participation in maintaining public order when mass social-political, sports, and other measures are being carried out;

d) the guarding and defense of important state projects, as well as special shipments, in conformity with a list approved by the Government;

e) the conveying of arrested individuals who are en route to court sessions and back to their place of confinement;

f) the conveying of convicted individuals while they are being moved from corrective-labor institutions to their place of work, and then back again, and also the guarding of the convicted individuals while they are working;

g) the guarding of the depots of their own military units and the warehouses of the Administration of Material-Technical and Military Supply of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

h) participation in guaranteeing the legal rules governing a state of emergency;

i) the rendering of assistance to agencies of the police in quelling violations of the public order if those violations are of a mass nature, represent a threat to the life and health of the citizens, and disorganize social-economic activity, or are directed against a private-owner's property;

j) participation in restoring order in instances of group disobedience or mass riots among persons who have been arrested or convicted;

k) the carrying out, jointly with other forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, of a search for arrested or convicted individuals who have escaped while being guarded by military details, as well as the search for and capture of individuals who have broken into projects that are being guarded;

l) participation in eliminating fires or the consequences of earthquakes, floods, or accidents at the projects being guarded or at populated places;

m) the guarding and defense of the buildings housing diplomatic missions and consular and other representations of foreign states;

n) participation, jointly with other forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in preventing, neutralizing, or quelling actions by subversive-terroristic elements;

o) in the event of war, participation, jointly with the troops of the Ministry of National Defense and other forces, in preventing actions directed against the independence or integrity of the republic; the guarding of the railroads; the evacuation of the population from places that have been subjected to attack; the fight against subversive-terroristic groups; etc.

Article 13. Rights of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops, in the process of executing their official duties, are given the powers of the state authority.

While executing the duties entrusted to them, the personnel of the carabinieri troops are granted the right:

a) to demand from citizens and officials the observance of public order, the cessation of actions directed toward the violation of public order, or actions that hamper the carabinieri in carrying out their official duties, and, in the event of the failure to execute those demands, to apply the coercive measures that have been stipulated by law;

b) to check the citizens' identification documents in the event that those individuals are suspected of perpetrating an infringement of the law;

c) to deliver to the police station any individuals who have perpetrated an infringement of the law, who have attempted to leave the scene of an offense, or who fail to have in their possession an identification document in the event that they are suspected of perpetrating an infringement of the law;

d) to detain for as long as three hours in the official areas of the carabinieri troops any individuals who have perpetrated infringements of the law that are linked with an encroachment on projects being guarded, for purposes of formalizing the documents transferring the offenders to agencies of the police or of national security; to carry out a personal examination of them, as well as an examination of the personal articles that are in their possession, and that are indicated in subparagraphs "b" and "c" and in this subparagraph;

e) to carry out an inspection of ground, water, and air transportation belonging to individuals who have used those means of transportation to violate the rules that have been established with respect to projects being guarded by the carabinieri troops;

f) to enter, in instances that require an instantaneous response, at any time of day or night, the territory or building areas of enterprises, institutions, organizations, juridical or physical persons, and to inspect them for purposes of quelling any infringements of the law that threaten public order or the security of the citizens; to pursue individuals who are suspected of perpetrating such infringements of the law, or arrested or convicted individuals; and in living areas, to quell directly any crimes that are directed against the life and health of the citizens. The procurator is to be informed in written form within 24 hours of all instances of forced entry by the carabinieri into the areas indicated;

g) to cordon off (blockade) rayons, populated places, institutions, and other projects while searching for arrested or convicted individuals who have escaped, while pursuing individuals who are suspected of having perpetrated infringements of the law, while quelling

mass riots or group violations of public order, and also while dealing with other emergency situations;

h) to carry out the personal search of convicted individuals at corrective-labor institutions, as well as arrested individuals while they are being convoyed;

i) to detain military personnel who have violated public order, and to turn them over to the military commanders or unit commanders;

j) to use without any hindrance the transportation means belonging to enterprises, institutions, organizations, or, with their consent, the transportation of citizens (with the exception of transportation means belonging to diplomatic missions or consular or other representations of foreign states, or special-purpose transportation means), in order to travel to a place where a state of emergency has been established, to pursue individuals who have perpetrated an infringement of the law and to deliver them to the police, or to accompany to medical-treatment institutions any citizens who require urgent medical assistance. In the last-mentioned instance, the consent of the citizens who own the transportation means is not required;

k) to use for official purposes the means of communication belonging to enterprises, institutions, organizations, or other juridical persons;

l) to obtain from enterprises, institutions, and organizations the information necessary for executing their official duties.

The damages incurred by juridical or physical persons in the instances indicated in subparagraphs "j" and "k" are compensated from funds in the state budget.

During the period when the legal rules governing a state of emergency are in effect, the carabinieri troops can be given special rights in accordance with the legislation that is in effect.

Chapter IV. Use of Special Means and Firearms

The military personnel in the carabinieri troops, while executing their official duties and defending themselves, have the right to keep, carry, and use special means and firearms.

Article 14. Use of Special Means

The military personnel of the carabinieri troops have the right to use batons; rubber sticks; tear gas; light and sound equipment; equipment to break into areas that have been seized by offenders, and to effect the forcible stopping of transportation; water throwers; other special means; combat methods of carrying out the struggle; attack dogs; armored vehicles and other transportation means in the following situations:

a) while repelling attacks on citizens, military personnel in the carabinieri troops, or other individuals executing

their official duties or their civic duty of guarding the public order or fighting offenders;

b) while quelling mass riots or group violations of public order;

c) while repelling attacks on buildings, areas, structures, and transportation means, irrespective of the individuals or organizations to whom or to which they belong, or, while liberating projects that have already been occupied; and also while repelling an attack on places where military units are deployed or on objectives being guarded;

d) while detaining and taking to the police station or other official area any individuals who have perpetrated an infringement of the law; while convoying and guarding arrested or convicted individuals if they demonstrate disobedience or resist the military personnel of the carabinieri troops or other individuals who are executing their official duties or their civic duty of guarding public order or fighting infringements of the law, or if there exists sufficient justification for assuming that they can escape or cause injury to someone else, and also with respect to persons who have deliberately impeded the military personnel of the carabinieri troops who are executing their official duties;

e) while quelling attempts to seize hostages and while freeing hostages;

f) while disarming individuals who illegally have in their possession weapons, ammunition, explosives, or strong chemicals or poisons.

The use of the special means must be preceded by a warning of the intention to use them, and, if the circumstances permit, the granting of a sufficient amount of time to stop the infringement of the law, except for instances when it is necessary to preempt a sudden attack, to detain individuals at the moment of perpetration of the infringement of the law, or individuals who are suspected of having perpetrated heinous crimes, and also when freeing hostages.

The type of the special means and the intensity of its use are determined by a specially empowered official with a consideration of the situation that is developing, the nature of the infringement of the law, and the personality of the offender. When operating individually, a member of the carabinieri makes his decision independently.

It is forbidden to use special means with respect to women showing signs of pregnancy, individuals with obvious signs of being severely disabled, or to minors, except in instances when they are committing a group attack or are putting up armed resistance.

The list of special means, and the rules for using them, are established by a decision of the Presidium of the Parliament.

Article 15. Use of Firearms

The military personnel of the carabinieri troops have the right to use firearms as the extreme measure in the following instances:

- a) to defend citizens and themselves against an attack that represents a real threat to life and health, and to free hostages and projects that have been occupied;
- b) to repel a group or armed attack on sentries, the places of deployment of military units and subdivisions, the buildings of state and public agencies, enterprises, institutions, organizations, and on the citizens' housing;
- c) to repel an attack on a military or official detail of agencies of internal affairs, or on workers at corrective-labor institutions;
- d) to detain a person who is putting up armed resistance or who has been caught perpetrating a heinous crime, a criminal who is trying to escape from being under guard, or an armed person who refuses to execute a legal demand to hand over his weapon.

The use of a firearm must be preceded by a warning of the intention to use it.

A firearm can be used without the issuance of a warning in the following instances:

- a sudden attack;
- when a person is putting up armed resistance;
- when a person is making an attack with the purpose of escaping, with the use of equipment or ground, water, or air transportation;
- when a person is escaping with the use of a firearm, and also under conditions of limited visibility;
- when freeing hostages.

It is forbidden to use a firearm against women or minors, except for instances when they are perpetrating an armed attack, putting up armed resistance, or carrying out a group attack that threatens the life of the military personnel of the carabinieri troops.

The military personnel of the carabinieri troops have the right to use a weapon in order to issue an alarm signal or to call for help, and also to render harmless an animal that is threatening the life and health of citizens.

In all instances of the use of a firearm, the military serviceman in the carabinieri troops is required to report the incident to his immediate commander for the purpose of subsequently informing the procurator, and to take the necessary steps to guarantee the safety of the citizens and to render immediate assistance to any victims.

Chapter V. Service in the Carabinieri Troops

Article 16. Personnel of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops consists of military personnel and civilians.

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops have ranks, insignia, and a prescribed uniform. The action of the laws that regulate military service extends to them. Military personnel are guided in their activities by the Statute Governing the Performance of Service by the Enlisted, Noncommissioned Officer, and Officer Complement of the Carabinieri Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that has been approved by the Government, and also by the regulations governing the carabinieri troops.

The activities of civilians are carried out in conformity with labor legislation and with the orders and instructions issued by the minister of internal affairs.

Article 17. Service in the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops are manned by citizens of the Republic of Moldova who have been called to active military service in conformity with the legislation that is in effect. The positions of enlisted men and noncommissioned officers can be filled by military personnel on a voluntary basis (by contract) in conformity with orders issued by the minister of internal affairs.

The procedure for performance of service by military personnel in the carabinieri troops, their rights and duties, and the procedure for the conferring of ranks, certification, enlistment, and transfer to the reserves are defined by the Statute Governing the Performance of Service by the Enlisted, Noncommissioned Officer, and Officer Complement of the Carabinieri Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Citizens who begin serving in the carabinieri troops take an oath to be faithful to the Republic of Moldova. The text of the oath is approved by the Presidium of the Parliament.

Article 18. Training of Personnel for the Carabinieri Troops

The training and instruction of officer personnel for the carabinieri troops are carried out at military educational institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at higher educational institutions of the Republic of Moldova, and of other countries.

Article 19. Juridical Status of the Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops

The personnel in the carabinieri troops enjoy the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, with the exceptions and limitations stipulated by legislation.

The personnel in the carabinieri, when executing the duties that have been entrusted to them and that are defined by this Law and other legislative acts, are the representative of state authority and are under the state's protection.

Lawful demands made by a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops are mandatory for execution by citizens and officials. Failure to obey the lawful demands made by military servicemen in the carabinieri troops incurs the responsibility established by law.

The personnel in the carabinieri troops are provided with material support, privileges, and advantages that compensate for the burdens and deprivations of service. They are established by this Law and by other legislative acts.

Article 20. Responsibility Borne By the Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops

The personnel of the carabinieri troops bear juridical responsibility in conformity with the legislation that is in effect.

In the event of failure to execute during the period of their service the duties that have been entrusted to them, the military personnel of the carabinieri troops bear complete responsibility in conformity with the law.

In the event that military personnel in the carabinieri troops have violated the rights and legal interests of citizens, their commanders and chiefs are required to employ measures to restore those rights and interests, to hold the guilty individuals legally responsible, and, in accordance with the law, to make compensation for the damage incurred. In the event of disagreement with the decision that has been made, a citizen has the right to appeal to the court.

Chapter VI. Legal and Social Protection of the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops

Article 21. Legal Protection of the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops

The implementation of the rights and legal interests of military personnel in the carabinieri troops and their family members is guaranteed by the Government, agencies of local self-government, the administrators of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and by the command element of the carabinieri troops.

The individuality, honor, and dignity of a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops are protected by law. The directing of an insult to him, the putting up of resistance to him, a threat, coercion, or an attempt against his life, as well as other actions that hamper his execution of his official duties, incur the legislatively established responsibility.

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops do not bear the responsibility for the material or physical damage inflicted on an offender as a result of his disobedience or his putting up of resistance while being detained.

Commanders, chiefs, officials of local self-government agencies, and administrators of enterprises, institutions, and organizations who are guilty of failure to execute their duties to implement the rights, freedoms, and legal

interests of military personnel in the carabinieri and their family members bear responsibility in conformity with the legislation that is in effect.

Article 22. State Insurance and Compensatory Payments in the Event of the Death or Disabling Injury of a Military Serviceman in the Carabinieri Troops

All the military personnel in the carabinieri troops are subject to mandatory state personal insurance with a total value of their ten-year monetary maintenance, to be paid out of the funds in the appropriate budgets.

In the event of the death of a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops during the execution of his official duties, the family of the deceased serviceman and his dependents are paid a lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of the ten-year monetary maintenance of the deceased. In the event of the death of a fixed-period military serviceman, the family of the deceased or his dependents are paid a lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of his ten-year average annual allowance, but no lower than the average annual wages for the republic as a whole. In addition, for a five-year period after the day of the death of the military serviceman in the carabinieri troops, the members of his family and his dependents are paid his monetary allowance every month. After the expiration of the five years, a pension is initiated for reasons of the loss of the breadwinner, in the procedure established by legislation, irrespective of the amount of the compensatory payment.

In the event of a disabling injury incurred by a military serviceman during the execution of his official duties, or of a disabling condition that has begun during the period of the performance of his service or no later than three months after being discharged from the service, or later than three months if the disability is the result of a disease that occurred during the period of the performance of his service, he receives a monthly allowance until he has become able-bodied, but for no more than ten years. In the event of a disabling injury, a fixed-period military serviceman is paid a lump-sum grant in aid in the amount of his average annual wages, but no lower than the average annual wages for the republic as a whole. After the expiration of the ten years, a pension based on disability is initiated.

The material damage inflicted on a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops or to a close relative during his official activities is compensated in judicial procedure in complete volume from the funds in the budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 23. Providing the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri With Housing and Other Benefits for Them and the Members of Their Families

Housing in the form of an apartment or a separate home is granted to the military personnel in the carabinieri troops in accordance with the legislatively established

norms by the local self-government agencies no later than three years, or to officers no later than one year, after their appointment.

The military personnel in the carabinieri troops have the right to receive interest-free loans for the construction of individual or cooperative housing, with repayment by installments over a 25-year period and the paying off of 50 percent of the granted loan at the expense of the funds in the appropriate budgets.

Units subordinate to the Department of the Carabinieri Troops have the right to purchase housing for the military personnel in the carabinieri troops at the expense of the appropriate budgets, with the subsequent payment by them of 50 percent of the value of the housing.

In the event of the death of a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops while performing his official duties, the family of the deceased retain the right to receive housing for the same justification that prevailed when being put on the waiting list, but no later than one year after the death of the military serviceman.

For military personnel in the carabinieri troops, a 50-percent discount is established when paying for housing and utilities, and also for fuel.

The Department of the Carabinieri Troops forms its official housing fund in the procedure established by the Government.

Fixed-period military personnel are housed in barracks or dormitories for the carabinieri.

Fixed-period military personnel retain the housing that they had prior to induction into the service. They cannot be excluded from the lists of persons waiting for housing or for an improvement of their housing conditions.

Officers, noncommissioned officers, and military personnel who have extended their enlistment in the carabinieri troop, when being transferred to the reserves or retiring, as well as their family members, are provided with housing in conformity with the Statute Governing the Performance of Service by the Enlisted, Noncommissioned Officer, and Officer Complement of the Carabinieri Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Article 24. Providing the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops With Telephones and With Places in Children's Preschool Institutions

Apartment telephones are installed for unit and subdivision commanders and military personnel in the operational service of the carabinieri troops within six months after the day of submitting an application, and for other categories of military personnel in the carabinieri troops (other than fixed-period military personnel) which are defined by the Government and local self-government agencies, with a period no later than three years.

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops are provided with places in children's preschool institutions within three months after the day of submitting an application.

Article 25. The Right of Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops to Receive a Supplementary Paid Furlough

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops have the right to receive a supplementary paid furlough: after ten years of service—for a period of up to five days; after 15 years of service—for a period of up to 10 days; and after 20 years of service—for a period of up to 15 days.

Article 26. The Rights of Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops While on a Temporary Assignment(TDY)

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops who are on a temporary assignment have the right to purchase, without waiting in line, tickets for all types of transportation, and also to get a hotel room on the basis of the official TDY orders.

Article 27. Consequences of Failure to Observe the Guarantees of the Social Protection of the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops

In the event of failure to observe the guarantees of the social protection that are stipulated by this Law, a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops has the right to receive compensation from the funds in the appropriate budget.

In the event of failure to provide a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops with housing within the established deadlines and on the conditions stipulated by legislation, he is provided on a nonrepayable basis the necessary funds to obtain a cooperative apartment or separate home, and during the period until he obtains such housing, he is paid compensation from the funds in the appropriate budget in the amount of the actual expenditures to pay for housing and utilities.

In the event of failure to provide a military serviceman in the carabinieri troops, by the established deadline, with places for his children in a preschool institution, he is paid, from the funds in the local budget, compensation in the amount of the average market prices existing in the particular locality for the services in providing child care.

Local self-government agencies can establish additional guarantees that have not been stipulated by this Law to guarantee the legal and social protection of the military personnel in the carabinieri troops.

Chapter VII. Financial and Material-Technical Supply of the Carabinieri Troops

Article 28. Financing of the Carabinieri Troops

The carabinieri troops are financed at the expense of specially allocated funds in the state budget. That budget also receives funds from the ministries, departments,

enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose projects they are guarding, in conformity with the decrees and orders of the Government.

The medical treatment provided to persons who have been injured and the payment of pensions to the families of deceased military servicemen and to disabled servicemen in the carabinieri troops are carried out at the expense of funds in the state budget.

Article 29. Material-Technical Supply of the Carabinieri Troops

The material-technical supply of the carabinieri troops is carried out at the expense of funds allocated by the Government on the recommendation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The construction of projects or the providing of accommodations for housing the carabinieri troops, and the repair and servicing of them, are carried out in the procedure and in accordance with the norms established by the Government, with a consideration of the peculiarities defined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, at the expense of the funds in the state budget.

The carabinieri troops that are executing tasks to maintain public order, under conditions of the legal rules governing a state of emergency, are provided with housing accommodations, utilities, means of communication, motor transportation and fuels and lubricants, and additional food at the expense of funds from the local budget (*uyezd*, municipality, communes), from which the troops' material losses are also compensated.

Chapter VIII. Monitoring and Overview of the Observance of Legality in the Carabinieri Troops

Article 30. Monitoring of the Observance of Legality in the Carabinieri Troops

The minister of internal affairs carries out the monitoring of the efficient use of the forces and funds provided to the carabinieri troops and the conformity of their organizational structures to the volume and nature of the duties assigned to them, and also the monitoring of the observance of legality in official operational activities.

The commander of the carabinieri troops and the unit commanders guarantee the strict observance of legality by their subordinates.

Article 31. Overview of the Observance of Legality in the Carabinieri Troops

Overview of the precise and uniform observance of legality in the carabinieri troops is carried out by the Procurator of the Republic of Moldova and the procurators who are subordinate to him.

Chapter IX. Observance of the Norms of International Law

Article 32. Observance By the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops of the Norms of International Law While Maintaining Public Order

Military personnel in the carabinieri troops, while performing their official duties, respect the personal dignity, rights, freedoms, and legal interests of the citizens in conformity with the norms of international law and with the treaty obligations of the Republic of Moldova in the area of the protection of human rights and the fight against crime.

Article 33. Observance By the Military Personnel in the Carabinieri Troops of the Norms of International Law in Dealing With Prisoners

When guarding projects and corrective-labor institutions and convoying prisoners, the military personnel in the carabinieri troops are guided by the norms of international law and the treaty obligations of the Republic of Moldova in dealing with prisoners.

[Signed] President of the Republic of Moldova, Mircha Snegur.

Kishinev, 12 December 1991.

Moldova Adopts Military Doctrine

92UM0444E Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Jan 92 p 2

[INTERFAX report: "Moldova Military Doctrine"]

[Text] The Moldova State Department on Military Affairs has developed a military doctrine according to which Moldova may not be a member of any political, military-political, or military bloc, and will not permit its territory to be used by foreign forces for the preparation or conduct of offensive action against other countries.

In the event an external danger arises, Moldova reserves for itself the right to join international military structures and organizations.

ARMS TRADE

Foreign Use of PVO Training Range Considered

92UM0323A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
9 Jan 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel N. Poroskov: "A Hard-Currency Training Range—Will We Be Able To Preserve Its Status?"]

[Text] Almost all year round one could hear foreign conversation at this piece of deserted land along the Caspian. Ingratiating Polish was replaced by chopped up German; the Bulgarian so similar to our language gave way to far-away Spanish; Hungarians echoed Czechs... None of these can be heard here today.

In the mid-1950's the sultry quiet lying over the sand dunes was disturbed by the roar of engines of the first vehicle caravan of military construction personnel. This marked the beginning of the training range's operation designed for improving and perfecting the level of training of Air Defense units and subunits; specifically, for the conduct of combat firing. With time the facility grew into a base, merging three combat training centers—missile air defense, aviation, and radio engineering.

With the beginning of the 1960's, the facility began to greet the arrival of units from member-countries of the Warsaw Pact and other friendly armies outfitted with Soviet-produced combat materiel to conduct firing. Immediately upon conclusion of theoretical training, some of them received new equipment components here and took them home. Priority was given to countries engaged in combat operations—Egypt, Vietnam... Over its years of existence, the training range was visited by representatives of more than 30 countries from Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, and even Latin America. Thousands of foreign specialists were trained here.

To provide links with foreign armies, a department and groups of officers by service branch were created in the Main Staff of the Air Defense Forces. They participated in the development and testing of materiel for export, familiarized foreign specialists with it, and, following conclusion of a sales contract, drew up the technical assistance package inventory. Their obligations included organization of training, development of programs for each country, development of combat operations manuals, and selection of Soviet military specialists to be sent abroad.

All these years professionals from the main command and all three training range centers functioned successfully and reaped substantial dividends for the state (especially the aviation center). Whereas in 1990 there was some usage of training range services by our former allies, in 1991 there was no one who came, in spite of applications submitted.

The reason is seen in the sharply changing political situation—the Warsaw Pact met its demise, some of its former member states intending to join NATO. But the main reason lies elsewhere—in the decision of our government to

exact payment for operation of the training range in hard currency, which is by no means available to everyone. Therefore, some of our subunits which would previously travel to a test site in Asia were rerouted to the former international missile "range." But it is not a full-capacity operation. Nor is the department headed by Colonel P. Rumynskiy operating in the mode to which it is accustomed. What will tomorrow bring? What is the future of the training range?

Colonel-General N. Chukarin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief and Director of Combat Training of the Air Defense Forces, is convinced that foreigners will be utilizing the services of the training range. At least for another 10 or 15 years—the operational life of the armament we have sold. People must be trained, equipment must be test fired, and there simply are not training ranges of this variety in densely populated Europe. Subunits of France and Germany fly to the United States to fire. But even if one of the former Warsaw Pact member states decides to conduct combat test firing on the island of Crete, let us say, it is forced to take along its own materiel and equipment, supplies and logistical support, and target launch systems. And here again, pay in hard currency.

Following events in the Persian Gulf, there has been a tendency for the circle of countries desiring to purchase our air defense missile systems to expand. Consequently there is today a need to think through the mechanics of further cooperation. Colonel P. Rumynskiy believes it is possible to effect partial payment for use of the training range through barter—in a country where there is a lack of everything. (Incidentally, even in previous years, the Bulgarians proposed delivering computers, Xerox machines, and other electronic equipment to the training center—in settlement of mutual accounts). A portion of the proceeds would be allocated directly to the training range—for incentives to instructors and technical specialists, and for developing funds to meet social, cultural, and everyday living needs. The head of the training range many times has had to listen to the justifiable reproaches of those who come—we pay more money but the room has no air conditioning or hot water. Yet today the construction of a comfortable hotel, dining facility, and club has been frozen. People out at the target launch "points," scattered over many dozens of kilometers through the unpopulated, waterless desert, are in dire straits. I was provided convincing evidence of this when flying by helicopter over several of the subunits.

Not the training range, not the Air Defense Main Command, not even the Ministry of Defense have seen any of the money they earned over all these years. It is the USSR Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations (MVES) which has managed the accounting with foreign clients. Training range personnel only managed the accounting reports for inventory and volume of services and expenditures—depreciation of materiel, cost of missiles, targets, fuel, oil and lubricants, transportation expenses, food, and hotel lodging costs. MVES financial specialists converted the accounting into rubles, then "tinkered" with this to convert it to hard currency. In this regard, a separate "tinkering"

was developed for each country—depending on political relations and ability to make payments. The method of socialist redistribution—who will “swallow” how much. The Cubans, for example, were always in a privileged position. The conversion coefficients were kept in strictest secrecy by MVES. All attempts on the part of the Main Command, Inspectorate for Matters of Air Defense to Friendly Countries, or of the Commander-in-Chief himself to get through this secrecy were thwarted. Only recently have we managed to obtain information in a roundabout way—that income from the training range in 1990 amounted to about 50 million foreign currency rubles, as it used to be expressed.

Times have changed. MVES no longer exists. In the course of a month it was organizationally joined with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also was eliminated. Former MVES personnel are not engaged in the arms trade—only in repair work, maintenance and servicing of armaments sold previously, and the delivery of spare parts and instrumentation. The training range has fallen out of the field of view of the department.

Logic would suggest that a renewed and reorganized military department engage directly in foreign economic activity, becoming a kind of intermediary between the manufacturing firm and client country. However, the firms themselves are extremely eager to engage in trade directly. The scientific production association “Almaz,” for example, of academician B. Bunkin—especially after the triumph in Le Bourget of the S-800 air defense missile system. But the firm cannot make do without the participation of military experts—who will engage in the scouting, development of draft positions, equipment placement in the deployment area, and training of foreigners? The most acceptable solution here would probably be a compromise—a single (firm and military department) contract—effecting “turn-key” delivery of the facility, so to speak.

If our equipment is sold, then training firings will be conducted on our training range equipment. The Caspian base could be turned into a training range of importance to Europe, into a trade exchange of new defensive technology with modern air battle demonstrations. (Including, perhaps, for tourists). And, finally, into a training center, replacing the foreign faculties of academies and educational institutions which have grown deserted in recent times.

These are not the dreams of a militarist—they are the reality of today. And they are not illusions on the “New Vasyuki” theme. Orders for 1992 have already come in from almost 10 countries. Iran intends to lease training range equipment for several years with the aim of effecting assembly and installation there. All of this means money—significant money—into the treasury. Decent amounts may be earned in just a single exhibition of export technology along with expert consultation. The charge for these services is high—such is world practice. Just consider that a one-hour lecture from any of our beginning political figures or visiting professors is priced “there” in tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars. The people who work for Colonel P. Rumynskiy are presently

receiving R25, and in “wooden” form at that. Today there are orders for equipment exhibitions with expert consultation—from Germany, Malaysia, Algeria, China, Libya, Morocco, and others. After all, sovereign states which intend to create their own armies also have to search for training ranges or build their own at great expense. And what if Russia finds allies in NATO...?

Everything leads toward the necessity to invigorate and develop the base we have presently. However, the destructive tendency which has become so fashionable in recent years reigns here as well. It would be possible to eliminate the directorate of the base while leaving the centers themselves. Interfering with the mutual interaction here would be fraught with consequences. The history of training ranges (and not only ours) knows instances of destruction of one's own aircraft by air defense missiles—because of a lack of coordination in the directorate.

Industry has ceased production of launch systems for target missiles based on the S-25, although there are still enough of the missiles themselves for another few years. The MIG-29 has been removed from the aviation center—counted toward 1,500 strike aircraft subject by treaty to removal from the European part of the country. But those who come to fire have such aircraft in their inventory. And so it is necessary to transfer squadrons from Asia when training exercises are being conducted, along with their ground specialists and technical support. One can only marvel in reflecting on this paradox.

One quarter of the training range, with its basic structures and airfield, is situated in the Russian Federation; three quarters—the combat ranges and target launch “points”—are situated in Kazakhstan. What do we do—cut up a living thing under the flag of sovereignization? Local authorities have already set down conditions: Firings are not to be conducted during the cattle grazing season—from May through October, i.e., when the training range is in full swing. So military people are breaking the established schedules. Oil industry personnel are coming up from the south...

But they are convinced at the Air Defense Main Staff that if the training range allocates a portion of the monies it earns to the ispolkom [executive committee], the problems will be taken care of. Including the ecological problem. But only under one condition—if an entry is made in the enumeration of paid services for damages inflicted on the environment. Guidance may be found in the Russian Federation law of 11 October 1991 on effecting payment for land. Firing range territory is littered with the remains of missiles and targets, as well as metallic strips of chaff used to provide passive electronic interference; it is polluted with missile fuel components. If funds become available, it will be possible to engage in a purposeful effort to clean up the territory, establishing a special ecological subunit for this purpose.

There is a future for the training range. The problem is to realize its capabilities in a wise and thrifty fashion based on the market.

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